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Mr. Herbert 
The results of the study a r e  presented in three volumes: Management 
Summary Report (Volume I), Technical Discussion (Volume 11), and 
Appendices (Volume 111). 
The Management Summary Report (Volume I) presents a brief, concise 
review of the study content, and summarizes the principal conclusions and 
recommendations. 
condensed, easily assimilated overview for management. 
The purpose of the Summary Report is to provide a 
The Technical Discussion (Volume 11) is the principal volume in the series. 
It provides a comprehensive discussion of the problems of assuring crew 
and passenger safety in  the post-Skylab Integrated Program. 
procedures and the use of "standard" and specially-designed equipment a r e  
treated. 
Operational 
Much of the material presented in Volume I1 was derived through detailed 
analyses. 
Volume 111, Appendices. 
to specialists in the a reas  discussed. 
These analyses and other backup material  a r e  presented in 
The contents of Volume I11 a r e  of interest primarily 
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APPENDIX A 
MISSION MODEL AND HARDWARE DEFINITION 
A. 1 GENERAL 
The Integrated Program is based upon the multi-purpose use of basic 
hardware elements. These include: 
1. A reusable Earth Orbit Shuttle, consisting of a Booster and an 
Orbiter, for crew rotation and passenger and cargo delivery 
into low earth orbit, and for delivery of experiments. 
Space Station Modules with application as 2. 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. Orbiting lunar station 
e. Lunar surface base 
f. Mars exploration spacecraft 
Low earth orbit space station 
Synchronous ear th  orbit space station 
Low earth orbit space base 
3. A Tug for Cargo Transfer in 
a. Earth orbit 
b. Lunar orbit 
c. Between lunar orbit and lunar surface (lunar lander) 
4. A Space Shuttle either nuclear o r  chemically powered, for Cargo 
and Passenger Transfer between low earth orbit and 
a. Geosynchronous orbit 
b. Lunar orbit 
A. 2 EARTH ORBIT MISSIONS 
A. 2. 1 Low Earth Orbit 
Both the Space Station and the Space Base are planned for a 270 n mi circular 
orbit a t  an inclination of 55". 
whereas the crew size of the base is between 50 - 100. Periodic crew 
Crew size for the station is between 6-12, 
A- 1 
rotation and resupply a re  provided by the Earth Orbit Shuttle. 
on-orbit aid in transfer of cargo, as required. 
the station/base is via a crew/cargo module carried by the orbiter and 
equipped with a docking fixture. 
cylinder, 60 f t  long, and cargo weight is nominally 50,000 lb. 
Tugs stationed 
Direct docking of the EOS to 
Cargo volume is  nominally a 15-ft-diam 
A. 2 . 2  Geosynchronous Orbit 
The Space Station in geosynchronous orbit is similar to the Low Earth Orbit 
Station. 
earth orbit by the space-based Space Shuttle. 
orbit aid in cargo transfer, as required. 
It is delivered to  geosynchronous orbit and resupplied from low 
Tugs stationed in geosynchronms 
A. 3 LUNAR MISSIONS 
A. 3. 1 
The Orbiting Lunar Station is derived from Low Earth Orbit Space Station 
hardware. 
and delivered to a 60 n mi lunar polar orbit by the Space Shuttle. 
and crew rotation a r e  provided from low ear th  orbit via the Space Shuttle. 
Delivery into low earth orbit is by EOS. 
cargo transfer and a re  also available for transportation between lunar orbit and 
the lunar surface. 
Orbiting Lunar Station 
It is  assembled in low earth orbit (260 n mi, 31. 5" inclination) 
Resupply 
Tugs stationed in lunar orbit aid in 
A. 3 . 2  Lunar Surface Base 
The Lunar Surface Base is a lso derived from Low Earth Orbit Space Station 
hardware. Component delivery and assembly in low earth orbit depend upon 
EOS and Tug support. Delivery to lunar orbit is  by Space Shuttle, and transfer 
f rom lunar orbit to the lunar surface is by a lunar tug. 
via Tug from the Orbiting Lunar Station. 
Resupply is provided 
A. 4 PLANETARY MISSION 
A Mars conjunction mission was selected for evaluation. Due to the advanced 
nature of the mission, little planning has been done and hardware and mission 
A- 2 
details a r e  vague. 
buddy-system concepts was considered. 
to be delivered to low earth orbit by the EOS and then assembled. Propellant 
was also delivered by the EOS and then stored in an Orbiting Propellant Depot 
until the vehicle was  fueled. 
An 8-man crew in a nuclear-powered vehicle employing 
Vehicle components were assumed 
A. 5 
The foregoing Integrated Program missions and hardware elements are 
summarized pictorially in Figure A-I. 
(Int-21) and various unmanned planetary probes which were not par t  of the 
present study. 
the decision between nuclear and chemical propulsion has not yet been made. 
A listing of documents reviewed (Ref. A-1 through A-IO) follows. 
SUMMARY O F  INTEGRATED PROGRAM PLAN 
Also shown is the unmanned Saturn V 
Although a Space Shuttle with nuclear prop.ulsion is illustrated, 
* 
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APPENDIX B 
HAZARDS SURVEY AND EMERGENCY 
IDENTIFICATION ANALYSES 
B. 1 GENERAL* 
Hazards and resulting emergency situations applicable to the Integrated 
Program are summarized in Volume II. 
present the more extensive results of (1) a literature survey of space hazards 
and (2) those supporting analyses upon which the material in Volume I1 is 
based. 
The purpose of this appendix is to 
The objectives of this effort were to: 
1. Analyze the gross safety hazards to crew and passengers inherent 
in the proposed hardware concepts for, operations of, and inter- 
actions between major elements of the Integrated Program 
2. Analyze potential emergency situations and isolate, where possible, 
those emergencies unique to various phases of the Integrated 
Program (IP). 
In meeting the foregoing objectives, an approach was utilized consisting of the 
following essential steps: 
1. Identify the operations and operational events required by any 
IP element in performing basic mission objectives 
2. Collect and review the data base relevant to manned space flight 
hazards 
3. Identify, categorize, and summarize those hazards resulting from 
the data review 
4. Identify the potential IP emergency situations which may exist due 
to the occurrence of a hazard. 
A major study guideline limited the hazards review to those hazards pertinent 
to orbital o r  space operations. Thus, operations related to pre-launch, launch, 
ascent, and reentry were not considered. 
effort was restricted to a review and updating of previous study results which 
Further, the hazards analysis 
I 
This,Appendix is based on work by M. Hinton and N.  Campbell. 
B- I 
a r e  applicable to the currently projected Integrated Program. 
of the probability of occurrence of any given hazard was beyond the scope of 
the analysis. 
Consideration 
B. 2 MISSION OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 
B.2 .  1 Gene r a1 
The specific objective of this subtask was to identify the operations and 
operational events required by a n  IP element in performing its basic mission 
objectives. 
identifying all major sequences of operations, with particular emphasis on the 
interactions between vatious vehicles. 
operational events that may involve hazards were identified. 
This objective was met by developing functional block diagrams 
F rom these block diagrams the 
B. 2 .2  Results 
B. 2. 2. 1 Missions /Operations Examined 
Figure B - 1 summarizes the spectrum of missions /operations examined. 
Figures B-2 through B-13 a re  functional block diagrams depicting the basic 
mission operations required for each of the elements of Figure B-1. 
Tables B-1 through B-5 a r e  a listing of operational phases and their 
associated detailed on-orbit operations for selected vehicles. 
For  example, Figure B-3 illustrates all of the top-level functional operations 
required of the ear th  orbit shuttle (EOS) in performing the mission objectives 
presently defined for the EOS, from pre-launch operations through ascent to 
orbit, orbit operations, and reentry and landing operations. Table B- I  is a 
summary listing of the orbit operations of the EOS (present study restricted 
to on-orbit periods) together with those operational phases /events required in 
performing the orbit operations (orbit change, docking, transfer, etc. ). 
B. 2. 2. 2 
Inspection of Tables B-1 through B-5 indicates that in order to perform the 
multiplicity of space operations required for the various Integrated Program 
missions, there are a number of "basic" phases o r  events which are required 
Basic Mission Operational Phases /Events 
after placement and/or assembly and checkout in a desired space position. 
As can be seen in Figure B- 14, these "basic" operational phases /events 
range from the standard o r  nominal "on-orbit'' (or  "on-surface") operating 
mode to such unique requirements as retrieval /recovery operations, o r  
hardware disposal operations. 
For  the manned vehicles of the Integrated Program, Table B-6 summarizes 
in matrix format the required operational phases as a function of space 
placement (mission). 
a r e  required to perform in many of the basic operational phases in a variety 
of space placement scenarios. 
in essence a ''space shuttle" which provides transportation to/from low earth 
orbit and the geosynchronous and lunar orbits. 
be chemically-fueled instead of the nuclear shuttle used as a reference 
system herein. 
As can be seen, the space tug and the nuclear shuttle 
It should be noted that the nuclear shuttle is 
Such a Itspace shuttle" could 
B. 2. 3 Summary 
The analysis of space operations and operational phases /events via functional 
block diagrams has shown that all of the manned orbital vehicles in the 
Integrated Program utilize certain basic planned operational phases in 
performing their designated missions. These basic phases include: 
1. On - orbit 
2. Orbit change 
3. Docking 
4. Transfer (crew /cargo/payload/fuel/etc. ) 
Orbit-to-orbit transfer vehicles (such as nuclear shuttle, space tug, manned 
Mars  vehicle) utilize the additional phases of: 
1. 
2. Arriving orbit insertion 
Injection into the transfer trajectory 
Orbit-to-surface transfer vehicles (lunar landing tug, manned Mars landers) 
also utilize the phases of descent/ascent to/from surface. 
B-3 
Deorbit (from low earth orbit) is unique to the EOS, while retrieval/recovery 
is unique to the manned Mars vehicle (MMV) unless the final plan calls for  
direct earth entry for the MMV. 
Disposal operations a r e  not unique to the nuclear shuttle. 
sources a re  used for the space station, both the station and the tug would be 
involved in disposal operations. 
If nuclear power 
B. 3 HAZARDS ANALYSIS 
B. 3. I General 
The particular objectives of the hazards analysis effort were (1) to review 
the applicable gross hazard information contained in the reference data base 
and (2) to systematically collect, integrate, and categorize gross hazards a s  
to source. 
o r  events which can lead to situations affecting life and/or well-being of crew 
or passengers. 
In this regard, hazards were treated as "discrete forcing functions 
It was recognized that a number of "hazard categories" had been defined by 
NASA (Ref. B-  I). These categories (safety catastrophic, safety critical, 
safety marginal, and safety negligible) a r e  summarized in Figure B-15. 
hazards review of the present study was limited to the catastrophic and 
critical hazard categories since the marginal and negligible categories do not 
lead to the requirement for escape o r  rescue, the primary subject of this 
study. 
The 
B. 3 .2  Data  Base 
A literature survey of studies either specifically concerned with the problem 
of space safety of treating safety as an adjunct to examintion/delineation of 
space hardware (e. g . ,  space station) revealed twelve relevant studies 
conducted by ten companies /agencies in the 1963-1970 period. 
companies /agencies a r e  identified in Table B-7 and the specific studies 
a r e  noted as Refs. B-2 through B-13. 
The particular 
B-4 
B. 3 .  3 Results 
B. 3. 3 .  I 
Figures B-16 through B-28 and Tables B-8 through B-15 summarize the 
salient results f rom each of the studies noted above (Refs. B-2 through B-13). 
Specific Hazards Listings 
As can be noted by observation, some analyses were restricted to single 
hardware elements and/or missions (e. g . ,  space station studies) while others 
encompassed a wide range of missions /equipments. Similarly, it is observed 
that numerous terms were used to describe hazards: 
Emergency situations 
Abort situations 
Causes of crew loss  
Hazard threats 
Hazards 
Hazard events 
Credible accidents 
This varied terminology appears to be the result of the particular identification 
technique employed (failure analyses, operations analyses, examination of 
space environment effects, examination of man's  basic needs) and whether 
the analysis was made to determine cause (the forcing function) o r  effect 
(the result of the occurrence of the forcing function). However, when treating 
the t e r m  "hazard" as the causative factor whose occurrence leads to a 
situation wherein the life or  well-being of crew o r  passengers is adversely 
affected, the variously-described factors identified by the numerous observers 
can be shown to have considerable commonality. 
Table B- 16 illustrates this commonality feature by comparing the "hazards" 
listings of several  of the reference studies. 
(due to the identification technique employed), the overall summation of 
specific hazards and hazard groups indicates a definite consensus based on a 
wide range of hazard identification approaches. 
While some listings are restricted 
B-5 
B. 3. 3. 2 Consolidated Hazards Listing 
Inspection of Figures B-16 through B-28 and Tables B-8 through B-15 indi- 
cates that the basic space hazards can be segregated as to those ( I )  internal 
to a given space vehicle and (2) those external to a given space vehicle. 
Figure B-29 summarizes the basic internal hazards and Figure B-30 sum- 
marizes the basic external hazards. These two groups a r e  combined in 
Figure B-31 to present an overall hazards listing applicable to vehicles/ 
missions of the Integrated Program. 
It should be pointed out that the hazards shown a r e  not mutually exclusive, 
and that the occurrence of one may trigger o r  cause the occurrence of 
another. 
where loss of electrical power could lead to a variety of otherhazards. 
This is particularly true of basic subsystem malfunctions; e. g . ,  
B. 3 .4  Sumrnary 
A review of twelve different studies relating to the hazards of manned space 
flight has indicated a consensus as to those gross hazards which may be 
faced. 
Program to the previously-identified spectrum of hazards indicates that this 
spectrum is also applicable to the Integrated Program. 
Comparison of the missions /hardware elements of the Integrated 
Although there was a diversity of nomenclature in defining or categorizing 
"hazards, I '  when the hazard is viewed a s  a causative factor there is excellent 
agreement as to the overall spectrum of hazards as listed in Figure B-31. 
B. 4 EMERGENCY SITUATION IDENTIFICATION 
B.4. 1 General 
The specific objectives of this subtask were to (1) identify those gross or  
general potential emergency situations applicable to the Integrated Program 
and (2) to identify, if possible, those emergencies unique to various phases 
of the Integrated Program. 
B-6' 
I 
The approach followed in this regard consisted of two basic steps. 
the gross hazards as identified in Figure B-31 were converted into gross 
emergency situations by observing the effect resulting from the occurrence 
of each hazard. Second, these gross emergency situations were compared to 
each manned IP element and operational phase for a subjective determination 
of applicability . 
First, 
B. 4 . 2  Results 
B. 4. 2 .  1 Gross Emergency Situations 
As mentioned, the previously-defined gross hazards were examined to deter-  
mine the effect of the occurrence o f  the hazard. These resultant effects were 
grouped as generic situations with which a matrix of resulting emergency 
situations versus hazards was developed, Table B- 17. 
event was assumed to be a non-catastrophic discrete event (no chain reactions). 
Each gross  hazard 
Based on this matrix checklist, the final summary of emergency situations 
is as shown in Figure B-32.  
to IP elements, except for the "inability to reenter' '  category which applies 
only to the EOS. 
As can be noted, the situations apply in general 
B. 4 . 2 .  2 
As a further check on the general validity of the resulting emergency situations 
the relationship between emergency and mission phase was  identified. 
interrelation is  subjective in nature, and although providing some insight 
into the likelihood of emergency/operational phase interaction, does not 
provide any basis for quantifying the probability of occurrence. 
Situation/Mission Phase Matrices 
This 
A summary of the applicability, by hardware element, of the selected 
erne rgency situation categories to the various Integrated Program missions 
is summarized in Table B -  18. 
B-7 
B. 4. 3 Sumxnary 
As indicated in Table B-18, the selected typical gross emergency situations 
apply in "general" to all mission orbits and IF hardware elements except for: 
1. 
2. 
"Unable to Reenter Earth 's  Atmosphere" 
' I  Out - of - Control Space c raft" 
The "unable to reenter' '  category is unique to the EOS (mission/hardware 
peculiar); however, it would apply to the MMV also if direct reentry is 
chosen for  this program. 
The "out-of-control'' category is also restricted. 
to surface-based vehicles (LSB, tug on lunar surface). "Decaying orbit" 
probably applies to all orbits except geosynchronous. 
not apply to stable orbits. 
"Tumbling" does not apply 
"Unsafe trajectory" does 
B. 5 CONCLUSIONS 
As delineated above, the hazards facing the IP program are generally similar 
to those previously identified in space safety studies. 
components (power generation, propulsion, radioisotope heaters and 
experiments) and unique equipment operation (X-ray machines, l aser  pro- 
jections, etc. ) may introduce new hazardous equipment, the basic hazard 
sources have not changed (equipment failure, hostile environment, personnel. 
e r ro r ,  etc. ). 
Although unique nuclear 
Hazards (as causes)have often been confused with the resulting emergency 
(effect). 
occurrence of a hazard) apply "in general" to all missions and hardware 
elements of the IP (except as restricted in Section B. 4. 3). 
The gross emergency situations identified herein (the result of the 
The specific quantitative requirements necessary to deal with any given 
emergency situation obviously depend quite strongly upon the specific missioh, 
hardware element, and phase of the mission. 
occurrence of a hazard as a causative factor to describe the specific needs 
to alleviate the emergency. 
These factors combine with the 
B-8 
In general, however, it can be seen f rom the foregoing hazards analysis 
that any vehicle called upon to provide rescue capability should be able to  
supply 
1. A habitable haven 
2. Medical aid 
3. Life support 
4. A communication function 
5. Emergency power 
6 .  Transportation from the scene of the emergency to a final haven 
of safety 
and may need capability for 
1. Collision avoidance 
2. Radiation protection 
3. Docking to a disabled spacecraft 
4. Arresting a tumbling spacecraft 
5. Retrieving personnel (EVA, spacecraft) 
B- 9 
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.I. 
Table B-7. Data Sources for  Hazard Analysis-'. 
~~~ 
Company 
Grumman Corporation 
Bethpage, N. Y. 
Douglas Aircraft Co. 
Long Beach, Calif. 
Rand Corporation 
Santa Mpnica, Calif. 
North American Rockwell Corp. 
Space Division 
Downey, Calif. 
Aerospace Corporation 
El Segundo, Calif. 
Bellcomm, Inc. 
Washington, D. C. 
Boeing Co. 
Aerospace Systems Division 
S eat t le, W a shin gt on 
NASA Headquarters 
Washington, D. C. 
Lockheed Missiles and Space Go. 
Space Systems Division 
Sunnyvale, Calif. 
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Co. 
Huntington Beach, Calif. 
~ 
Date of Study 
1963 
1967 
1967 
1967, 1970 
1968, 1970 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1970 
1970 
.Ir a- 
Twelve different hazard analyses were conducted by 
10 different companies from 1963 to 1970. 
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LIGHTNING STRIKE/STATIC DISCHARGE 
Figure B-24. Hazard Descriptive Groups (Lockheed, Ref. B-10) 
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Figure B-24. (Continued) 
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Figure B-25. Credible Accidents (North American Rockwell, Ref. B-21) 
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11. 
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Inoperative hatch 
Loss of attitude control capability 
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Figure B-28. Classification of Emergencies (USAF, Ref. B-13) 
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APPENDIX C 
NASA CONTINGENCY PLANNING 
c. 1 GENERAL" 
There i s ,  as yet, no separately-documented, overall safety plan for the 
manned phases of the Integrated Program. There a re ,  however, numerous 
references to safety and safety-related guidelines offered in both NASA and 
contractor documents concerned with the various missions and hardware 
elements of the Integrated Program. The objective of this portion of the 
study was to review the available pertinent documents and provide a general 
summarization of the existing contingency and preventive / remedial plans. 
c.2 DATA SOURCES 
The pr imary sources of data were those NASA documents which define either 
the missions o r  the hardware elements of the Integrated Program. 
category included project description documents, work statements, and 
specific guideline documents. 
with current hardware studies related to the Earth Orbit Shuttle, the Space 
Station program and the Reusable Nuclear Shuttle program were reviewed. 
This 
In addition, contractor reports concerned 
A listing of the specific documents reviewed (Ref. C-1 through C-16) is 
given a t  the end of this appendix. 
c . 3  DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
C.3.1 
c .3 .1 .1  
Specific Contingency Plans 
Earth Orbit Missions 
It i s  proposed that rescue capability will be provided for the Space Station 
and Base in low earth orbit. 
(EOS) a r e  mentioned a s  rescue vehicles. 
Both the Space Tug and the Earth Orbit Shuttle 
* 
This appendix is based on the work of M. Hinton. 
c- 1 
Several tugs a r e  proposed for use in the vicinity of the station, with a standby 
tug always available. 
In the case of the EOS, it is currently defined as having a 24-hour rendezvous 
capability (from notice of station emergency to rendezvous with the station) 
and, further, to be able to complete any required rescue operations (including 
personnel transfer) within an additional 24 hours. 
There a r e  no escape o r  rescue provisions proposed a s  yet fo r  the case 
where either the EOS o r  the manned tug becomes a distressed vehicle. 
C.3.1.2 Lunar Missions 
It i s  also proposed that rescue capability will be provided for the lunar 
missions. In this case, the two major elements--Orbiting Lunar Station 
(OLS) and the Lunar Surface Base (LSB)--are each designated a s  a rescue 
operations base for the other. 
Various configurations of a basic space tug a r e  proposed in lunar mission 
operations, with one "ready status'' tug always available for rescue missions. 
Such tugs a r e  defined to have extensive lunar orbit maneuvering capability. 
It is suggested that a tug always be available at the OLS for descent and a 
tug available on the lunar surface (at  the LSB) for ascent to implement any 
required escape /rescue mission from either haven. 
that a tug in lunar orbit have the capability to return to low ear th  orbit. 
It is further suggested 
If the Space Shuttle (either nuclear o r  chemically fueled) is available in  
lunar orbit it could provide the return-to-earth function also. 
C . 3 . 1 . 3  Mars Mission 
The currently-defined manned Mars exploration program rel ies  totally on a 
pre-planned self-help capability in the event of emergencies. 
capability is provided by configuring the manned Mars  vehicle system as  a 
buddy system with redundant spacecraft, mission modules, and landers. 
This self-help 
c-2 
In the case of spacecraft elements, each is manned by a separate crew, with 
each spacecraft capable of sustaining both crews. 
A spare mission module is provided but the entire crew is in the pr imary 
mission module under non-emergency conditions. 
With regard to planetary landers, two a r e  deployed with a 2-man crew in 
each lander. 
module . 
Each lander has the capacity to return four men in i t s  ascent 
These provisions for self-help via the buddy approach a r e  in consonance with 
previous safety studies concerned with advanced planetary missions. 
C.3.2 Preventive Planning 
Considerable emphasis has always been given preventive planning in the NASA 
manned space programs. 
programs a r e  being applied to the Integrated Program. 
capability and vehicle design provisions have been emphasized. 
back-up, in-flight maintenance, repair o r  replacement, safety-oriented 
system design and component location a r e  arnong suggested features. 
specific examples a r e  delineated below. 
C . 3 . 2 . 1  
The procedures and experience gained in previous 
Crew training and 
Redundancy, 
More 
Ope rational P r ovi s ions 
Examples in the general area of operational provisions to prevent the 
occurrence of emergencies are: 
a. 
b. 
c. Buddy- system EVA 
d. Crew training and capability 
Trajectory shaping (to permit  free-return paths 
to low earth orbit) 
Crew override capability for critical automated 
cont r ol s 
(1) 
(2) 
EOS flown by single crewman 
Duplicate crew capability to perform required tasks. 
c-3 
With regard to nuclear systems, planned operations a re  prescribed f o r  the 
disposal of used systems and components. 
required to stand off f rom other manned spacecraft. 
The nuclear space shuttle is 
C . 3 . 2 . 2  Vehicle Design Provisions 
In the general area of vehicle design provisions to prevent the occurrence of 
emergencies, numerous approaches have been specified. 
example s a r e  : 
The more significant 
a. 
b. 
C.  
d. 
e. 
f .  
g -  
c . 3 . 3  
NASA and 
Redundancy--included in this a rea  a r e  not only the 
fail -operation /fail -ope rational /fail -safe sys  tem 
design requirements for cri t ical  functions but also 
i tems such a s  backup lighting for docking and excess 
o r  spare consumables, etc. 
Maintenance / repair  / replacement 
Safety-oriented systems and subsystems- -including 
malfunction detection systems, self-validating avionics 
systems, radiation protection provisions, micrometeoroid 
penetration detection and location, shielded pyrotechnics, 
materials compatibility, atmosphere consistent with fire 
protection, deactivated "one -time-use'' items, and design 
to avoid accidental damage or  inadvertent operation 
Equipment location- -including separate, isolated com- 
partments for  redundant elements a s  well a s  the isolation 
of high-energy-release equipment from each other and 
crew/passenger quarters 
Remote shutoff for hazard isolation 
Fluid/gas venting and containment provisions 
Multiple viewing ports 
Remedial Planning 
industry references recognize that in spite of all  precautions, 
emergencies can and will occur. Both self-help and rescue possibilities 
a r e  considered. Limited emergency supplies and equipment a re  identified 
and recommendations a r e  made for  spacecraft design features to facilitate 
escape and rescue. 
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C.3.3.1 
The specific operational provisions for rescue and self-help were described 
in Section C. 3. I. In addition, provisions for abort operations are specified 
wherever applicable. 
Ope rational P r o  vis ions 
C. 3.3.2 Vehicle Design Provisions 
In the a rea  of spacecraft design, features to facilitate escape/rescue include 
such examples as common atmospheres, common docking mechanisms, 
multiple access/egress  routes, separate pressure-isolated volumes, hazard 
containment and control, hatches operable from either side, and compartment 
exterior pressure indication devices. 
Also identified is emergency equipment to be carried,  such a s  medical 
facilities, EVA/IVA suits, full-face O2 masks, and portable lights. 
Backup emergency life support and power have also been suggested, a s  well 
a s  EVA support i tems (pre-breathing O2 facilities, provision for return 
of incapacitated EVA crewman, and 2-man a i r  locks). 
c . 4  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Although there is no separately documented overall safety plan for the 
Integrated Program, it is clear that a "de-facto" plan exists. 
all aspects of the safety problem, from preventive measures to action in 
re  sponse to an emergency. 
It encompasses 
It is proposed that rescue capability be provided for both earth orbit and lunar 
missions. Missions will be designed to allow EOS, Tug, and Space Shuttles 
to be available for this purpose. For  Mars mission emergencies, self-help 
appears to be the only solution. Buddy system concepts a r e  being proposed 
for this latter mission, including redundant spacecraft, mission modules, 
and landers . 
c-5 
The plan is, a s  yet, incomplete and must remain dynamic, changing as the 
missions and hardware elements become more clearly defined. At present, 
certain equipment capabilities and operations are assumed without considering 
their  technical feasibility. 
specialized escape and rescue equipment. Furthermore, there is little indi- 
cation of coordinated planning between interfacing major hardware elements. 
Also assumed is the availability, when needed, of 
There a re  no escape o r  rescue provisions specified, as yet, for either the 
Earth Orbit Shuttle o r  the manned Tug. 
.b 
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APPENDIX D 
REENTRY DELAY DUE TO 
LANDING SITE LOCATION 
D. 1 INTRODUCTION* I 
The nature of space emergencies may require a rapid return to ear th  becavke 
of crew injury o r  equipment failure. Irrespective of the mission, the last leg 
of a return to earth is from low earth orbit and is currently planned to be 
via the Orbiter stage of the Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS). 
is, however, not always possible, and waiting periods in space may be 
required before an appropriate return opportunity occurs. 
is determined by the Orbiter position in space, its operational characterist ics,  
and the location of available landing sites. 
Rapid Orbiter return 
This waiting time 
The Orbiter horizontal landing feature implies a landing capability at most 
commercial airports.  However, its landing must, in fact, be restricted to 
prepared s i tes  where appropriate ground support has been provided. 
the landing need not necessarily be made a t  the launch site, a single launch 
and landing site may be operationally preferred. No final selection has, as 
yet, been made. One of the candidate si tes is ETR. Am analysis was there- 
fore made, using ETR as the launch site, to a s ses s  the effect of Orbiter 
crossrange and the number and location of available alternate landing sites 
on the re-entry waiting time. 
D. 2 SCOPE O F  ANALYSIS 
The return opportunities f rom two low ear th  orbits were examined in detail. 
One corresponded to the orbit of the Space Station, namely 270 n mi altitude 
and 55" inclination. The other corresponds to the orbit of the Orbiting 
Propellant Depot (OPD) which provides propellant storage for vehicles 
operating between ear th  orbit and lunar orbit, namely 260 n mi altitude and 
31. 5" inclination. 
Although 
Both of these orbits a r e  subsynchronized with the ear th  
d. *P 
This appendix is based on the work of R. Nagy. 
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rotation to assure  a t  least  one in-plane and in-phase EOS launch opportunitjr 
every day. The resulting ground tracks repeat after 15 orbital revolutions] 
i. e . ,  the tracks for the first and sixteenth revolutions coincide. 
orbit has an additional property in that the regression rate of the orbital plhne 
i s  synchronized with lunar orbital rates and provides periodic departure 
opportunities for transfer to the moon. 
The OPD 
It is  assumed that the Orbiter is in one of these orbits and, following its 
participation in a rescue mission o r  an emergency of its own, seeks to 
return to earth as rapidly as possible. 
considered, each having a different crossrange capability. Although the 
nominal crossrange value is currently 1100 n mi, a lower value of 200 n mi 
and a higher value of 1500 n mi were also examined. The ability of each 
version of the Orbiter to reach selected landing sites from each of the 15 
different ground tracks was then determined. 
landing sites were considered. 
and except for  Ramey AFB, Bermuda, a r e  either within the continental 
United States (CONUS) o r  at U. S. possessions. 
sites are: 
Three versions of the Orbiter were 
In addition to ETR, eight other 
A l l  alternate sites have 10,000 f t  runways 
Included as alternate landihg 
Edwards, Calif. Hawaii Puerto Rico 
Wendover, Utah Wake Bermuda 
El  Paso, Texas Guam 
D. 3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
D. 3. 1 270 n mi, 55” Inclination Orbit 
The return opportunities at each of the nine landing sites considered a r e  
tabulated according to  the orbit number in Tables D-1, D-2, and D - 3  for 
crossranges of 200, 1100, and 1500 n mi, respectively. A n  “X” indicates 
the orbits from which the designated site can be reached for a landing. 
Although individual site availability improves a s  the crossrange is increaskd, 
worst case delays for a single site of a t  least  five orbits (-8 hours) occur 
even at  1500 n mi. These data have been plotted in Figures D-1, D-2, and 
D- 2 
D-3 to show the effect of having more than one landing site available. 
curves a re  presented on each figure, one an optimum combination of sites 
and the other a random selection with Edwards as the second available site. 
Both represent worst case situations for the combinations of sites involved. 
Two 
The effect of crossrange on the worst case waiting orbits for the optimum 
selection of landing sites is summarized in Figure D-4. If ETR is the only 
landing site used, substantial orbital loiter could be required. In the worst 
case, an 1100 n mi crossrange could require an 8-orbit (-13 hours) landing 
delay. 
case, and requires five alternate landing sites in addition to ETR. They are 
Edwards, Hawaii, Wake, Guam, and Puerto Rico. With Edwards a s  the only 
alternate, a 7-orbit (-11 hour) reentry delay can be encountered. 
, 
The minimum delay for this crossrange is one orbit, in the worst 
D. 3.2 260 n mi, 31. 5" Inclination Orbit 
Results for the OPD orbit a r e  tabulated in Tables D-4, D-5, and D-6 and 
and plotted in Figures D-5, D-6, and D-7. For  these latter figures, the 
number of waiting orbits is again the worst case. 
grouping of landing sites for the three crossranges considered is given 
in Figure D-8. 
a substantial orbital loiter delay. 
delay can be as long as nine orbital revolutions (-14 hours). 
augmented by Puerto Rico and Guam as alternate landing sites, then one of 
these sites is available from every orbit and no orbital loiter is required. 
is  interesting to note that with an  1100 n mi crossrange capability, a 
commonality of landing sites occurs for both orbits considered. 
A summary of the optimum 
For this orbit as well, an ETR-only landing site can require 
W i t h  an 1100 n mi crossrange capability this 
If ETR is  
It 
D. 4 CONCLUSIONS 
For  an ETR launch and an 1100 n mi crossrange, no single continental United 
States (CONUS) site offers a shorter landing delay than ETR. Multiple CONUS 
D- 3 
sites offer a 1-orbit reduction in orbital loiter over the single site case but 
still require a half-day delay in the worst  case, which in the case of a 
medical emergency may prove to be intolerable. 
si tes outside the CONUS can a significant reduction be made in this landing 
delay. 
Only by adding landing 
D- 4 
Table D - i .  Return Opportunities f rom 270 n mi 
5 5 "  Orbit - -  200 n mi Crossrange 
t i 
PUERTO 
REV ETR EDWARDS WENDOVER HAWAl I EL P A S 0  WAKE GUAM RlCO BERMUDA 
1 X X 
2 X 
3 
4 X 
5 X 
6 
7 
8 X 
Q 
11 
19 ' 
1 AC I 13 X 
- .  
15 
Table D-2. Return Opportunities f rom 270 n mi 
55"  Orbit - -  1100 n mi Crossrange 
PUERTO 
, REV ETR EDWARDS WENDOVER H A W A I I  ELPASO WAKE GUAM RlCO BERMUDA 
1 X X X 
2 X X X 
3 X X X X 
4 x x  X X X X X X 
5 x x  X X X 
6 X X 
7 X 
8 X 
9 X 
10 X X 
.# 
1 .  
~~ 
13 X x 
14 X X ' X  
l 5 x x  X X X 
D- 6 
Table D-3. Return Opportunities f rom 270 n mi 
55" Orbit -- 1500 n mi Crossrange 
I 1 
PUERTO I REV ETR EDWARDS WENOOVER H A W A I I  EL P A S 0  WAKE GUAM R l C O  BERMUDA 
X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X I I  x X X X X X X X 
6 X X X 
7 X X 
8 X X 
9 X X 
10 X 
V 
X 
V 1 1  
12 X 
13 X X X 
14 X X X X 
15 X X X X X X 
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Table D-4. Return Opportunities f rom 260 n mi 
31.5" Orbit - -  200 n mi Crossrange 
1 
PUERTO I 
REV ETR EDWARDS WENDOVER H A W A I I  E L P A S O  WAKE GUAM R l C O  BERMUDA 
1 X X 
2 X X 
3 x x* 
4 
j 
6 
7 X 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 X 
13 
14 X X 
15 X X 
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Table D-5. Return Opportunities from 260 n mi 
31.5" Orbit - -  1100 n mi Crossrange 
5 X x x  
6 X '  x x  
PUERTO 
REV EJR EDNARDS WENDDVER H A W A I I  EL P A S 0  WAKE GUAM R i C O  BERMUDA 
l , x  X X x X X X X 
2 x  x X ,  X X x x  x X 
3 x  X X X X x x  X 
4 X X X x x  1 
9 X 
10 X 
11 X 
12 X X 
13 X X X 
14 X X X X X 
15 x X X X X X X 
D- 9 
Table D-6. Return Opportunities from 2 6 0  n mi 
31.5" Orbit - -  1500 n mi Crossrange 
I PUERTO REV , ETR EDWARDS WENDOVER HAkVAI I EL P A S 0  JVAKE GUAM RlCO BERMUDA 
, 1  x X X X X x x  X X 
- 2  x X X X X x x  X X 
3 x  x X X X x x  X 
10 X X 
11 X 
12 x X X 
13 x X X X 
, 14 X X X X X x X 
15 x X X X X X X X 
6 X x x  
7 X x x  
8 x x  
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APPENDIX E 
EMERGENCY AV REQUIREMENTS 
E. 1 GENERAL * 
In order to help determine the applicability of IP  elements to an escape o r  
rescue operation, i t  i s  necessary to establish the performance requirements 
imposed by the various IP  missions. 
such requirements, new vehicles would be required to meet these AV 
requirements. 
ducted to determine the range of emergency situations which might require 
assistance from a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV), and to derive the maximum 
performance requirements which each mission class would impose upon an 
SRV. This review of emergency situations was also used to establish per- 
formance requirements which abort of the basic mission would impose. The 
inherent performance capability of the mission vehicle was then compared to 
the abort requirements to determine i ts  adequacy. 
Should IP  elements be unable to meet 
A review of earth and lunar missions was therefore con- 
This review covered both low earth and geosynchronous missions. 
assumed that emergency situations could occur in low earth orbit (LEO), in 
geosynchronous orbit(GE0) and in transit between these orbits. 
not concerned with vehicles in transit between the ground and low earth orbit. 
It 
The review was 
The lunar mission spectrum was similarly examined. 
final destination orbits were  treated, as  well a s  the transit phases between 
them. 
Both starting and 
The emergency spectrum considered included such situations a s  medical 
emergencies requiring earliest  possible return either to earth o r  to an 
intermediate haven with appropriate medical facilities. 
was failure of the main propulsion system resulting in the inability to per- 
form orbit injection o r  orbit circularization, an impact upon either lunar or  
::This Appendix is based on the work of E. J. Rattin and others as  indicated. 
Also considered 
E- 1 
earth surface, o r  in escape into the solar system without return to low earth 
orbit. 
dezvous with a distressed vehicle (DV) suffering a propulsion failure. 
The SRV might have to travel considerable distances to make ren- 
Another objective of this review was to determine where the SRV should be 
based. 
orbit, in lunar orbit, and on the lunar surface. In the instance of earth 
orbits, basing could again be in low earth orbit o r  in geosynchronous orbit. 
Figures E - I  and E - 2  summarize all  the emergency AV requirements 
examined. 
In the case  of lunar missions, basing could be assumed in low earth 
A fundamental assumption underlying the results reported in succeeding 
sectbons of this appendix was that all of the emergency situations treated had 
an equal probability of occurring. 
ment f o r  a particular mission regime, based on a particular emergency 
situation and rescue mode, does not imply a judgment that the causative 
emergency situation had a high probability of occurring and that a rescue 
vehicle should be available to meet this requirement. 
The selection of the maximum AV require- 
E. 2 ANALYSIS 
E.2.  1 
The emergency situations considered for self-help by the DV involved abort 
of the mission o r  a faster than nominal return from either lunar orbit o r  fly- 
by f o r  reasons such a s  medical emergencies o r  subsystem failures. 
discussion of lunar missions will precede that of geosynchronous missions. 
DV Emergency AV Requirements 
The 
E.2.  1. 1 Lunar Missions 
E. 2. 1. I .  I Midcourse Abo rt’g 
Figure E - 3  shows a typical abort situation for  a translunar flight phase. 
After translunar injection, about 17,000 fps is typically available to complete 
.I, 1\ 
This subsection is based on the work of V. Chobotov, Ref.  E- i .  
E- 2 
a lunar mission. 
the earth orbit injection AV a s  well. 
in the order  of 10, 000 fps. 
This remaining AV must cover not only the abort  AV but 
This latter maneuver requires a AV 
Two -return times, representing near extremes a r e  given in Figure E-3. 
The shorter time of 11 hours requires more total AV ( 1 4 , 0 0 0  fps f o r  the 
abort maneuver alone) than remains in the DV. 
itself into low earth orbit, a fly-by rendezvous with an SRV would have to be 
arranged. The longer 52-hour return represents a near  upper limit since it 
is not much shorter than a free return after a swingby of the moon. 
Since the DV could not inject 
If the entire 17,000 fps is utilized, the return time to low earth orbit is about 
35 hours after translunar injection. 
excess of that needed to perform the nominal lunar mission would reduce this 
time. 
Adding AV to the mission vehicle in 
The point along the flight path a t  which abort becomes ineffective in reducing 
time of return, is a function of the remaining velocity capability of the DV. 
This in turn may be a function of the emergency situation itself and of the 
ability of the DV to jettison payload. 
assure  that the vehicle is in a f ree-return trajectory a s  discussed in the 
following section. Very little AV i s  required to s teer  the vehicle into such 
a trajectory, and the secondary propulsion system should be designed with 
such a capability a s  a backup to the main propulsion system. 
Beyond that point i t  is only feasible to 
E.  2 .  1. 1 . 2  
If midcourse abort is impractical o r  i f  the emergency requiring mission 
abort does not occur until after the "point of no midcourse abort, " the 
moon's gravitational attraction will produce a return trajectory. This 
situation is shown on Figure E-4 .  
lunar flight path, i. e . ,  the emergency has not brought about major t ra-  
jectory perturbations, only small amounts of AV (in the order  of 50 fps)  a r e  
required to produce a so called "free return" trajectory. 
Return to Earth without Lunar Injection 
If the DV is st i l l  on the nominal trans- 
Such a return 
E-.3 
trajectory would require about 72 hours after translunar injection (TLI) to 
reach LEO. 
is functioning, the 6000 fps of AV available f rom a nominal mission budget 
can be used to speed this return. If the return time is to be cut in half, to 
about 36 hours, only about 5300 fps a r e  required. 
would therefore be feasible with a functioning main propulsion system. 
If this i s  considered too slow and if the main propulsion system 
An even faster return 
E. 2. 1. 1. 3 Fast  Return to, Earth from Lunar Orbit 
A s  already stated, the nominal lunar return flight time would be about three 
days if  velocity requirements were to be minimized and if the emergency did 
not require a faster return. 
on Figure E-5, a AV of about 3000 fps (no plane change) would be required to 
inser t  the DV into a nominal return trajectory. 
time could be accomplished by the expenditure of an additional 5000 fps, but 
a t  the cost of leaving insufficient AV to perform low ear th  orbit insertion 
(LEOI) f o r  a nominal mission budget. 
with a SRV during fly-by of the earth to rescue the crew. 
E. 2. 1.2 Earth Missions 
E.2. 1.2. 1 Midcourse Abort* 
With the DV in orbit around the moon a s  shown 
A 50% reduction in flight 
This in turn would require rendezvous 
Because of the emphasis on orbital vehicles and emergencies occurring during 
orbital operations, only the abort f rom a Hohmann Transfer to geosynchronous 
orbit was treated in this analysis. 
be required f o r  the EOS during i ts  ascent from the ground and that the require- 
menes f o r  such an abort should be studied. 
It is obvious that mission abort may also 
As already discussed for the lunar mission, medical problems, malfunction 
of the EC/LS, o r  other causes may make i t  desirable o r  necessary to return 
to low earth orbit and to transfer to a permanent haven more rapidly than 
rlr e,. 
This subsection is  based on the work of V. Chobotov, Ref. E-2. 
E-4 
feasible by completion of the HQhrnann Transfer ellipse into apogee and 
return therefrom. 
(HTI) to LEOI on a minimum energy trajectory would require about 10. 5 
hours. It might, in some cases be desirable to abort the mission by the 
application of retro impulse along a velocity vector optimized for shortest 
return time. In the example shown on Figure E-6, the retro impulse was 
applied a t  an altitude of about 2000 n mi; that is ,  shortly after completion of 
HTI. The reduced velocity of approach to LEO from that normally occurring 
when returning f rom GEO, brings about a reduced EO1 velocity requirement. 
As shown on Figure E-7, about 8200 fps a r e  nominally required for a normal 
Hohmann transfer return including a small  plane change at  perigee. 
abort case,  the same plane change requirement exists, since the ascent 
portion of the transfer trajectory i s  performed at  an inclination about two 
degrees different f r o m  that of the starting orbit. If time is not critical, then 
the nominal return (IO. 5 hours) can be used without expenditures of any 
additional AV other than that f o r  LEOI. 
A complete round trip from Hohmann Transfer Injection 
In the 
E. 2. 1.2.2 Fast Return to Low Earth Orbit 
Although nominal return from geosynchronous orbit is only about 5.25 hours, 
the need for faster return may arise. 
transfer time reductions a re  not impressive and require considerable addi- 
tional AV. 
mission budget i f  the return to low earth orbit were made without plane 
change, and LEOI would result in an equatorial orbit. 
rendezvous with an SRV for crew removal and transfer to a space station 
o r  to an EOS orbiter for earth reentry. 
reduction requires an increase in mission vehicle AV s o  that plane change 
capability is not sacrificed and more rapid rendezvous with a safe haven can 
be achieved. 
A s  indicated on Figure E-8,  the 
Approximately 1000 fps would be available out of the nominal 
This would require 
Any really effective total trip time 
E-5  
An optimally fast  return from CEO requires that the plane change and retro 
impulse be applied along the circular orbit track beyond the location on the 
major axis of the Hohrnann Transfer ellipse (line of apsides) at which the 
nominal, minimum energy transfer re t ro  firing would have occurred. 
degnee of overshoot a t  this fas t  return injection burn is a function of the 
desired return speed and corresponds to about 20  degrees f o r  a AV of 1800 
fps. 
point of tangency with LEO at  which the nominal transfer perigee would 
occwr, i. e.,  on the major axis of the transfer ellipse. 
The 
The return trajectory i s  designed to result in a perigee at  the same 
E. 2..2 Space Rescue Vehicle AV Requirementsak 
Table E-1 shows the variety of situations in which aid from an SRV might be 
required and which were considered in this study. 
and E-4 provided the basic information presented in the following sections. 
References E-I ,  E-3, 
E. 2.2. 1 Lunar Missions 
E. 2.. 2. 1. 1 SRV in Lunar Orbit o r  a t  Lunar Surface Base 
E. 2.2.  1- 1. 1 Rescue from DV in Approach to the Moon 
The emergency situations considered under this heading include those in 
which the DV has performed a nominal translunar injection, and perhaps 
also a nominal midcourse correction, but where the main propulsion system 
has failed pr ior  to o r  a t  the time of lunar orbit injection. 
case would return to earth vicinity if in a f ree  return trajectory, o r  i t  could 
be injected into a free return trajectory with use of secondary propulsion. 
However, since low earth orbit injection could not be achieved i t  might be 
desirable f o r  an SRV to rendezvous with the DV near the moon. 
based a t  the Orbiting Lunar Station (OLS) would require considerably less  
AV for such a rendezvous than an SRV based in LEO, Figure E-9. 
The DV in this 
An SRV 
* 
This subsection is based in par t  on the work of V. Chobotov and R. D. Sugar, 
Refs. E- 1 and E-3. 
E-6 
The AV requirements fo r  descent/ascent between a 60 n mi lunar orbit and a 
lunar surface base vary f r o m  about 6000 fps for the coplanar case to about 
12,000 fps for a 90 degree plane change in low lunar orbit, Figure E-10. To 
rendezvous with a DV in a fly-by orbit tangent to and in the plane of the lunar 
orbit requires about 3000 fps when starting from the lunar orbit. 
mately equal AV is required to return to lunar orbit. 
increases to a maximum of 12, 000 fps if the rendezvous point is not a t  the 
point of tangency with the lunar orbit but i s  along the fly-by hyperbola either 
prior to arrival a t  the point of tangency o r  past this point. 
AV requirement in lunar orbit thus exists when an  SRV based on the lunar 
surface must intercept an incoming DV far  from i ts  point of closest moon 
approach and must perform 90-degree plane changes during both departure 
from the ground and return to the ground. This corresponds to the 39,000 
fps AV requirement shown on Figure E-9. Plane change requirements would 
also add to the AV needed for  SRV departure from lunar orbit. 
An approxi- 
This requirement 
The highest rescue 
It should also be noted that plane changes a t  high altitudes impose lower AV 
requirements. Lf allowable rescue mission reaction time permits injection 
into elliptical lunar orbits for the purpose of performing plane changes a t  the 
apogee of such orbits, a considerable reduction in velocity requirements can 
be achieved. This technique is discussed la ter  in this section. 
Figure E-9 shows that the minimum AV requirement f o r  the case  of nominal 
approach to the moon calls for lunar orbit basing for the SRV and return to a 
safe haven in lunar orbit. 
rendezvous with the DV, instead of return to lunar orbit, would require 
little more of the SRV than the case of an intercept of the DV near earth by 
an LEO-based SRV which, in the best case, expends about 20,000 fps. 
Even the return to low earth orbit (LEO) after 
Another requirement for  rescue would occur in the situations depicted on 
Figure E- 11 where a three-burn lunar injection maneuver is only partially 
successful. 
assumption of three-burn rendezvous trajectories taking full advantage of 
The velocity requirements shown here a re  based on the 
E-7 
the lowered plane change velocity requirement if that maneuver is  performed 
a t  altitude. The emergency situation depicted here assumes that the planned 
lunar insertion maneuver involved three burns since the encounter geometry 
requires a plane change in excess of about 10 degrees. 
becomes more  economical to f i r s t  inject into a lunar ellipse, perform the 
plane change burn a t  apolune, and circularize with the Orbiting Lunar 
Station (OLS) orbit a t  perilune. 
injection burn, the DV orbit will not be coplanar with the OLS orbit and the 
SRY from that orbit wil l  have to perform the plane change f o r  rendezvous. 
If the second burn were performed before propulsion failure, then the SRV 
would only need to perform phase matching and inject into the DV orbit at  
perilune, since the orbits would be coplanar. 
In such missions i t  
If propulsion should fail  after the f i r s t  
The most optimum elliptic orbit for  minimum plane change velocity and total 
minimum injection velocity is one with an apolune of about 10, 000 n mi, 
requiring an injection velocity a t  perigee of about 2000 fps from an SRV in a 
60 n m i  ci rcular  orbit. 
the OLS orbit. 
orbital basing for  the SRV, and with the safe haven also in lunar orbit. 
However, even the return to earth by the S R V  i s  feasible, since i t  requires 
about 16,000 fps of AV, which can be obtained from planned Space Tugs. 
The same AV would be required to return the SRV to 
Here again the minimum rescue AV is attained with lunar 
The final group of emergency situations under this heading a r e  shown on 
Figure E-12 and assume that the approaching DV is either going to impact 
the moon o r  i s  on a trajectory that does not return it to earth. 
requirements f o r  rescue a r e  comparable to some of the situations discussed 
for the nominal &pproach to the moon because approach velocities a r e  
assumed essentially nominal. 
The AV 
The off-nominal conditions assumed here  involve primarily guidance e r r o r s  
combined with the inability to perform LO1 o r  course correction to avoid 
impact o r  escape. 
nominal. Disastrous overspeed conditions could exist, of course, but since 
The velocity of a r r iva l  i s  assumed to be essentially 
E- 8 
no rational limit can a t  this time be se t  to such conditions, no consideration 
was given to them. 
In a wors t  case of impact the SRV would have to intercept the DV prior to i t s  
arr ival  on the moon, with a consequent maximum rendezvous velocity 
requirement of about 12,000 fps from lunar orbit. 
the lunar surface, a s  much a s  12,000 fps more might have to be expended f o r  
ascent and plane change. 
fps, and a final return to the LSB with maximum plane change would cost an 
additional 12,000 fps, totalling 39, 000 fps. 
If the SRV were based on 
Return to lunar orbit would require another 3000 
The minimum AV requirement i s  represented by a rendezvous with the DV in 
a fly-by (escape) orbit and with the SRV starting from lunar orbit (LO). 
this instance, only 3000 fps a re  required to rendezvous with the DV and 
another 3000 fps to return to LO. 
the f ree  return case, but assume that the approach trajectory lies in the 
plane of the lunar orbit. 
In 
These AV's a r e  similar to those quoted for  
Plane change would add to these AV requirements. 
E. 2.2. I. 1.2 
Figure E - I 3  shows two of the situations considered under this heading. 
safe haven to which the SRV brings the DV crew can be on the lunar surface 
o r  back at  earth. 
Orbiting Lunar Station, is also valid but requires so little AV from the SRV 
that i t  was not shown o r  analyzed here. 
Rescue from DV in OLS Orbit 
The 
The third alternative, that of the safe haven being the 
As discussed ear l ier ,  i f  the SRV is based on the lunar surface and if a return 
to the LSB is required, the AV requirements might reach 22,000 fps. Here 
again, orbital basing of the SRV represents minimal velocity requirements. 
If the OLS is not available fo r  a safe haven, direct return of the SRV to earth 
after rescue would appear feasible in the sense of not imposing impossible 
AV r equi r ement s . 
E-9 
E. 2.2. 1 . 2  
E. 2.2.  1.2. 1 
An SRV in LEO can react to a DV which is unable to perform LEOI after 
returning from the moon and which therefore is on an escape trajectory o r  
headed for  an impact on the earth surface. Nominally, LEOI from a lunar 
mission requires about 10,000 fps of AV. 
f rom LEO would require a t  least  twice that much, o r  20, 000 fps, to match 
velocities with the incoming DV on a nominal trajectory and then to return 
to LEO. If,  however, the DV approach trajectory is off-nominal, caused by 
overspeed at  t r  
fly-by trajectory the AV requirement on the SRV might increase to very 
Space Rescue Vehicle in Low Earth Orbit 
Rescue from DV in Approach to Earth 
A s  a consequence, a SRV starting 
s-earth injection, and is leading to either an impact o r  a 
large values, well beyond the likelihood of SRV capability. 
no quantitative analysis was performed. 
F o r  this reason 
E. 2.2. 1 .2 .2  
Sending an SRV to the moon would involve, as  a minimum, a AV budget 
identical to that of the basic lunar mission and might exceed it, depending on 
the lunar approach geometry a t  the time of rescue. Nominal lunar missions 
a r e  planned around departure and arr ival  dates requiring minimum plane 
changes on both earth departure and arrival,  and lunar arr ival  and departure. 
Under such optimal conditions, a lunar mission requires about 27,600 fps. 
Since i t  is unlikely that a rescue mission could be dispatched under such 
optimal conditions, an SRV in standby at  LEO f o r  dispatch to lunar orbit 
will  probably need a t  least  an additional 1500 fps if a three-impulse insertion 
maneuver is  performed to complete a maximum 90 degree plane change a t  
LOI. Since this maneuver may take a s  long as  36 hours to perform, other 
insertion maneuvers involving only a double o r  a single impulse may be 
desirable to accomplish rescue in shorter time periods. 
much a s  6000 fps of additional AV may be required fo r  situations needing 
maximum plane change capability. 
Rescue from DV in Lunar Orbit 
1) 
In that event, a s  
E-IO 
More study effort is needed to determine the optimum combination of SRV 
performance with speed of rescue, since additional AV above the nominal 
would also be required to return to an earth orbit accessible to an EOS, 
without excessive waiting time prior to trans-earth injection. 
E. 2.2. I. 2. 3 
If the DV has been able to inject itself into low earth orbit according to the 
nominal mission plan, it will be in an orbit accessible to a space station o r  
an Orbital Propellant Depot (OPD) from which SRV's may be dispatched a t  
AV expenditures in the order of a few hundred feet per second. Lf a more 
rapid mission abort from lunar orbit resulted in an off-nominal lunar 
departure date, the earth arr ival  orbit may differ considerably from the 
station o r  OPD orbit in inclination and ascending node. Some of these possible 
arr ival  orbits may be accessible to a ground-launched SRV. 
if the lunar departure were entirely random. 
will permit it to perform some on-orbit plane change. 
change in LEO is very expensive in terms of AV, i t  is not reasonable to 
assume that totally random arr ival  orbits will  always be accessible to an 
SRV either based in a nominal station orbit o r  ground launched. 
desirable, therefore, that lunar aborts not be random in time but rather that 
TEI be performed at  times that permit earth arr ival  orbits accessible to an 
SRV in low earth orbit o r  ground launched. No quantitative analysis of this 
problem has been performed during this study, nor  were references to out- 
side analyses uncovered. 
Rescue from DV in LEO 
Most may not, 
The AV capability of the SRV 
However, since plane 
It is 
E. 2 .2 .2  Earth Missions 
E. 2 .2 .2 .  1 
E. 2.2.2.  1. 1 
Figure E-I4  shows the problem of an off-nominal DV approach to geo- 
synchronous orbit; it is off-nominal in the sense that overspeed has occurred 
a t  Hohmann Transfer injection (HTI) in LEO and the disability of the DV 
main propulsion system prevents correction of the condition. 
SRV in GEO 
Rescue from DV in Approach to GEO 
A s  a 
E-11 
consequence, the DV is on an escape trajectory and an SRV may be required 
to remove its  crew and return i t  to LEO. This type of emergency is the only 
potentially difficult performance requirement imposed on an SRV by the geo- 
synchronous mis  sion. 
Underspeed a t  HTI would return the DV to LEO automatically, while inability 
to perform CEO1 would also return the DV to LEO. 
SRV in LEO could rendezvous with the DV a t  perigee a t  a total AV requirement 
of l ess  than 16,000 fps. 
requirement would be about 16,000. 
ment would be decreased by about 2000 fps for return to earth orbit haven. 
In the f i r s t  instance, an 
In the second instance, the LEO based SRV AV 
If the SRV is GEO based, the require- 
In the instance of the problem shown in Figure E-14, the AV requirement 
could be large. 
would result in a one-way rendezvous AV requirement of approximately 
5000 fps fo r  the SRV. 
14, 000 fps a t  HTI, based on its nominal mission budget, the SRV require- 
ments could reach unachievable values. Such an extreme overspeed con- 
dition is very unlikely, however. Further study is required to determine 
rational values of off-nominal conditions during approach to GEO, if i t  i s  
desired to size an SRV stationed in GEO. 
An overspeed condition a t  HTI of about 1000 fps, for example, 
Since the DV could have a maximum overspeed of 
E. 2 . 2 . 2 .  1.2 Rescue f r o m  DV in GEO 
As shown in Figure E-15,  it may be required to rescue a crew from a DV 
trapped in GEO. Unless a fast  return is desired, the SRV AV requirements 
a r e  identical to those of the basic mission, i. e . ,  about 6000 fps to re t ro  and 
perform plane change, and about 8000 to 8200 fps to perform EOI. 
problem of fast  return was already discussed in Section E. 2. 1. 2 . 2 .  
additional 1800 fps during retro would provide a rather minor reduction in 
flight time. 
The 
An 
In addition, LEO1 would also be slightly more demanding in AV. 
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E. 2.2.2.2 SRV in LEO 
E. 2.2.2.2. 1 
If the DV is  in a nominal approach to LEO, the SRV AV requirements for 
rendezvous with the DV and to return to the LEO a r e  between 16,000 and 
16,400 fps, depending upon the plane change to be performed at LEO. 
Rescue f rom DV in Approach to LEO 
The case of the off-nominal approach i s  shown on Figure E-16. If a re t ro  
maneuver were performed a t  GEO with an overshoot of about 1000 fps, the 
additional AV required of the SRV in LEO in order  to rendezvous with the 
DV during fly-by would be about the same amount. 
in AV requirement to that for rendezvous. 
Return to L E O  is equal 
E. 2.2.2.2.2 
A s  Figure E-17  shows, the AV requirement f o r  rescue from DV in geo- 
synchronous orbit is identical to  that for the basic geosynchronous mission, 
except f o r  the addition of small amounts of AV f o r  phasing with the DV and 
f o r  rendezvous and docking. 
Rescue f rom DV in GEO 
E. 3 SUMMARY 
E. 3.1 AV Needs of DV to Assist in Rescue 
Figure E-18  provides an overview of the results detailed in previous sections 
for both ear th  and lunar mission regimes. 
compared to the AV available, one finds that, i f  DV propulsion systems a r e  
functioning, mission abort  may be a feasible means of self-help. 
to those emergency situations where the crew is functioning and where the 
cri t ical  DV subsystems allow the crew to remain with the vehicle until safe 
haven is reached. Table E-2 shows that abort to a safe haven can be accom- 
plished relatively rapidly for either lunar o r  ear th  mission regimes with 
available performance margins, and that additional AV augmentation will only 
be marginally useful in reducing return times. 
When these requirements a r e  
This applies 
E- 13 
E. 3.2 
Figures E-19 and E-20 summarize the SRV emergency AV analysis a s  a 
function of DV emergency, SRV basing, and location of final haven. The 
salient characterist ics of these figures have been extracted and presented 
in Table E-3 f o r  lunar missions. This table shows that lunar orbit basing 
leads to the smallest  SRV AV requirement, particularly if the safe haven 
can also be located in lunar orbit. This holds true only f o r  emergencies 
occurring in transit  to the moon o r  while in lunar orbit. Emergencies 
occurring during the return tr ip to  earth must be dealt with by an SRV 
based in LEO. 
AV Needs of SRV to Perform Rescue Mission 
Table E-4 shows that f o r  emergencies occurring on the way to geosynchronous 
orbit o r  in CEO, SRV basing in GEO imposes the minimum AV requirement. 
SRV basing in LEO in addition to GEO appears unnecessary. The Hohmann 
Transfer orbit is a repeating orbit; i. e . ,  if LEO1 i s  not performed, the DV 
returns to GEO in the original transfer ellipse which repeats until orbit 
degradation at  perigee al ters  the trajectory. 
about 10.5 hours of travel; therefore, ascent to CEO o r  return from CEO 
requires about 5.25 hours. If, therefore, main propulsion failure of the DV 
prevents i ts  insertion into LEO when returning from CEO, i t  may receive aid 
f rom the SRV based in GEO by waiting about 5 .25  hours, o r  some multiple 
thereof, until the trajectory returns the DV to GEO at a longitude accessible 
to the SRV. 
i s  in a true synchronous orbit, its period is 24 hours and i t  will have moved 
a considerable distance from the apogee of the repeating Hohmann Transfer 
orbit by the time the DV returns to GEO 10. 5 hours after leaving. The SRV 
will therefore have to enter a phasing orbit such that it can rendezvous with 
the DV on the latter 's  second o r  third return to CEO. 
The total orbit ellipse requires 
The longer waiting periods may be needed because, if the SRV 
E- 14 
E. 3. 3 Concluding Remarks 
The data presented in this appendix represent only an overview of the main 
classes of emergency AV requirements. 
be considered in sizing the propulsion capability of an SRV, and in deter- 
mining preferred basing concepts. 
time and the relative capabilities of available safe havens. 
the considerations involved in basing the SRV will  be the relative probability 
of events requiring rescue, i. e. ,  the probabilities of main propulsion failure, 
guidance failure, etc. 
A great variety of situations must 
Such decisions must also consider access 
Not the least  of 
Additional study recommendations include the search for  repeating lunar 
orbits which would return the DV to the vicinity of the moon in the event 
LEO1 could not be performed. 
orbit would be considerably less  demanding of SRV performance capability 
than rescue near earth. 
This would be useful since rescue from lunar 
Further detailed attention should also be given to the problem of accidental 
cverspeed a t  HTI, o r  re t ro  from GEO, and the likely values of AV required 
of the rescue vehicle in those instances. 
E- 15 
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APPENDIX F 
DECOMPRESSION SICKNESS* 
F. 1 GENERAL 
The analysis of the hardware and operational requirements of a space rescue 
vehicle (SRV) disclosed a number of operational paths which involved EVA 
for either or  both the rescue crew and the crew of the distressed vehicle 
(DV). 
control phases as well as the actual rescue phase, while the DV crew might 
require EVA in transferring to the rescue vehicle. 
associated with these operational phases led to consideration of the decom- 
pression sickness problem since it affected the rapidity with which rescue 
operations could be performed. Additionally, this problem could affect the 
mobility of the rescue crew and the nature of the transfer equipment provided 
for ill o r  injured crew members.  
The rescue crew could require EVA during the inspection and damage 
A review of the timelines 
The decompression sickness problem stems from the decision that hardware 
elements of the Integrated Program (IP) such as the Earth Orbit Shuttle and 
the Space Station/Base will operate with an oxygen/nitrogen atmosphere 
approximating standard atmospheric conditions; i. e. , with total pressure of 
14. 7 psia and oxygen partial  p ressure  of 3. 1 psia. 
however, provides an atmosphere of 3.5 - 4 psia of pure oxygen. 
transition from cabin to suit can therefore subject the crew to various degrees 
of dysbarism (decompression sickness). 
transition may be desirable and means to permit it a r e  desirable. 
Current space suit design, 
Sudden 
In a rescue situation such sudden 
In this study consideration was  given to several alternate means of avoiding 
decompression sickness, with emphasis on means which would allow rapid 
acclimation and thus reduce the time periods required to attain EVA capability. 
2< 
This appendix i s  based on the work of M. Donabedian, Ref. F-1. 
F- 1 
F. 2 SYMPTOMS AND SUSCEPTIBILITY 
The te rm "decompression sickness" will be used in a general sense to cover 
the various physiological effects resulting from reduction in barometric 
pressure.  
Of specific interest a r e  the effects of gases, primarily nitrogen, evolving 
from body fluids and tissues, and resulting in such symptoms a s  bends and 
chokes, and in skin and neurological effects. 
symptom, is characterized by deep pain in bones, joints, and muscles of the 
extremities, including hips and shoulders. Chokes, the next most common 
symptom, i s  characterized by a burning sensation in the chest, and by 
coughing and respiratory distress.  Skin symptoms, characterized by tingling, 
itching, etc. , and neurological problems (which occasionally result in head- 
aches, fainting, blurred vision, etc. ) a r e  much less  frequent. 
symptoms include abdominal pain resulting from trapped and expanding gas, 
and barodontalgia - -  a painful condition of the jaws and teeth brought on by 
lowered atmospheric pres  sure. 
Bends, the most common 
Other 
The incidence of o r  susceptibility to bends is dependent upon a number of 
factors including (a) the ratio of the pressure change (significant if  ratio of 
initial to final pressure exceeds two, (b) final pressure,  (c) exposure time, 
(d) physical activity, (e) the ratio of body fat to lean body mass,  ( f )  age, and 
(g) individual physiological variables. 
The relative severity of bends has been classified into four grades (Ref. F-2) 
a s  follows: (a) Grade I - -  intermittent or  mild symptoms, tingling sensations 
and fleeting pains, (b) Grade I1 - -  moderate to severe symptoms not requiring 
abort of mission, pain moderate but not constant, (c) Grade I11 - -  severe 
symptoms requiring abort, pain intolerable, unable to work, (d) Grade IV - -  
severe sickness. Under normal activity, the probability of decompression 
sickness is very low at equivalent pressure altitudes below 23, 000 ft (5. 9 
psia). With increased activity, incidence of decompression sickness, and 
F - 2  
specifically bends, has  been observed at pressure  altitudes as low as 
17, 000 ft (7.65 psia). 
tibility to decompression sickness with age. 
There is generally a positive correlation of suscep- 
A number of studies have been made to a s ses s  the r isk of bends resulting 
from decompression to 3.5 psia oxygen from pressures  ranging from 5 to 
14. 7 psia mixed gas atmosphere. Several semi-empirical equations have 
been proposed for f i r s t  order prediction of bends frequency after decom- 
pression from these atmospheres (Refs. F-3, F-4, and F-5). 
Semi-empirical equations of Ref. F-5 suggest that after reaching total equili- 
brium in a 7 psia 50 percent nitrogen, 50 percent oxygen environment, a 
well conditioned astronaut, when decompressed to 3.  5 psia oxygen at res t ,  
will have less than a one percent chance of experiencing mild Grade I o r  I1 
bends. 
about 7 percent. 
and conditioning, the bends incidence rate  in an exercise environment would 
be between 10 to 15 percent. If the suit p ressure  were raised to 5 psia, the 
bends incidence ra te  would drop by a factor of 3. 
a 5 psia, 30 percent nitrogen, 70 percent oxygen environment, with subsequent 
decompression to 3. 5 psia, would probably not result  in symptoms with even 
heavy exercise. 
If moderate exercise is imposed, the incidence rate would rise to  
For  the general population with only average physical status 
Complete equilibrium with 
In comparison, direct  decompression f rom air at sea  level pressure  to  3. 5 
psia oxygen presents a more  serious hazard. 
subjects would probably experience the bends. 
exercise, f rom 50 to 100 percent of individuals exposed could experience 
moderate to severe bends. 
symptoms experience the symptoms between 20 and 60 minutes after exposure. 
Very few subjects show susceptibility to  decompression sickness after enduring 
2 to 3 hours of exposure without symptoms. 
At res t ,  about 25 percent of the 
Depending on the degree of 
Experimental data show that most subjects with 
F-3 
F. 3 PREVENTION 
F. 3.1 
F. 3.  1.1 Physiology 
D e - nit r o g enation 
The incidence of bends can be effectively reduced and incapacitation prevented 
by adequate de-nitrogenation before exposure to lower pressures .  The ability 
of a tissue to reduce its nitrogen concentration depends primarily upon the 
circulation of the blood and the type and condition of the tissue. Breathing 
pure oxygen at sea  level p re s su re  is a most efficient means of removing 
nitrogen from the body. Total removal of nitrogen is possible by exposure 
to  100 percent oxygen atmospheres f o r  periods above 16 hours, which will 
reduce the incidence of bends to zero. 
result in progressively greater  incidence of bends. 
nitrogenation depends on the t ime, the difference in partial  pressure of the 
nitrogen, t issue,  age, and body condition. 
function of oxygen pre-breathing is typically shown in Figure F- 1, which is 
based on data f rom Refs. F-6 and F-7. 
Shorter t ime periods of de-nitrogenation 
The rate  of de- 
The incidence of bends as a 
Based on a l i terature review, the following general  observations can be made: 
(a) De-nitrogenation follows an exponential rate. Approximately 50 
percent de-nitrogenation is accomplished in a period of 30 minutes 
to one hour in a 100 percent oxygen atmosphere a t  sea level 
pres  sure .  
De-nitrogenation ra tes  differ both between individuals and with 
the same individual f rom day to day. 
de-nitrogenation are generally more  resistant to  decompression 
sickness symptoms than a r e  other subjects. 
In some cases ,  breathing 100 percent oxygen up to approximately 
20,000 ft (6. 8 psia) is nearly as effective in  giving protection 
against bends and chokes as de-nitrogenation at ground level, but 
the effectivity can vary greatly. 
It has been found that approximately four hours of pre-breathing 
of 100 percent oxygen a r e  necessary to  completely protect more 
susceptible individuals who a r e  expected to be active at  a reduced 
pressure  of 3.  5 psia. One o r  two hours of oxygen inhalation offer 
relatively complete protection from bends when activity is limited. 
(b) 
Subjects with a high rate of 
(c) 
(d) 
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F. 3. 1. 2 
De-nitrogenation (oxygen pre-breathing) will have the greatest usefulness in 
missions initiated specifically for space rescue. If rescue team members 
anticipate the requirement for extensive EVA, planning for approximately 
four hours of oxygen pre-breathing is required. 
effective method of pre-breathing would be to  utilize a demand type oxygen 
mask while seated in a shirtsleeve environment of the vehicle during the pre- 
rendezvous flight phase. 
atmosphere will continually be oxygen enriched during this phase, since these 
masks normally allow oxygen to be exhaled directly to the cabin atmosphere. 
Fo r  pad operations this would be undesirable from a safety standpoint. This 
problem could be alleviated, however, by allowing for a "controlled leak" 
in the vehicle and provide the necessary additional make-up nitrogen to main- 
tain the desired sea-level pressure and atmospheric composition. 
interruption in the oxygen pre-breathing would nullify a large par t  of the de- 
nitrogenation already accomplished. 
accomplished in the airlock with no effect on the main compartment. 
Operational and Design Implications of De-nitrogenation 
The simplest and most 
This method implies that the normal two-gas vehicle 
Any 
The pre-breathing could also be 
The rescue team members  could also be pre-suited during the pre-flight and 
ascent phases while breathing 100 percent oxygen via a demand mask. 
closed-loop recirculating system would have to be provided for suit ventila- 
tion and to prevent oxygen enrichment of the vehicle atmosphere. This can 
be accomplished either by providing a separate oxygen recirculating system 
(similar to Apollo, for example) as part  of the vehicle, o r  by providing an 
additional portable life support system (PLSS) for each team member 
anticipating EVA. PLSS units designed primarily for EVA of four hours at 
average metabolic ra tes  of 1 ,600  Btu/hr would provide approximately eight 
A 
hours operation at resting metabolic ra tes  in the order of 800 Btu/hr. 
ever, units designed primarily for the pre-breathing function would be 
considerably simpler and lighter than the normal EVA units. 
the EOS, an alternative mode would be to provide a special rescue module 
How- 
In the case of 
F - 5  
within the cargo bay which would operate with the appropriate atmosphere 
to provide de -nit rog enat ion. 
F. 3 . 2  
Alternate solutions (summarized in Figure F- 2) to the de-nitrogenation 
process,  applicable to the SRV crew, could involve increasing the suit pres-  
sure,  reducing the vehicle operating pressure,  substituting other inert  gases, 
o r  limiting EVA time. 
Section F. 3. 3. 
Solutions Other than De-nitrogenation 
Solutions available to the DV a r e  discussed in 
F. 3 .  2.  I Increased Suit P re s su re  
Current suit design precludes increasing suit pressure beyond 4 to 5 psia 
because of the reduced mobility. Increased suit leakage rates,  increased 
metabolic rate with associated reduction in effective work duration, and in- 
creased cooling requirements a r e  additional considerations. 
development of hard suits with constant volume joints would permit suit 
operation at a high enough pressure to minimize or  eliminate incidence of 
bends. 
ideal from the standpoint of decompression sickness, a mixed gas atmosphere 
ranging in pressure from approximately 7 to 10 psia would probably be more 
nearly optimum. 
suit joints and in improved multi-layered suit materials may allow suit 
pressures  to be increased to 7 to 8 psia while retaining acceptable mobility. 
Further 
Although the .use of normal sea level atmosphere in the suit would be 
Anticipated developments by NASA in improvement of soft 
The use of 100 percent oxygen suit 
oxygen toxicity problem a s  long as  
eight hours. The use of a two gas 
extensive operations. 
atmospheres would not present a serious 
exposures were limited to less  than about 
(02 - Nz) suit atmosphere would allow more 
F. 3. 2 . 2  
Vehicle operating pressure could be reduced to a level where low incidence 
of bends would preclude significant de-nitrogenation requirements. 
Reduced Cabin P res su re  
F-6  
Experimental data relating to decompression from approximately 7 psia 
50/50 0 2 / N 2  atmosphere to about 3.5 psia oxygen a r e  contained in Appendix 
A of Ref. F - 8 .  That study was designed to establish (among other things) 
the required time for de-nitrogenation at a simulated altitude of 18,000 f t  
(7. 35 psia) in a 50 percent O2 - 50 percent N 2  atmosphere for protection 
against decompression to 35, 000 f t  (3. 47 psia at 100 percent 02) and to 
determine bends susceptibility of the test subjects. 
listed personnel served as subjects in  tes ts  conducted in the Air Crew Equip- 
ment Laboratory of the Naval Air Engineering Center, Philadelphia, Pa. 
The specific test  se r ies  of interest involved a rapid decompression (60 
seconds) f rom sea level to 18, 000 ft (7 .  35 psia), undergoing equilibration 
at 7.  35 psia for either 12, 18, o r  24 hours, followed by rapid decompression 
(60 seconds) to 35, 000 f t  (3. 47 psia) and remaining there for three hours. 
Similar tes ts  were also conducted with various degrees of de-nitrogenation 
(pre-breathing 100 percent 0 
decompression from a normal two g a s  sea level atmosphere to 3.47 psia of 
100 percent O2 and remaining there for  three hours. Results a r e  shown in 
Table F-I. 
breathing, incidence of decompression sickness was high (10 out of 12) but 
dropped sharply with equilibration of 18 and 24 hours. 
A total of 12 naval en- 
a t  sea level pressure)  and also with direct  2 
With 12  hours equilibration at 7.  35 psia and without oxygen pre-  
With decompression from sea level pressure  directly to 3 . 4 7  psia, the 
incidence of decompression sickness was very high ( I O  out of 12) even with 
two hours de-nitrogenation, but dropped sharply (I out of 12)  with three hours 
de-nitrogenation. Thus, the probability of decompression sickness was shown 
to be significantly less  with the 7 .  35 psia intermediate atmosphere a s  com- 
pared with direct  transition from the sea level atmosphere. 
As a design alternative, a 7 psia two-gas atmosphere could be considered as 
the baseline system for all vehicles o r  a s  a back-up mode when the vehicle is 
used in rescue operations. 
F - 7  
F. 3. 2. 3 
Experience with decompression from high pressures  associated with deep 
sea diving has shown that the use of helium in place of nitrogen reduces the 
incidence of decompression sickness. 
ences between the various data available (as reported in  Ref. F-3) the 
primary advantage of helium is attributed to the body's fas ter  ra te  of desatura- 
tion of the dissolved gas.  
nitrogen is magnified by the high pressures  associated with diving and may 
not be as significant for space applications. 
Replacement of Nitrogen with Helium o r  Other Inert Gases 
Although there a re  significant differ- 
The difference in solubilities between helium and 
Relatively little data exist to ass i s t  in  evaluating the effect of helium in the 
lower pressure environment associated with decompression to altitude. 
reported in Refs. F - 3  and F-9  a r e  inconclusive and, in fact, show that in 
certain instances the t ime of onset of bends symptoms may even by shorter 
for helium than €or nitrogen. Unfortunately, the data available a r e  only for 
short time exposures. 
after 12 or  more hours of equilibration in inert  gases could be found. 
there does not appear to be clear evidence to suggest the use of helium o r  
other inert  gases as an effective alternative. 
Data 
No experimental data on decompression to altitude 
Thus, 
F. 3.  2 . 4  Limits on EVA 
EVA time could be limited to about 10 minutes to minimize the probability of 
onset of bends symptoms. However, the r isk of compounding the emergency 
situation with another hazard does not appear attractive, nor do such work 
periods appear practical in a rescue situation. 
F. 3.  3 
The options available to the DV crew prior to  EVA in order to avoid decom- 
pression sickness a r e  outlined in Figure F - 3 .  
mains, related to the operational effectiveness of the rescue crew in the DV 
If the rescue crew enters the DV via EVA, it faces a problem 
Operations within Distressed Vehicle (DV) 
One additional problem re-  
' environment. 
whether the spacesuit is the current design operating at 3.5 psia o r  an 
F -8  
improved model a t  7 psia. 
remain within pressure suits while performing the rescue operation 
although this may be desirable for reasons of time economy as well as of 
isolation from contamination. 
requires only a short time, but acclimation to the lower suit pressure for 
the return t r ip  requires the same procedures as outlined on Figure F - 3 .  
If the DV is at  14.7 psia, the rescue crew cannot 
Acclimation to the higher pressure of the DV 
It would appear desirable, therefore, to make provisions for bleeding the DV 
atmosphere to about 7 psia of 50 /50  OxygenJnitrogen mixture after occurrence 
of an emergency requiring rescue and to couple this with the improvement 
in pressure suit technology to increase suit operating pressure to the same 
level. 
garments after cycling into the DV through an airlock, which may be essential 
if the vehicle atmosphere is contaminated. It would also pre-condition the DV 
crew for EVA in either 7 psia pressure suits o r  in the current 3.  5 psia soft 
suit, whether of EVA o r  IVA design. 
If the higher operating pressure suit should not be developed, a space crew 
preconditioned at about 7 psia for a period of 18 to 24 hours (probably less  
than the time required for  the rescue crew to reach them) would then not find 
it objectionable to have their vehicle's atmosphere reduced to 3.  5 psia of 
pure oxygen in order to permit rescue operations by a fully suited and sealed 
rescue crew. 
LS of any Bail-out and Wait (BOW) device. 
the pressure of the DV in order to permit rapid entry of the DV crew. 
system should then be capable of atmosphere change to  the 50/50 oxygen/ 
nitrogen mixture, at  7 psia, with subsequent reduction to the rescue crew 
suit pres  sure.  
This would permit the rescue crew to remain sealed in their pressure 
Similar considerations should underlie the design of the EC/  
Such a device would initially be at  
The 
Bail-out and Return (BOR) devices should be similarly equipped, although, if 
the escape mission is completed according to plan, a pressure reduction may 
not be required. 
F-9 
Oxygen pre-breathing equipment should also be on board theDV and associated 
escape devices to provide a back-up position to cabin depressurization. 
F. 4 
1. 
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Space rescue operations involving EVA, using current suit 
technology (i. e . ,  3. 5 psia suits) and starting from a two-gas, 
14. 7 psia spacecraft atmosphere, will require approximately 
four hours of pre-breathing of 100 percent oxygen by both DV 
and rescue crews to prevent decompression sickness. 
Oxygen pre-breathing can be most easily accomplished in a shirt- 
sleeve condition utilizing a demand-type 0 2  mask. The avoidance 
of 0 2  enrichment of the cabin atmosphere may require special 
closed-loop 0 2  systems within the rescue vehicle or  additional 
N2 gas coupled with some deliberate leakage to maintain 
standard atmosphere compo sition. 
The alternatives to pre-breathing 100 percent oxygen include 
(a) increasing suit pressure to 7 psia or  greater and use of 
50/50 OZ/NZ, (b) reducing cabin pressure to approximately 7 psia 
50/50  OZ/NZ, (c) limiting EVA in current design suits to 10 
minutes, and (d) replacing nitrogen with a different inert gas .  
Development of suit technology to permit operation at  7 psia of 
50/50  OZ/NZ or  greater,  or  providing 0 2  pre-breathing equip- 
ment, appear to be the most practical solutions to the decom- 
pression sickness problem of the rescue crew. 
Future manned space vehicles a s  well as associated escape 
devices should be designed to permit atmosphere reduction to the 
highest pressure level of planned EVA suits. 
also be provided with oxygen pre-breathing equipment as a back- 
up. The use of airlocks or other spaces as recompression 
chambers in the treatment of bends should also be considered. 
Such vehicles should 
F-10 
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APPENDIX G 
MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 
G. 1 GENERAL 
Among the major goals of the Space Rescue Study was that of defining the 
equipment requirements of the Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV). 
responding to  a space emergency, could reasonably expect to find either 
illness or  injury on board the distressed vehicle (DV). 
number of possible emergency situations postulated which might require 
rescue was the category of "illness /injury. " In addition, other possible 
emergency situations can produce illness o r  injury as an effect, such as for 
example, the situations of "metabolic deprivation, I t  "non-habitable environ- 
ment, 
therefore not only include items for first aid but also for preventing deteri- 
oration of a serious medical problemin order to permit removal of the 
injured crew to a permanent haven. It was assumed that conclusive medical 
Such a vehicle, 
In fact, among the 
etc. The equipment and supplies to be carr ied by the SRV should 
treatment would have to await return to such a haven by the SRV. 
The listing of desired medical equipment, supplies and skills should ideally 
be based on an estimate of the types of medical problems which the rescue 
crew might encounter, and on their probability of occurrence, since providing 
for all medical eventualities could conceivably overburden the payload capa- 
bility of the rescue vehicle. Since event probabilities for medical emergencies 
in space flight have not yet been determined, this phase of the study derived 
medical equipment needs on the basis that all of the medical problems had 
an equally high probability of occurring and that supplies o r  equipment for 
treatment o r  containment of all problems should be carried.  Some informa- 
tion on event probabilities based on submarine experience was available and 
is summarized in the following sections, but only for the purpose of informa- 
tion and to form the basis for  further study recommendations. 
.JI -T 
\ This Appendix is based on the work of M. Donabedian, Ref. 1. 
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In addition to determining possible SRV medical equipment needs, this study 
subtask also considered desirable equipment and supplies to be routinely 
on board space vehicles to permit maximum self-help. 
In order to provide the medical skills required by this phase of the rescue 
study assistance was solicited and was received on a no-cost basis f rom the 
RPC Corporation, El Segundo. 
mental research in  the life sciences and provided assistance of a graduate 
physiologist in the preparation of the input to this subtask. 
This company performs analytical and experi- 
G. 2 IDENTIFICATION O F  POTENTIAL INJURIES AND 
ILLNESSES 
In order  to identify requirements for medical equipment, either on board a 
potential DV o r  specific to an SRV, a systematic survey was made of potential 
i l lnesses o r  injuries which might occur. As par t  of this effort, the services 
of RPC Corporation were utilized. 
possible illnesses and injuries, together with estimates of resulting lost time 
and type of treatment and/or medication required. These data a r e  presented 
in Tables G-1 and G-2.  
used in these tables a r e  provided in Tables G-3 and G-4.  
Initially, RPC provided a matrix of 
Explanations and/or examples of medical terminology 
Available information on space flight medical problems (Ref. G-2)  shows that 
principal problems have concerned respiratory infections and minor bodily o r  
gastrointestinal discomforts. However, with the increase in crew size,  dura- 
tion of flight, and mobility of the crew about, for example, a space station, 
the potential for more serious problems is considerably higher. 
determination of event probability data is beyond the scope of this effort, a 
brief review of available data toward this end was made. 
included the Apollo manned spaceflights and U .  S. Navy experiences aboard 
submarines. 
Although the 
The sources of data 
G-2 
G.2.1 Apollo Data 
A summary of medical experience in the Apollo 7 through 11 manned space- 
flights is provided in  Ref. G 2 .  
Apollo 7 through 11 flights totals approximately 1035 hours, o r  the equivalent 
of 129 man-days for the three-man crew. 
f rom which to draw valid conclusions statistically; however, it does provide 
a basis of comparison with other data. 
Apollo 7 through 11 crews a r e  summarized in Table G-5. 
The exposure to space environment of the 
This is obviously too little data 
The inflight medical problems in 
The three cases  of coryza (sinus infection) shown in Table G-5 occurred on 
the Apollo 7 mission. 
ulcers,  were reported on the flight of Apollo 8. 
occurred on the Apollo 10 mission. 
One episode each of nausea and vomiting, and aphthous 
The fiberglass irri tation 
Five of the s ix  crewmen on the Apollo 8 and 9 missions reported symptoms of 
motion sickness. The symptoms ranged from mild stomach awareness with 
head and body motion in the weightless environment, to nausea and vomiting 
in  one crewman, and lasted from 2 hours to 5 days after which adaptation 
allowed movement without any symptoms re-occurring. One Apollo 10 crew- 
man also had stomach awareness lasting 2 days, again indicating that adapta- 
tion to the weightless environment takes place. 
It should be noted that the crew had been instructed prior to the Apollo 10 
mission to ca r ry  out programmed head movements during the first two flight 
days to hasten the adaptive process.  
awareness noted an increase in the severity of this symptom after one minute 
of head movement. 
movements produced stomach awareness after 5 minutes. 
indicates that the opportunity to move about more freely in the Apollo cabin 
than in previous spacecraft contributed to  the motion sickness problem. 
Sensory inputs f rom the semicircular canals to the central nervous system 
during head movements in space a r e  apparently enhanced during the weightless 
The crewman reporting stomach 
When attempted on the seventh flight day, these head 
Reference G-2 
G-3 
state. 
and requiring increased mobility. 
This could become a significant problem in larger  vehicles permitting 
The 16 medical problems noted in  Table G-5 represent a frequency of one 
medical problem every 8.1 man-days of flight. 
G.2.2 Submarine Medical Experience 
Long-term confinement of selected crews in a closed environment, such a s  
in a submarine, provides a relatively good analogy to extended space flight. 
A summary of medical experiences aboard 360 patrols of Polaris submarines 
during the period 1963 - 1967 is contained in Reference G-4. Each of the 360 
patrols involved a crew of approximately 140 men submerged for a period of 
two months so that this data covers approximately 50,000 man-patrols o r  
3 million man-days . 
The data presented in Ref. G-4 has been summarized in Table G-6. 
frequency of medical problems is broken down into 12 major categories. 
Except for dental problems, the bulk of the data came f rom cases actually 
involving sick days (i. e.  , removal of the patient from all duties for 24 hours 
or longer), cases  involving surgical procedures, o r  those cases receiving 
special comments by the onboard medical officer. 
of cases,  number of sick days, and percentage of the total for each category. 
The total number of cases  reported (I, 760) results in a frequency of approxi- 
mately one incident per 1 , 700 man-days as compared to one incident per 8 
man-days in the brief Apollo experience. However, i t  should be noted that 
most o r  all of the 16 minor medical cases listed in the Apollo studies would 
not have been included in the submarine medical list based on the listing 
cr i ter ia  of the latter, namely, removal of patient f rom all duties for 24 hours 
or  longer. On this basis, the Apollo medical frequency data would be reduced 
to zero for the 129 man-day exposure. 
The 
Table G-6 shows number 
G-4 
A breakdown of the surgical procedures performed at sea is presented in 
Ref. G-4. 
mately 133 or  nearly 70 percent involved incision and/or drainage. 
there would appear to  be a requirement for an incision and drainage surgical 
equipment kit on board. 
It is important to note that of the 196 cases reported, approxi- 
Thus 
It is also of interest that over 35 percent of the medical problems were of a 
dental nature. The high frequency of dental problems encountered suggests 
that a minimum dental kit for the purpose of tooth extraction is required. 
Further study is required to identify the need for the treatment of caries and 
other problems. 
The last column of Table G-6 shows the proportional number of cases for a 
12-man space station for  one year.  This is based on a direct ratio of the 
man-days involved, i .e. ,  4,380 as compared to 3,000,000 covered by the 
submarine data. 
G.2.3 Miscellaneous Data 
Probability data concerning illness and/or injury are given in Ref. G-5. It 
is indicated that these data are based on information compiled by USAF; how- 
ever, the exact nature of this information has not been identified. 
/ 
The probability data presented in Ref. G-5 for a 12-man Space Station crew 
are as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3 .  
4. 
5. 
One major injury per  4 years  which probably would call 
for return of crewmen 
One minor injury per 1.5 years  
About 0.0005 major illnesses per year  which might 
require return of a crewman 
About 25 minor illnesses per year 
About 0.002 major contagions per year  which may require 
return of all crewmen and temporary mission abort 
These total approximately 25.92 medical cases per year or about 170 man-days/ 
case. 
mately 1 ,7  00 man-days for the submarine data. 
This compares with 8 man-days/case for the Apollo data and approxi- 
h 
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These predictions of illness and disease serve to indicate that sufficient 
probability exists to justify an onboard treatment capability. It is not 
possible to predict the communication of disease once it appears, but for the 
general case it should be assumed that a highly viable pathogen, once intro- 
duced, will be propagated rapidly. 
Because of the relatively high incidence of dental problems noted in  the 
submarine data and the probability that a dental kit of some sort  would be a 
definite requirement, contacts were made with dental officers both at USAF 
Aerospace Medical Division, Brooks AFB, Texas, and at NASA Manned 
Spacecraft Center, Houston. 
initial Skylab missions (28 day/3 -man crew) involve primarily tooth extraction 
equipment. For longer durations, provisions for treatment of caries would 
probably be required. 
Based on Ref. G-6, dental provisions for the 
The probability of having dental problems aboard LSkylab is estimated by 
Ref. G-6 as 7 percent for  a minor dental problem and 1 percent for  a major 
problem (severe toothache). Projecting these figures to a 12-man space 
station would yield approximately 4 minor dental cases per year and a 50 
percent chance of a major dental problem. 
G. 3 REQUIRED ME,DICAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES 
G.3.1 Pr imary  Medical Items 
Because of the relative short duration of previous manned spaceflights, on- 
board medical kits  to date have been first aid kits with a selected number of 
analgesics, antibiotics, decongestants, etc. The contents of the medical kits 
for the Command Module (CM) of Apollo flight 7 through 11 are summarized 
in Table G-7. 
Due to the increased mission duration and crew size of post-Apollo vehicles, 
and the opportunity for greater freedom of movement and activity, the require- 
ments for medical kits are considerably increased. Based on inputs f rom 
G-6 
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RPC Corporation (Ref. G-3), review of available data from previous manned 
spaceflights (Ref. G-2), submarine experiences (Ref. G-4), and communica- 
tions with various medical personnel (Ref. G-6 and G-7), a preliminary list 
of medical items was compiled for a space rescue vehicle. However, most 
of the items defined were found to be also applicable to onboard space station 
kits.  A list of medical items with estimated unit weight and number as 
required for  both a space rescue vehicle and for a 12-man space station is 
shown in Table G-8. Details on the content of some of the individual kits  are 
given in Table G-9. 
rescue vehicle is estimated a s  35 pounds. The partial listing shown for the 
space station totals 80 pounds; however, as noted at the bottom of Table G-8, 
a number of items of potentially major significance in terms of weight and 
volume require further evaluation either to establish need, to define require- 
ments, o r  to identify development priority. Most of these items appear to be 
more  applicable to the space station than to the space rescue vehicle. Thus, 
the weight shown in Table G-8 for the space station probably represents only 
a fraction of the final total medical equipment weight. 
The total weight of the medical items for the space 
If the probability of fractures is  assumed to be high, the importance of on- 
board X-ray equipment, non-gravity dependent traction devices, and light- 
weight splinting and casting materials is obvious. 
means of providing non- gravity intravenous fluids administration should not 
pose a serious problem. 
an adequate supply of intravenous solutions is a strong motivation for rehy- 
dratable solutions. The use of both pre-packaged and "cook book" concepts 
for the clinical laboratory could simplify onboard chemical analysis equipment 
and minimize onboard skill levels required. 
capabilities with minimum modification could provide an onboard hyperbaric 
therapy facility for  burn and decompression sickness patients. 
existing air-lock with its pressure controls might be adequate based on 
determination of optimum pressure levels. 
The development of a 
The potentially large weight penalty associated with 
Utilization of vehicle EC /LS 
The use of an 
Also use of the vehicle oxygen 
supply in  conjunction with a 
positive pr  e s sur  e breathing 
Bennet respirator or equivalent would provide 
for inhalation therapy. 
G-7 
The'individual items comprising the dental kit of Table G- 9 were identified in  
Ref. G-6 and are oriented primarily towards tooth extraction. 
defined, does not include i tems for treatment of caries, which, on the basis 
of submarine data, may be required for missions beyond four to six  months. 
Development effort would be needed for such items as prepackaged temporary 
The kit, as 
fillings and lightweight, low-power drilling equipment to permit the in- space 
treatment of caries. 
Preliminary information obtained from Ref. G-7 subsequent to the completion of 
the requirements listing in Table G-8 indicated that a considerable increase 
may be made in the medical contents of the Skylab program as compared to 
the Apollo medical kit. Items under consideration include a surgical kit ,  a 
suture kit, a microbiology kit, a hematology kit, a urinalysis kit, and a 
relatively extensive list of drugs and medications. 
already included in the requirements l is t  i n  Table G-8, have been added to 
the list of items requiring further study at the bottom of the table. 
Any of these items, not 
G.3.2 
The transfer of injured personnel f rom the distressed vehicle to the rescue 
vehicle without further injury or damage can be a significant factor i n  assuring 
containment of the medical situation. 
immobilization include fractures and /or dislocations. 
result f rom moving in a weightless environment, body acceleration during 
maneuvering or  docking operations , meteoroid penetration of the spacecraft 
cabin or  the spacesuit during EVA, and mechanical injuries arising from 
explosive decompression, explosions, and walking on extraterrestrial surfaces 
Personnel Car r ie r  and Auxiliary Aids 
Injuries requiring careful handling and 
Such injuries can  
The ideal characteristics of a device to transport an individual with such injury 
include: 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. Handles or  grips, and tie-down provisions to the spacecraft 
Light weight, with minimum storage volume 
Provision for body and limb restraints 
Protection against bumping interior surfaces while being moved 
interior 
G-8 
One concept combining these characteristics visualizes a stretcher-type 
inflatable air mattress with bumping shields, restraint  belts and hand holds, 
and compressed air bottle. 
torso and for each leg. 
Restraint belts would be provided for both the 
To provide full immobilization for fractures and /or  dislocations, the use of 
pneumatic splints could supplement this personnel carrier. 
volume of the car r ie r  uninflated is estimated at 0.25 cubic foot with a total 
weight of under 10 pounds. 
The storage 
G.3.3 
Medical conditions on board the distressed vehicle (DV) may require means 
for quarantining and/or decontaminating members of the DV crew and/or 
members of the rescue crew. 
which could have secondary application in  this context. The transfer capsule 
was conceived as a device to allow transfer of ill o r  injured personnel unable 
to don pressure garments for EVA transfer when docking was infeasible. 
capsule, equipped with an independent environmental control system, could 
be docked against the SRV during the return-to-haven phase while serving 
as a one-man quarantine station. 
for this purpose. 
decontamination functions for personnel transferring in  a docked situation or  
during a quarantine period. 
Other Equipment With Medical Utility 
Appendix H discusses two equipment items 
> This 
The portable airlock could hold two men 
This airlock could also be equipped to perform biological 
These devices could also be used to isolate against radioactive contamination. 
In that role,  docking against the SRV may not be feasible and tethering at a 
suitable separation distance may be required. 
G.4 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A review of available data shows a frequency of medical problems ranging 
from one case per .8 man-days of flight for minor problems in Apollo inflight 
medical experience to one case per  1 ,700  man-days for more serious problems 
in  U . S. Navy Polaris submarine experience. 
G-9 
Based on examination of potential crew injury and illness data, preliminary 
medical equipment and supply requirements have been defined for a space 
rescue vehicle. 
The rescue vehicle medical kits are estimated to weigh a total of 35 pounds 
for a rescue mission involving 12 crew members of a distressed vehicle. 
A partial listing has also been provided for a space station. 
Development is required for a number of space-oriented equipment items 
and supplies including non-gravity-dependent traction devices and means 
for intravenous fluids administration, lightweight X-ray equipment, rehy- 
dratable intravenous fluids, utilization of vehicle EC /LS capability for 
hyperbaric and inhalation therapy facilities , and lightweight dental equipment. 
Consideration should be given to equipment suitable for quarantine and decon- 
tamination of personnel. 
Medical experience aboard submarines as compiled by the Submarine 
Medical Research Center provides a good source of data and shows that dental: 
problems may be one of the more  significant areas associated with extended 
missions . 
It is recommended that an in-depth statistical study of Navy submarine data 
and other appropriate information be made to better identify risk factors 
for long-duration space flights. 
of event probabilities of medical emergencies i n  space and the selection of 
threshold values for such probabilities. 
selection for both the space rescue vehicle and a potentially distressed 
operating vehicle. 
Of particular importance a re  the determination 
This will permit a rational equipment 
Based on better knowledge of medical emergency event probabilities , medical 
training requirements of rescue crews as well as primary mission crews 
should be analyzed and implemented. 
G-10 
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Table G-3 .  Explanation of Medical Terminology Used for 
Injury and Illness from Tables G - i  and G-2 
nlne s s 
(From Table I) 
-- 
Skin eruption, "breaking-out" -- -- -- 
Nosebleed -- -- -- 
Sinus infection 
Ear infection 
I l ~ u l l  
-- -- -- -- -- 
Nosebleed 
"Coughing of blood" 
Bladder infection 
"Infection of testicle" 
Kidney stone 
Irritation of lower small bowel 
-- 
-- -- 
Eye infections 
"Fast heart" -impulse arising 
-- 
-- -- 
Kidney stone 
Gallbladder infection 
Gallstone 
Infection of pancreas 
Local infection of vein 
Ear infection with dizziness 
Fluid collecting in chest 
Liver infection 
"Infection of brain" 
"Infection of brain" 
"Kidney stone" 
"Kidney infection" 
Infection of heart 's protective sac 
Early beats o r  heart-out of rhythm 
Electrical conduction block in heart 
"Fast heart" - a r i s e s  in ventricles 
-- 
-- -- -- 
Injury 
(From Table II) 
-- 
-- 
Minor cut -- 
-- -- 
Large o r  deep cut -- 
-- 
Rib fracture 
Collarbone fracture 
Bum or  abrasion of eye 
Types of fractures at wrist 
Types of fractures at wrist 
Types of fractures at wrist 
Fractures of bones of the forearm 
Fractures of bones of the forearm 
Fracture of upper a r m  
Type of ankle fracture 
Type of ankle fracture 
Type of ankle fracture 
Type of ankle fracture 
Type of ankle fracture 
Type of ankle fracture 
Fracture of bones of the lower leg 
Fracture of bones of the lower leg 
Fracture of upper leg 
-- 
-- -- -- 
-- 
Object in windpipe 
Ruptured internal organ 
Collarbone fracture 
Rib fracture 
Fracture involving torn skin overbreak -- 
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Table G- 9 e Detail  Lis t ing of Medicat ions,  Drugs ,  Intravenous F lu ids ,  
and Miscel laneous Ki t s  
-. -. - --- 
Classification 
Medication and D r g g s  -
Antibiotics 
T op i ca 1 
Op tha 1 mi c 
Systemic 
Ane stheti c s 
Opthalmic 
Local 
Analgesics 
Antiemetics (for 
motion s ickness)  
Antispasmodics 
Antitussives 
(cough remedies)  
Decongestants 
Sy s t emi  c 
Nasal Spray 
Exp e c to rar,t s 
Fungicides 
St e roi d s 
T op i cal 
Systemic 
Tranquilize r s 
Antiseptics 
Intravenous Fluids -_ 
Miscellaneous Kits 
Suture Kit (wound 
closure)  
Dental Kit 
- 
De scription 
neosporin ointment 
neosporin ointment 
pollycillin (ampicillin) 
opthaine drops 
xylocaine 1% injectors 
demeral  
da rvon 
asp i r in  
marez ine  
marezine 
lomotil 
donnatal 
actifed 
actifed 
afrin 
antifed - C 
tinactin creani  1% 
celestone c r e a m  (0.2%) 
to be  selected 
v is ta r i l  (25 mg) 
seconal (100 mg) 
be fa dine solution 
r ingers  lactate 
57'0 dextrose in water 
dextran 
administration set  
adhesive s te r i - s t r ip  s 
needle holder ,  forcep, 
s c i s s o r s ,  gloves, drape 
nylon plus  silk suture  
gauze 4 x 4 
forceps 
penlight / m i r r o r  
e levators  (for ex t rac-  
ti on a s si s t an c e) 
hand instruments  
dental syringe 
disposable needles 
local anesthesia 
magnetic t r ay  /pouch 
No. Re uired I P e r  Zit Unit 
1 oz. tube 
1 /8  oz. tube 
250 mg tablet 
15 cc bottle 
5 cc 
100 mg injectors 
65 mg tablets 
300 mg tablets 
50 mg injectors 
50 mg tablets 
tab1 et  s 
tab 1 e t  s 
tablets 
same a s  above 
3 cc bottle 
10 cc  
15 gm 
15 gm -- 
cap sule s 
capsules 
1 /2  oz. 
1000 cc 
1000 cc 
500 ck -- 
2 
1 
48 
1 
4 
3 
12 
72 
4 
12 
24 
12 
6 0  
- -  
3 
16 
2 
1 
18 
24 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
-- 
6 
1 each 
12 
8 
2 
2 
8 
2 
12 
I 
-- 
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APPENDIX H 
SPACE RESCUE VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS 
H. I GENERAL" 
H. 1. I Objectives 
The primary aim of this phase of the Space Rescue Operations Study was to 
provide the data base for the conceptual design of a space vehicle capable of 
performing required rescue operations, and, additionally, to evaluate the 
capability of the planned Integrated Program (IP) vehicles to perform these 
operations. 
goals were established for this task. 
major functions which a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) and crew would have to 
perform during a rescue operation, and which could generate special equip- 
ment requirements and special operational procedures. It also included a 
review of operations which the SRV would have to perform to protect itself 
in  the event the emergency within the distressed vehicle (DV) resulted in an 
external environment hazardous to the SRV. Here again, the goal was dis- 
closure of special equipment and operational requirements for a potential 
rescue vehicle imposed by such a hazardous environment. 
In order to attain this primary objective, a number of subsidiary 
These included the determination of all 
The output sought f rom this study task would be quantitative only with respect 
to equipment weight and volume requirements which would be imposed upon an 
SRV o r  an IP vehicle to  be used for rescue missions. 
timelines a r e  of necessity "rough order of magnitude" during this early 
phase of rescue analysis. 
to hazards which the rescue vehicle itself might encounter because these 
hazards cannot be quantitatively defined at  this time. 
Rescue operations 
Even more qualitative would be output data related 
H.1.2 Ground Rules and Assumptions 
Ground rules initially provided by NASA were amplified during review 
meetings with the NASA Study Monitor. Among the more important ground 
d. .,. 
This Appendix is  based on the work of E. J. Rattin, N. Campbell, and others 
as indicated. 
H-1 
rules was the restriction of the study effort to only those emergency situations 
which could reasonably be expected to require rescue. A number of other 
emergency situations can be postulated which might result from equipment 
failures but which could be resolved with onboard emergency supplies a t  
least  until the next scheduled arr ival  of a logistics vehicle. 
emergency could result in  personnel injuries calling for  the return of 
personnel to earth. 
t ressed vehicle is adequate until arr ival  of a regular scheduled logistics 
flight, a rescue situation would not exist. 
Similarly, the 
However, if the treatment capability on board the dis- 
This phase of the study was also constrained to consider only those vehicle 
and rescue crew operations, shown in Figure H-1, to be conducted after 
rendezvous between SRV and DV and pr ior  to the departure of the SRV from 
the vicinity of the DV. 
rescue or  after a decision that rescue could not be accomplished. 
sition of the DV after rescue was to be considered as part  of the problem 
under consideration. 
were restricted to the Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS), and the Space Station o r  
Space Base, in earth orbit. After completion of the analysis, however, it 
was noted that the operations and equipment derived as special to a rescue 
operation would be equally useful if applied to  rescue in lunar orbit o r  in 
geosynchronous orbit. 
The latter could take place either after successful 
The dispo- 
For  this task only, rescue situations to be considered 
Among the many emergency situations disclosed as possible by the hazards 
analysis (Appendix B), the  ground rules require specific attention to the 
problem of a tumbling DV, docking with a non-cooperative spacecraft, and 
rescue from a DV with a damaged or  incompatible docking port. 
situations considered included: 
Other 
DV-generated debris 
Uncontrolled nuclear radiation 
Loss of communication 
EVA from DV not feasible 
DV damage interferes with rescue 
External medical aid required 
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The probabilities of occurrence of these situations versus those of the many 
other emergency situations was beyond the scope of the study. 
equal probability was assumed for all situations. 
Therefore, 
The results of this study phase were to be generally applicable. 
specified that rescue vehicle requirements and the rescue crew equipment 
and operational requirements not be unique to any planned IP vehicle. 
It was 
Since most emergency situations might permit alternate operational plans 
and different types of equipment, it was determined that all reasonable rescue 
alternatives would be defined. Subsequent optimization based on cost o r  other 
effectiveness parameters  would follow. 
H. I. 3 Rescue Requirements 
The hazards analysis reported in Appendix B resulted in the definition of 
various emergency situations requiring rescue, and produced a listing of the 
capabilities which a remedial system such as a rescue vehicle should possess. 
Reference H- 1 also provided important guidance. 
The remedial system should be able to  supply the following essential functions: 
A habitable haven 
Medical aid 
Life support 
Communication 
Power 
Transportation to  a final haven of safety 
The remedial system will a lso be required to provide some o r  all  of the 
following capabilities: 
Collision avoidance 
Radiation protection (nuclear radiation from DV) 
Docking to a disabled spacecraft 
Arres t  of a tumbling spacecraft 
Retrieval of personnel f rom EVA or  from DV 
H- 4 
H. 1 . 4  Approach 
Because of the complexity of a rescue operation in te rms  of the many 
available alternate operational paths, the approach chosen and depicted in 
Figure H-2 called for the preparation initially of simple binary logic diagrams. 
Starting with a top flow diagram, this method permitted the charting of 
alternate operational flows to  that level of detail required to identify major 
operational segments. This set  of logic diagrams also permitted segregating 
flow segments representing routine space operations to be performed by, for  
example, logistics vehicles, from those operations specific to the rescue 
mission. These special rescue operations were then further detailed with 
the aid of additional levels of flow charts and logic diagrams to define method- 
ology and equipment needs unique to the rescue mission. 
studies were then undertaken to develop equipment details to sufficient detail 
to permit rough order of magnitude weight and volume estimates, to identify 
technology requirements and additional study needs, and to estimate timelines 
Conceptual design 
prepar 
for the operations involving these equipment concepts. 
H. 2 LOGIC DIAGRAMS 
H. 2 .1  Explanatory Notes 
The logic diagram approach was chosen to ass is t  in th tion of the 
rescue operational flow because i ts  binary logic aids in the identification of 
all reasonable alternate operational modes. 
this rescue study i t  precedes the evaluation of planned transportation elements 
of the Integrated Program such as the EOS and the Space Tug for rescue use. 
The nomenclature chosen for this phase of the study does not reflect actual 
o r  planned vehicles and i ts  results a r e  generally applicable. 
In the chronology of performing 
For  example, the bail-out device (BOD) is used in the logic diagrams in i ts  
basic functional sense, i. e. , a shelter into which the DV crew has fled to 
await rescue and which i s  st i l l  in the vicinity of the DV, possibly still attached. 
In the subsequent study phase the BOR was further defined as a bail-out and 
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wait device o r  a bail-out and return device. 
modifying standard IF' hardware o r  could be an entirely new development. 
Either could be derived by 
Similarly, a s  used in this subtask the SRV represents the vehicle which has 
brought the rescue crew close to the DV. If it is able to dock against the DV 
and/or ca r ry  the special rescue equipment, then no other vehicle is required 
If i t  cannot dock, a transfer module (TM) would have to be carr ied for that 
purpose. This TM is equipped with sufficient propulsion to dock to the DV 
while carrying the rescue crew and its special equipment, and to return with 
both the rescue crew and DV crew to the SRV. 
performing external surveys o r  aiding in damage control. 
The TM is also useful in 
During the study phase concerned with the final remedial system selection 
(Appendix J), it was concluded that a special transfer module equipped for 
rescue would always be required, and subsequently the te rm SRV was ex- 
clusively used for such a vehicle. The te rm "transfer module" was then 
dropped and i ts  basic concept, that of providing the short-distance transfer 
between transporter and DV, was retained in the form of the SRV. 
H. 2 . 2  Logic Diagrams 
Figures H-3 through H-13 and Tables H-1 through H-36 form a unified set 
that illustrates and interprets the logic flow. 
to which the logic flow diagram approach is applied a r e  shown on the top flow 
diagram of the rescue operations, Figure H-3. 
given a letter designation on the top flow logic diagram to which the following 
detail diagrams a r e  keyed. Likewise, second-order codes a r e  assigned in 
the detail diagrams, and these sub-segments are further treated in the 
accompanying tables, which a r e  keyed to the detail diagrams. 
The major operational segments 
Each of these segments is 
The intent in preparing these diagrams was not to cover all of the individual 
operational steps making up the total rescue effort but to concentrate upon 
those operations unique to rescue and involving possible special equipment. 
As a consequence, and also to simplify the process,  a number of questions 
H- 7 
a r e  not asked in the logic diagram format but a r e  listed under the heading of 
"Required P r io r  Knowledge" on the tables following each diagram. 
actions shown on the diagrams therefore reflect only the cri t ical  questions 
directly related to unique rescue operations. 
mented by other questions as shown on the tables, which also indicate the 
means used by the rescue crew to provide needed answers. 
detail diagrams use a dashed line to enclose an a rea  of the diagram. 
line indicates that the tables following the diagram cover only the actions 
within the enclosure. 
The 
They a r e  preceded and supple- 
Some of the 
This 
Under the "Required Action" heading of the tables a r e  listed those actions 
shown o r  implied by the logic diagram, which may require special equip- 
ment not normally available on a transporter vehicle. 
times associated with these actions a r e  not based on special analysis 
but represent experience as reflected in Gemini and Apollo data, as well as 
analysis performed under the USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory program 
and judiciously translated to the rescue problem. The "Equipment Needs" 
are the special equipment needed to accomplish the required actions. 
The stated operations 
The top flow diagram shows an overview of the individual operational phases 
to be described in  more detail in  subsequent diagrams and tables. As stated 
ear l ier ,  only those operations between the establishment of rendezvous con- 
ditions between SRV and DV and the departure of the SRV from this rendezvous 
position a r e  included in this analysis. Unless the exact nature of the emer- 
gency is known to the SRV crew, this rendezvous condition is established at 
a stand-off distance of some miles to permit a situation survey as indicated 
in Action Box A. If this survey discloses all of the information about the DV 
which the SRV requires to perform rescue, the SRV moves to whatever posi- 
tion relative to the DV has been indicated as safe. 
docking o r  merely a much shorter stand-off distance from which EVA transfer 
is feasible. 
reached the BOD. 
This may involve direct  
The initial survey may have indicated that the DV crew has 
If this vehicle is not attached to  the DV, the SRV will make 
€3- 8 
suitable contact with the BOD, a s  indicated by Action Box D, and proceed 
with further action as shown by Action Boxes L and J, o r  M. 
survey under A was incomplete in the sense of not informing the SRV crew of 
DV status, DV crew condition, and/or hazards possibly facing the SRV or  its 
crew, a close survey may be performed. As indicated by Action Box B, such 
a survey may require a motion stabilizing operation, if DV motion is so 
severe as to prevent, for example, a survey crew from performing an ex- 
ternal inspection from EVA. 
Jf the initial 
If one follows the logical flow of questions and resulting action boxes, one 
finds several  instances where the rescue mission i s  suspended because of 
information indicating that rescue is infeasible o r  no longer necessary. 
Because of the many alternative situations which might warrant such action, 
as well as the time constraints on this study phase, such situations have not 
been further treated. 
Action Box M, indicating that the rescue control center would determine sub- 
sequent course of action of the SRV. 
The logic flow has in those cases been terminated by 
For  the purpose of this study the rescue mission can be terminated by finding 
that the emergency on the DV can be relieved by replacement of supplies o r  
by minor repairs,  thus permitting the DV either to abort to safe haven o r  to 
continue with i ts  original mission. The rescue mission will, of course, also 
terminate after successful completion of rescue a s  indicated by Action Box G. 
The multiple occasions for medical aid a r e  also indicated by the use of Action 
Box J in several  of the flow paths. 
Disposing of o r  securing the DV after rescue o r  when rescue is infeasible is 
an important requirement which has  not received the attention i t  warrants in 
this study because of time constraints. It should, however, be the subject of 
further effort, particularly with respect to a DV in low earth orbit. 
circumstances, orbit degradation as a result of natural causes not self- 
correctible by an inoperative DV, o r  caused by the emergency itself, could 
pose a hazard to  earth populations. 
In such 
H- 9 
The meaning of the other action boxes shown on the top flow logic diagram 
will become evident upon inspection of the detailed diagrams and tables to 
follow. 
each action box (i. e . ,  segments A through M) a re  presented in Section H-3. 
Further details concerning the operations to  be performed under 
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Table H-I. Segment A. 1: Establish Condition of DV and DV 
Crew by Communication f rom Stand-off Range 
Automatic sensor reading 
telemetry transmitter on 
DV, receiver on SRV 
I I I I 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
What is  maximum range for emergency 
communications ? 
What a r e  communications systems 
possibly available on DV o r  BOD? 
Means 
Handbook* 
Handbook 
Is DV provided with BOD? Handbook 
I Required Action I Equipment Needs I Operations Time I 
Attempt to communicate 
with DV and/or BOD 
Obtain telemeter ed 
diagnostics data 
R F  communications and 
blinkers in SRV and 
DV/BOD 
t 30 minutes 
:: 
This term, as used here  and in subsequent tables, means that the rescue 
crew is  provided with descriptive data covering details of equipment and 
operational capability of the specific DV being contacted. Such data files, 
in the interest of payload weight and volume considerations, will need to 
be restricted to items impacting upon the rescue operation. 
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Table H-2. Segment A. 2: Survey DV Environment 
for Hazardous Conditions 
Required Action 
Search for  debris, presence 
and vector data 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
Equipment Needs 
LWIR/laser search system 
Orbital position at time of hazard 
occurrence 
Hazardous equipment on board DV 
Nature of hazard 
DV orbital parameters 
Means 
.I, 
Ground datal' 
Handbook 
Ground data 
Handbook, ground data 
Search for  presence of 
harmful radiation 
Radiation sensors 
Operations Time 
.l. P 
This term, as used here  and in other tables, implies data obtained through 
a communication link with the SRCC, either pr ior  to launch of the rescue 
mission o r  during flight. 
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Table H-3. Segment A. 3: Stand-off Survey DV/BOD for 
Data on Vehicle and Crew Status 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge Means 
Safe approach range and approach 
cor  ridor 
Previous survey as in A .  2 
Or 
Handbook 
Or 
Communication with 
DV/BOD 
DV configuration and manning level Handbook 
Location and ty-pe of passive survey 
aids on DV/BOD 
Handbook and/or communi- 
cation with DV/BOD 
I Required Action 
Approach DV/BOD 
Observe condition of 
DV/BOD 
Measure motion of 
DV/BOD 
Obtain diagnostic data 
Debris 
Radiation (nuclear) 
Thermal radiation 
Equipment Needs 
Existing propulsion on SRV 
Viewports, telescopes 
and illumination source 
in SRV 
Laser  system on SRV, 
passive targets on DV/BOD 
Visual means 
I R / l a  s e r  mapping 
Radiation sensors 
I R  thermal mapping 
Operations Time 
30 Minutes 
90 Minutes 
5 Minutes 
During above 
operations 
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Figure H-5. Segment B: Stabilize DV Motion for Close Survey 
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Table H-4. Segment B. 1: Perform Stabilization of DV/BOD 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
Description of undesirable motion 
Means 
Laser, visual observation 
during stand-off survey 
Axis (Axes) of rotation 
Rates 
Condition of on-board systems Communication, telemetry 
Availability of suitable stabilizing 
equipment 
Onboard DV/BOD 
Onboard SRV 
Availability of external attachment 
points on DV/BOD 
Handbook, communications 
Handbook , ob s e r va t ion 
Does existing motion permit attachment 
of stabilization equipment by SRV? 
Handbook 
1 Required Action 
1. If onboard stabilization 
system is potentially 
functioning on DV: 
a. Request that DV crew 
activate system 
b. If DV crew cannot 
activate system, 
attempt remote c om- 
mand activation by 
SRV o r  ground 
c. If remote activation 
is not feasible, 
attempt activation 
by SRV crew in 
EVA 
~ ~~ 
Equipment Needs 
Existing communications 
sy s tem 
Command and control link 
between DV and both o r  
either SRV and ground 
EVA suits for  SRV crew 
Portable plug-in command 
and control electronics, 
with portable power supply 
:< 
Each man 
H- I 8  
Operations Time 
2 minutes 
2-10 minutes 
.*. -8- 
5 minutes to dress ,  
7 min. for  AL cycle, 
5 min. for transit  
one way 
Table H-4. Segment B. i:  Perform Stabilization of DV/BOD 
(Continued) 
Required Action 
If DV onboard stab 
lization system is 
not functioning , 
attempt to provide 
portable system 
f rom SRV 
Equipment Needs 
AMU ' s,  manipulators to 
assist in anchoring EVA 
crew to rotating DV, tether 
lines 
EVA suits for SRV crew 
Mini- shuttle with 
manipulators 
De-spin system 
Attachment sy s tern 
Tether lines, AMU's 
with manipulators to 
ass i s t  in anchoring EVA 
crew to rotating DV 
Operations Time 
Activation time not 
determinable at 
this time 
* 
5 minutes to dress  
7 min. for AL cycle 
Unloading of equip- 
ment f rom SRV 
- 3 0  min. 
5 minutes for 
transit  one way 
Anchoring of 
equipment on 
DV - 30 min. 
Despin operation - 3 0  min. 
JI 1\
Each man 
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Figure H-6. Segment C: Perform Close Survey of DV/BOD 
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Table H-5. Segment C: Perform Close Survey of DV/BOD 
P r i o r  Knowledge Reauired 
Safe approach distance to DV/BOD 
Means 
Communication, stand- off 
survey 
Crew quarters  location Handbook, 
Location of DV exterior plug-ins for  Handbook, 
hardline communications 
Location of DV exterior repeaters of Handbook, 
damage sensors  
Location of atmosphere sampling points Handbook, 
on DV exterior 
Location of DV hatches and airlocks Handbook, 
communications 
communications 
c ommunic a tions 
communications 
communications 
Required Action 
i .  Search for debris pres-  
ence and determine 
vector data 
2. Search for presence of 
harmful radiation 
3. If survey can be 
performed f rom SRV: 
a. Approach DV/BOD 
to permissible range 
b. Fly-around DV/BOD 
f o r  visual and sensor 
observations 
e .  Attempt 
communications 
Equipment Needs 
IR/laser  search system 
Radiation sensors 
Existing SRV propulsion 
and guidance system 
Existing SRV propulsion 
and guidance systems, 
viewports, telescopes and 
illumination on SRV, I R  
thermal mapping, radiation 
sensors  
Blinker- system 
.I 
Operations Time 
5 minutes 
5 minutes 
5- 10 minutes 
'I. 
Assumes that previous attempts at R F  communications have failed. 
Table H-5. Segment C: Perform Close Survey of DV/BOD (Continued) 
?k 
Feasibility uncertain 
I Required Action 
4. If unmanned devices 
perform survey: 
a. Make ready and 
launch TV ca r r i e r  
and manipulator 
b. Per form fly- 
around DV/BOD 
for visual and 
sensor obser- 
vati o n s 
c. Land TV ca r r i e r  
on DV/BOD for 
contact - typ e 
survey to: 
- read exterior 
damage sensor 
repeaters 
- plug-in hardline 
communicator 
system 
- perform atmo- 
sphere sampling 
5. If SRV crew in EVA 
performs survey: 
a. Per form visual 
inspection 
b. Read damage 
9 
sensors 
Equipment Needs 
Self -propelled manipulator 
and TV ca r r i e r  with power 
source and communications 
system 
TV ca r r i e r ' s  propulsion sys- 
tem, remote guidance f rom 
SRV, illumination source on 
car r ie r ,  TV camera .on J. 
car r ie r ,  I R  thermal mapping-'. 
system ( ? )  on car r ie r ,  radi- 
ation sensors on ca r r i e r  
Propulsion system and 
landing guidance system 
TV camera, illumination 
source, manipulator a r m s  
and communication set, 
ha r dline telemetry 
r ec eive r 
Power drill,  sampling 
probes, instrumentation, 
sample collector s 
EVA suits, AMU's o r  self- 
propelled manned 
manipulators 
Portable illumination source 
plus power pack 
Portable plug- in repeaters 
plus power pack 
Operations Tim6 
30 minutes 
10- 90 minutes 
5 minutes 
5 min. transit 
one way 
10 minutes 
5 minutes 
H- 22 
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Table H-5. Segment C: Perform Close Survey of DV/BOD (Continued) 
I Required Action 
c. Establish 
communications 
- by phone 
- by visual means 
- by audible means 
d. Determine feasi- 
bility of entering 
DV/BOD 
Sample atmosphere 
Determine radiation 
environment 
Equipment Needs 
Portable plug-in telephone 
hand sets 
Blinkers , writing slates 
Contact speakers and 
microphones 
Portable instrumentation 
Portable instrumentation 
Body shield 
Operations Time 
10 minutes i 
15 minutes I 
4 
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Table H-6. Segment D: Perform Rendezvous with Bail-Out Device 
LW IR /la s e r 
Or: 
R D F  and doppler ranging 
system 
Communications with SRCC 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge 
4 
Configuration of BOD-’ 
Number of BOD available to DV 
5 minutes 
5-45 minutes 
AV and ECLS capability of BOD 
Location aids on BOD (beacons) 
Communication systems on BOD 
Means 
Handbook 
Handbook, communications, 
observation 
Handbook, communications 
Handbook 
Handbook 
Ground tracking net capability Handbook 
Required Action 
i. SRV locates BOD 
a. If near DV 
b. If distant, conduct 
volume search, 
determine range, 
vector, rate data 
2. Ground net o r  other 
vehicle locates BOD 
3. If SRV has sufficient 
AV capability, com- 
pute and execute 
rendezvous maneuver 
4. If combined BOD and 
SRV AV capabilities 
are required, compute 
and execute rendezvous 
maneuver 
Operations Time I Equipment Ne e ds 
Visual, laser ,  R D F  5 minutes 
Guidance computer on SRV or 
SRCC provides navigation 
data 
Laser  rendezvous and dock- 
ing guidance, existing SRV 
propulsion 
5 min. for computer 
1 - 3  orbits 
As under 3 above, plus 
communication link with 
BOD, and BOD propulsion 
1-3  orbits 
I 
>,< 
Could be non-propulsive bail-out and wait system, or  propulsive bail-out and 
return system electing to remain near DV. 
tug at DV at time of emergency. 
Could also be IP vehicle like 
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Figure H-8. Segment E: Transfer Rescue Party into DV 
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Table H-7. Segment E. i: Dock SRV to DV Airlock (AL) 
Equipment Needs 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge Means 
Operations Time 
Is object already docked to AL? Observation, communication 
(space vehicle, experiment module) 
Is object self-propelled? 0 b s e r va t ion, c ommunic a ti on, 
handbook 
Can DV separate object? Communication 
Can SRV separate object? Handbo o k , c ommuni ca ti on, 
observation 
Is AL operable? C ommuni ca ti on , ob s e rva ti o n 
Does AL have docking mechanism? Observation, handbook 
Required Action 
Remove object by external 
command 
Remove object by entry and 
internal command 
Remove object by docking 
SRV and subsequent 
disposal 
Remove object by exter- 
nal o r  internal disconnect 
and added auxiliary 
p r opul s ion 
Dock SRV to AL 
R F  o r  hard command link 
Crew in EVA mode 
5 minutes 
15 - 30 minutes 
30 minutes 
R F  o r  hard command link 
and crew in EVA mode; 
attachable auxiliary pro- 
pulsion system 
Mating docking fixtures, 
docking guidance and 
doc king propulsion 
Electric potential 
eq uali z . kit 
60 minutes 
20 minutes 
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a 
Required Action 
Same as for E. 1 except 
read TM for SRV 
Table H-8. Segment E. 2: Dock SRV to DV Hatch 
Same as for E. i except read hatch for airlock 
Equipment Needs Operations Time 
Same as for E. 1 Same as  for  E. 1 except 
add: 
One transfer module 
Table H-9. Segment E. 3: Dock Transfer Module (TM) to DV Hatch o r  AL 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge 
Same as for E. 1 except read TMI' for  
SRV and Hatch/AL for AL 
Jr 
Means 
Same as for E. 1 
.I 
The Transfer Module car r ies  rescue crew and all equipment required for the 
rescue operation. 
mother ship to the DV and its return. If this approach is used, the TM 
becomes in effect the SRV and the mother ship's role is that of a trans- 
porter to and from rendezvous point. 
It has sufficient propulsion for  the transit  from the 
.j3 
...... r 
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Table H- 10. Segment E. 4: Dock Portable Airlock (PAL) to DV Hatch 
Reauired P r i o r  Knowledge Means 
Is portable airlock necessary to 
transfer DV crew to SRV? 
Communication 
- SRV, TM, cannot dock? Observation, handbook 
- DV crew cannot transfer in EVA? Communication, handbook 
- to enter DV and to exit? Communication, handbook 
- A L  onboard DV not functioning? Communication, observation 
Is hatch available? Observation 
Is hatch functioning ? Observation, communication 
Does hatch have docking mechanism? Ob s e rva tion, c ommunication 
Required Action 
~~ 
Make hatch available by 
removing object as in E. 1 
If needed, attach docking 
mechanism on hatch 
Transport PAL to DV 
Equipment Needs 
As in E. 1 
Crew in EVA plus dock- 
ing mechanism 
or: Docking mechanism 
attached by 
manipulators 
or: Portable airlock with 
docking interface not 
requiring special DV 
doc king mechanism 
with TM 
or: With reaction motors 
on PAL 
Operations Time 
A s  in E. 1 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Attachment 20 min. 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Attachment 20 min. 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Docking 5 minutes 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
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Table H- 10. Segment E. 4: Dock Portable Airlock (PAL) to 
DV Hatch (Continued) 
Required Action F== 
Dock PAL to DV 
I 
Equipment Needs 
or: Wi th  remotely actuated 
o r  manned self- 
propelled manipulators 
Docking guidance and dock- 
ing propulsion 
Electric potential equaliz. 
kit 
Operations Time 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
5 minutes 
H-3 0 
Table H- 11. Segment E. 5: Enter Hatch by EVA 
Required P r io r  Knowledge Means 
Can DV compartment behind hatch be Communications , inspection 
evacuated? 
Is hatch available? Ob s e rva tion, communication 
If not, can hatch be made available? Observation, communication, 
handbook 
Is hatch functioning? Inspection, communication 
If not, can it be opened by other means? Inspection, communication 
Required Action 
1. If needed, remove 
object from hatch 
2. Evacuate compartment 
behind hatch (if needed) 
- SRV crew in EVA 
opens bleed-down 
valve on exterior 
or: drills hole in 
hatch 
- DV crew opens 
bleed-down valve 
through command 
circuit 
or: manually opens 
valve 
3. Open hatch 
- DV crew opens 
through command 
circuits 
or:  DV crew opens 
manually 
Equipment N e  e d s 
As in E.4  
- valve in proper exterior 
location on DV 
- power drill or  explo- 
sively actuated punch 
- no special equipment 
- original design provision 
- original design provision 
- original design provision 
Operations Time 
As in E. 4 
5 minutes 
10 minutes 
5 minutes 
5 minutes 
1 minute 
1 minute 
! 
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Table H-11. Segment E. 5: Enter Hatch by EVA (Continued) 
Required Action 
- SRV crew in EVA 
opens through 
external command 
- SRV crew opens 
hatch manually 
or: SRV crew 
f o r c e s hatch 
4. If hatch was forced, 
protect against 
hazardous edges 
- install soft edge 
guard 
5. Transfer SRV crew to 
hatch a rea  (for above 
operations o r  for 
entry) 
6 .  Enter through hatch 
Equipment Needs 
- hard command link plus 
power source 
or: RF command link 
plus power source 
- original design provision 
- with special tool 
or :  with explosive 
(FLSC) 
Crew in EVA suits, 
foamed rubber edge 
guard 
Crew in EVA suits, AMU‘s, 
tether lines 
or: crew in EVA suits 
within TM 
Illumination s our c e 
Operations Time 
1 minute 
1 minute 
30 minutes 
10 minutes 
* 
5 minutes“’ 
4, 
i minute”’ 
<. ... 
.I. *r 
Each man 
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Table H-12. Segment E. 6: Enter DV Through Portable Airlock (PAL) 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge Means 
What is atmosphere behind DV hatch? Communications, inspec tion 
Required Action 
Transfer SRV crew 
to PAL 
Open outer PAL hatch 
Enter PAL 
Close outer PAL hatch 
Equalize PAL atrno- 
sphere to that of DV 
Open inner PAL hatch 
Open DV hatch 
Same as for E. 5 
except that bleed down 
of DV compartment is 
not required 
Enter DV 
Equipment Needs 
- SRV crew in EVA suits 
- AMU'S 
No special equipment 
No special equipment 
No special equipment 
- original design provisions 
- atmosphere source 
No special equipment 
See E. 5 
No special equipment 
Operations Time 
.b 
5 minutes*r 
I minute 
i minute". 
1 minute 
5 minutes 
i minute 
1 minute 
* 
.b 
i minute"' 
.I -8. 
Each man 
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Table H-13. Segment E. 7: Enter DV from SRV Docked to DV Airlock 
or  to DV Hatch or from TM Docked to DV Airlock 
or  DV Hatch 
- If hatch is forced 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
What is atmosphere behind hatch? 
Means 
Communications, inspection 
Required Action 
If hatch was forced 
install edge guard 
f 
Equipment Needs 
No special equipment 
In EVA suits, if needed 
No special equipment 
Original design provision 
No special equipment 
No special equipment 
Special tools, FLSC 
Foamed rubber edge 
guard 
- 
Operations Time 
I minute 
- _--- 
rl, 
I minuteer 
1 minute 
5 minutes 
I minute 
30 minutes 
10 minutes 
I 
I 
i 
1 
t 
I 
I 
i 
I 
! 
1 
.I 1
Each man 
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Table H-13. Segment E. 7: Enter DV from SRV Docked to DV Airlock 
o r  to DV Hatch o r  from TM Docked to DV Airlock 
o r  DV Hatch (Continued) 
Required Action 
Enter DV AL 
Open DV AL inner 
hatch (as  for 
outer hatch) 
Enter DV 
b. If docked to DV 
hatch 
(As for E. 6) 
* 
Each man 
Equipment Needs 
Illumination source 
(As for  outer hatch) 
No special equipment 
(As for E. 6) 
Operations Time 
* 
1 minute 
1 minute 
* 
1 minute 
As  for E. 6 
Table H-14. Segment E. 8: Gain Access to DV Other than Through 
Hatch o r  Airlock 
Equipment Ne e d s 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge 
Location of unoccupied compartment 
Operations Time 
Means 
Handbook, communication 
Bulkhead (shell) construction Handbook 
Location of intra -bulkhead 
service lines 
Location of hazardous stowage o r  
equipment in compartment 
Required Action 
i. Bring bulkhead cutting 
equipment to access  
location on DV 
2. If cutting into unpres- 
surized, sealed 
compartment 
a. Perfor,m cutting 
action-" 
b. Remove cut-out 
c. Attach edge guard 
and seal damaged 
service lines 
3. If cutting into pres-  
surized, sealed 
compartment 
a. Bleed pressure  
Handbook 
Handbook 
SRV crew in EVA, o r  
unmanned teleope ra ted 
manipulator 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit  5 midutes 
FLSC cutting kit 
As under (1) above 
Sealing kits and rubber 
edge guards 
Bleed valves on DV 
accessible f rom 
exterior 
or :  Power dril l  o r  
explosive punch 
30 minutes 
2 minutes 
i 0 - 30 minutes 
5 minutes 
20 minutes 
.b 
I,, 1 Requires original design provision (see Section H. 3. 3. 2) 
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Table H- 14. Segment E. 8: Gain Access to DV Other than Through 
Hatch or  Airlock (Continued) 
Required Action 
~~ ~ 
b. (As in 2a, b, c, 
above) 
4. If cutting into pres -  
surized unsealed com- 
partment (with o r  with- 
out personnel) 
a. Attach portable 
pressurized shelter 
b. (As in 2a, b, c, 
above) 
Equipment Needs 
~ 
(As in 2a, b, c, above) 
Portable airlock at pres- 
sure  level matching that 
of compartment in DV 
(As in 2a, b, c, above) 
Operations Time 
As above 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit  5 minutes 
Attachment 20 - 60 
minutes 
As above 
,I  
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Figure H-9. Segment F Assess and Control Damage 
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Table H- 15. Segment F. 1: Survey and Assess Damage 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
DV configurations and systems details 
Location of exterior and interior 
damage sensor readouts 
Means 
Handbook 
Handbook 
Location of interior communication system 
Damage control procedures specific to DV 
Handbook 
Handbook 
Damage data already available Communications from DV 
crew, f rom SRCC 
Required Action 
1. Assess  damage: 
a. Readout of fixed 
sensors in DV, if 
accessible 
b. If fixed sensor 
readouts not 
available: 
1. Compartment 
by compartment 
survey 
Equipment Needs 
Built into DV: 
F i r e  sensors, contamina- 
tion sensors, pressure 
sensors, radiation sensors, 
leak indicators, illumination 
or: With SRV crew: 
Illumination, plug-in test  
equipment, power pack 
EVA o r  IVA suits for 
damage control team 
Hatch opening tools, bulk- 
head cutting system, port- 
able tes t  and sampling kits, 
illumination source, tether 
lines, EVA or  IVA suits for 
damage control team, radia- 
tion suits, leak detectors 
Operations Time 
5 minutes 
10 minutes 
Not dete rmina bl e 
a t  this time 
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Table H- 16. Segment F. 2: Perform Damage Control 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge 
Is o r  was there f i re?  
W a s  there an explosion? 
Is there decompression? 
Is there a contaminated atmosphere? 
Is there radiation? 
Is DV crew protected‘? 
Means 
Data from survey 
Data from survey 
Data from survey 
Data from survey 
Da ta  from survey 
Data from survey 
Required Action 
1. Fight f i res  
a. By decompression 
b. By chemical means 
2. Decontaminate 
a. Fo r  smoke and 
toxic vapor s : by 
decompression 
b. Fo r  radiation 
c. Fo r  bacterial 
pres  enc e 
3. Repressurization 
4. Repair of essential 
subs y s tem s 
Equipment Needs 
Hatch opening tools, 
bulkhead cutting tools 
o r  FLSC 
Extinguisher 
As above, 
or: Purge provision 
Sc rubdown equipment 
cutting tools , equipment 
removal tools 
Disinfectant 
Hole sealing kit, hatch 
sealing kit, a i r  o r  oxygen 
bottles or other atmosphere 
supply system 
Replacement par ts  as 
required 
Operations Time 
5 minutes 
5-30 minutes 
5-30 minutes 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
20 minutes 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Not determinable 
at this time 
. . :,.
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* Table H-17. Segment G: Terminate Rescue Mission 
1 
Required Action 
Separation from DV: 
Undocking 
Jettisoning 
Return 
P r i o r  Knowledpe Required Means 
Equipment Needs Operations Time 
No special equipment 5 minutes 
Rescue has been accomplished Observation 
DV has been secured o r  disposed of 
(See Segment K) 
Rescue cannot be accomplished 
Observation 
Observation, communications 
with SRCC 
* 
Note: There is no flow diagram f o r  Segment G. 
(Figure H- 3). 
See top flow logic diagram 
7 I I 
docked to 
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Figure H-10. Segment H: DV Crew Transfers to SRV by Itself 
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Table H- 18. Segment H. 1: Transfer Through Airlock 
Required P r io r  Knowledge 
(Segments H. 1 through H. 3) Means 
Is docking of SRV or TM to DV feasible? Survey, c onlmunica tions 
Are  atmospheres of SRV/TM and DV 
compatible? Can they be made 
compatible ? 
Is DV crew capable of transferring 
without aid in  EVA o r  IVA? 
Does DV crew have required transfer 
equipment? 
Handbook, communications, 
survey 
C ommunic a ti on s survey 
Communications, survey 
Is  DV crew decontamination necessary? Communications 
Required Action 
1. Transfer through AL 
2. Per form decontamina- 
tion in AL 
Equipment Needs 
Functioning docking AL in 
SRV/TM or  DV 
or:  Portable AL 
Decontamination s y s tem 
change of clothing 
Disposal means for  
clothing 
Operations Time 
1 minute 
10 minutes 
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Table H- 19. Segment H. 2: Transfer Through Other Internal Means 
Required Action 
1. SRV/TM and DV a r e  
doc ked c ompa r tment to 
compartment : 
a. If atmospheres a r e  
compatible, transfer 
through hatch 
b. If atmospheres a r e  
not compatible, DV 
crew: 
1. Enters exiting 
compartment of 
DV in EVA or 
IVA suits 
2. Seals compart- 
ment f rom DV 
3. Bleeds compart- 
ment to SRV/TM 
pressure 
or: Changes com- 
position to 
compo s ition 
SRV/TM 
or: Pressurizes  
to SRV/TM 
pressure and 
enters SRV/TM 
Or:  
c. If atmospheres a r e  not 
compatible: 
.I -4. 
Each man 
Equipment Needs 
No  special equipment 
EVA or  IVA Suits 
Bleed valves 
Variable atmosphere 
source 
Pressurization means 
Operations Time 
*: 
I minute 
* 
1-5 minutes 
1 minute 
5 minutes. May 
require accli- 
mating time for 
DV crew 
10 minutes 
May require 
acclimating time 
for DV crew 
Table H- 19. Segment H. 2: Transfer Through Other 
Internal Means (Continued) 
Required Action 
i. SRV/TM crew in 
EVA suits bleeds 
crew cabin o r  entry 
compartment to DV 
pressure 
or: Changes com- 
position to DV 
composition 
or: Pressur izes  
to DV pressure  
and admits DV 
crew 
>r: 
d. If atmospheres a r e  not 
compatible: 
1. SRV/TM crew in 
EVA/IVA suits 
bleeds crew cabin o r  
entry compartment 
to vacuum 
2. DV crew in EVA/ 
IVA suits enters 
DV exiting com- 
partment and bleeds 
it to vacuum 
3. DV crew enters  SRV/ 
TM compartment o r  
crew cabin and pres-  
surizes it to SRV/ 
TM pressure  and 
atmosphere, o r  to 
DV pressure  and 
atmosphere, o r  to 
EVA/IVA suit 
conditions 
Equipment Needs 
Bleed valves, EVA o r  
IVA suits 
Variable atmosphere 
source 
Pressurization means 
EVA or  IVA suits, 
bleed valves 
Bleed valves 
Variable atmosphere 
source, p res  su r  ization 
means 
Operations Time 
5 minutes. May 
require accli- 
mating time for  
SRV crew 
10 minutes. May 
require accli- 
mating time for 
SRV crew 
5 minutes 
5 minutes. May 
require ac  c limating 
time for SRV crew 
5 minutes. May 
require acclimating 
time for DV crew 
10 minutes 
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Table H-20. Segrnent H. 3: Transfer by EVA 
Required Action 
I. DV crew in EVA suits 
exits DV 
2. DV crew transfers 
to SRV/TM 
3.  DV crew enters SRV/ 
TM AL 
(Decontamination as 
in H. 1) 
3r: 
DV crew enters SRV/ 
TM evacuated com- 
partment and repres-  
surizes it to either 
SRV/TM o r  to EVA 
suit condition 
Equipment Needs 
EVA suits, operating EVA 
AL or means to depres- 
surize exiting compart- 
ment o r  entire DV 
AMU's or  means of 
propulsion 
No special equipment 
As in H. 1 
Variable atmosphere 
source 
Pressurization means 
Operations Time 
AL cycle - '7 min. 
each 
Exiting compart- 
ment - 10 minutes 
May require accli- 
mating time 
5 minutes each 
10 minute/cycle 
10 minutes I 
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A (IlJ 
Portable A L  crew and 
rescue crew 
Provide 
DV crew 
Is 
Portable 
No 
transfer be c transfer capsule life support 
I 
accomplished available ? and request 
assistance 
r 
Transfer DV I 1 Transfer DV 
0 --- T Yes ~ 
and rescue crews1 crew in capsules 
and rescue crew by 
EVA 
i 
Figure H-11. Segment I: Transfer DV Crew to SRV with Aid 
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Table H-21. Segment I. 1: Exit DV and Transfer to SRV or  TM without EVA 
Pr io r  Knowledge Required 
Condition of DV crews: 
Capable of self-help? Observation 
Capable of getting into IVA suits? Observation 
What is  shortest safe internal route to Handbook, observation 
SRV o r  TM? 
What a r e  characteristics of the docking Handbook, observation 
connection between DV and SRV 
or  TM? 
No airlock (AL) 
Fixed AL in either DV or  SRV/TM 
Portable AL 
Is decontamination required? Communication, observation 
I Required Action 
1. If needed, get DV crew 
into IVA suits 
2. If needed, place on 
carrying device 
3. Enter SRV or  TM 
a. Cycle through AL 
of SRV or  TM 
b. Cycle through 
portable AL 
c. Perform decon- 
tamination in AL 
.I, I -Each man 
Equipment Needs 
IVA suits. Possible aid by 
SRV crew 
Personnel ca r r i e r  
No special equipment 
Portable AL 
As in H. 1 
Operations Time 
* 
5 minutes 
May require accli- 
mating time 
2 minutes” 
7 minutes/cycle 
7 minutes/cycle 
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Table H-22. Segment I. 2: Exit DV and Transfer to  SRV or  TM by EVA 
Pr io r  Knowledge Required 
Condition of DV crew: 
Capable of self-help? 
Capable of getting into EVA suits? 
Means 
Observation 
Ob s e rva tion 
c1 
What a r e  available means of propulsion Handbook, observation, 
in EVA mode? inspection 
Required Action 
I. DV crew into EVA suits 
- autonomously 
- with aid 
2. Place on carrying 
device (if needed) 
3 .  Alternate egress 
modes 
a. Depressurize 
compartment 
b. ThroughAL 
(As in H. 1) 
4. Alternate transfer'  
modes 
a. Propelled with 
external aid 
: 
Each man 
~ _ _ _ _ _  
Equipment Needs 
EVA suits, PLSS 
SRV crew aid 
Personnel car r ie r  
P r io r  design provisions 
or: Cut or  drill hole in 
hatch, power tool 
No special equipment 
Astronaut Maneuvering 
Units (AMU) 
or: Hitch ride on tele- 
operated o r  manned 
manipulator 
or: Pulled by SRV crew 
Operations Time 
10 minutes 
* 
May require accli- 
mating time 
.I 
2 minuteser 
5 minutes 
20 minutes 
7 minutes / cycle 
:: 
5 minutes 
.I. 
5 minutes- 
& 
IO minutes- 
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Table H-22. Segment I. 2: Exit DV and Transfer to SRV ~ 
o r  TM by EVA (Continued) 
Required Action 
b. Autonomous (manual) 
5. Enter SRV or  TM 
a. Cycle through stan- 
dard AL (As in H. 1) 
b. Cycle through spel 
c ial compartment 
.!, ,* 
Each m a n  
Equipment Needs 
~ 
Tether line between SRV 
and DV 
No special equipment 
SRV compartment capable of 
pressure cycling with suit- 
able atmosphere 
Operations Time 
* 
10 minutes 
7 minutes/cycle 
15 minutes/cycle 
:j 
.. . .... 
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Table H-23. Segment I. 3: Transfer DV Crew in Capsules 
P r io r  Knowledge Required 
' W h a t  is condition of crew? 
Where is location of hatch leading to capsule? 
Which hatch on the SRV or  TM can accommodate 
capsule? 
Means 
Observation 
Ob s e r va t i on 
Handbook 
Required Action 
1. If not yet in place, move 
capsule from SRV to 
DV hatch and dock 
2. Move DV crew to 
capsule hatch 
Aided, if needed 
3. Place DV crew in 
capsule 
4. Close hatch and trans- 
f e r  capsule to SRV 
hatch o r  AL, o r  PAL 
(decontaminate a s  in 
H. 1) 
5. Move DV crew into SRV 
* 
Each man 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~  ~~ 
Equipment Needs 
SRV crew with manipulators 
Capsule 
or: Autonomous capsule 
propulsion, and SRV 
crew manual 
guidance 
Possibly IVA suits 
Personnel ca r r i e r  
SRV crew 
Autonomously 
or: Aided by SRV crew 
SRV crew with manipu- 
lator s 
or: Autonomous capsule 
propulsion and SRV 
crew manual guidance 
PAL 
Aided by SRV crew, 
if needed 
Operations Time 
~ ~~ ~ 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Docking 5 minutes 
Erection 5 minutes 
* 
Dressing 5 minutes 
Transit 1-5 minutes 
Dressing 5 minutes 
Carrier 2 minutes* 
Transit 1-5 minutes" 
* 
* 
2 minutes 
5 minutes 
10 minutes 
* 
* 
* 
5 minutes-'. 
.b 
3-5 minutes- 
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Table H-24. Segment I. 4: Provide DV Crew Life Support and 
Await Further Assistance 
P r io r  Knowledge Required 
Size of DV crew 
ECLS requirements of DV crew 
Availability of assistance 
Time period until assistance 
Means 
Handbook, observation 
Communications, observation 
Communications with SRC C 
Communications with S RC C 
Required Action 
1. Transfer to DV of 
required life support 
supplies 
2. Provide stand-by aid 
3. Request assistance 
Equipment Needs 
c02 Oxygen source, removal source, water, 
food, etc. 
SRV crew 
Communication link 
with ground 
Operations Time 
Unload 10 minutes 
Transit 5 minutes 
Entry 2- 7 minutes 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
5 minutes 
..... 
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JI 
Table H-25. Segment J: Provide Medical Aid- 
Required P r io r  Knowledge Means 
W h a t  is condition of crew? 
Diagnosis 
Prognosis 
What a r e  limi-s to aid capabili-y of: 
SRV? 
EVA crew? 
What time is available for medical aid? 
Required Action 
Check DV crew for 
symptoms 
Check onboard diagnostic 
instrumentation 
Check ground for prog- 
nosis and advice on medi- 
cal needs 
Treat illness and/or 
injury 
Inspection, communication, 
handbook 
Handbook, communication 
Handbook 
From condition of DV crew, 
from limits on SRV crew 
EVA, and limits on transfer 
and rescue operation times 
Equipment Needs 
Medic or  medically 
trained SRV crew mem- 
ber, portable diagnostic 
equipment 
Medic o r  medically 
trained SRV crew 
member 
Communications link 
Medical kit, oxygen 
mask, etc. 
>: 
Note: There is no flow diagram for Segment J. 
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Operations Time 
Not determinable 
at this time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Secure 
DV/BOD 
and . 
advise SRCC 
Return 
DV/BOD 
internal PL 
Q 
Transfer 
Yes . D V / B O D ~ ~  
transferred stable orbit fl 
I 
Facilitate 
reentry - 
SRV 
provide controlled 
controlled reentry 
DV/BOD 
rescue 
mission 
1 I 
/' 
No Advise SRCC 
4 
/ 
& await disposition 
Figure H-12.  Segment K: Dispose of or Secure DV and/or BOD 
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Table H-26. Segment K. 1: Return DV/BOD as Internal Payload 
Decontamination equip- 
ment 
Damage control equip- 
ment 
Required P r i o r  Knowledge 
(Segments K. 1 through K. 5) 
SRV payload return capability 
Not determinable 
at this time 
Not determinable 
at this time 
Handbook 
Means 
Hazardous components of DV/BOD Handbook, survey 
DV/BOD orbital parameters  Communication with S R C C 
AV requirements for  orbit  change Communication with S RC C 
Required Action 
2. Secure DV/BOD 
a. Remove hazard 
source 
b. Shutdown systems 
ment device, retractable 
arms and attachment 
device 
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Table H-27. Segment K. 2: Secure DV/BOD and Advise SRCC 
1. Shutdown systems 
Required Action Equipment Needs I 
No special equipment 
2. Remove hazard sources 
3. Install location aids 
4. Report status and 
actions to SRCC 
Damage control equipment 
RF and/or laser beacons 
Communication system 
Operations Time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
10 minutes 
5 minutes 
Table H-28. Segment K. 3: Transfer DV/BOD to Stable Orbit 
I Required Action 
1. If not already docked: 
a. Dock to DV/BOD 
b. Transfer auxiliary 
propulsion sy s tem 
Equipment Needs 
Docking fixtures 
Auxiliary propulsion sys-  
tem, manipulators manned 
o r  remotely operated, crew 
in EVA, attachment devices, 
remote command and con- 
t ro l  system 
If docked, use SRV propul- 
sion system; otherwise, use 
auxiliary propulsion system 
Operations Time 
10 minutes 
60- 120 minutes 
5 minutes 
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Table H-29. Segment K. 4: Facilitate Reentry 
Required Action I Equipment Needs I Operations Time 
~~~ 
1. If desirable, reduce 
size of reentering 
mas  s (exclude 
nuclear devices) 
2. If desirable, reduce on- 
orbit time by providing 
retro impulse (As in 
K. 3) 
Explosives, FLSC cutting 
systems, manned o r  tele- 
operated manipulators, 
remote actuation devices 
(As in K. 3) 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
5 minutes 
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Table H-30. Segment K. 5: Provide Controlled Reentry 
Required Action 
1. If entire DV/BOD i s  to 
be reentered: 
a. (As in K. 3) 
?. If only hazardous com- 
ponents require con- 
trolled reentry: 
a. 
b. 
C. 
Separate components 
from D V ~ B O D  
Provide protective 
devices for reenter- 
ing components 
Provide retro propul- 
sion for reentering 
components, and pro- 
duce needed AV 
3. Facilitate non- 
hazardous reentry 
(As in K . 4 )  
Equipment Needs 
(As in K . 3 )  
Cutting methods and equip- 
ment, manned o r  teleoper- 
ated manipulators 
Radiation shielding, reentry 
heat shield 
Auxiliary propulsion sys - 
tem, attachment devices 
(As in K - 4 )  
~~ 
Operations Time 
75 - i 35 minutes 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
60- 120 minutes 
Not determinable 
a t  this time 
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alive 
- -  
t o  fo 
Dock with 
transfer BOD 
i i 
Capture BOD 
and exit crew 
within pressurized 
compartment 
- 
1 
Soft dock 
and transfer 
i 
crew 
docking 
fixtures 
Dock and 
Transfer 
if------- 
Figure H-13 .  Segment L: Dock with BOD and Transfer Crew to SRV 
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Table H-31. Segment L. 1: Dock with BOD and Transfer  Crew to SRV 
P r i o r  Knowledge Required 
(Segments L. 1 through L. 5) 
Configuration and capability of BOD 
Means 
Handbook 
Condition of BOD crew Communication, survey 
BOD crew equipment and life support Communication, survey 
system status 
~ ~ 
Re'quired Action 
1. If BOD and SRV/TM 
atmospheres match: 
dock, open hatch, and 
transfer 
2. If BOD and SRV/TM 
atmospheres do not 
match: 
a. Transfer through 
existing AL on 
SRV/TM 
b. Change SRV/TM 
atmosphere to that 
of BOD and t ransfer  
c. If SRV and BOD crew 
a r e  in EVA/IVA 
suits: bleed SRV/TM 
and BOD to vacuum, 
transfer,  repressurize  
SRV/TM 
Equipment Needs 
No special equipment 
N o  special equipment 
Variable atmosphere 
source, repressurization 
means, acclimating means 
EVA/IVA suits for  SRV/TM 
crew, bleed valves, repres-  
s u r  iza tion means 
Operations Time 
Docking 10 minutes 
Hatches 2 minutes 
Transfer I minute* 
7 minute/cycle 
10 minutes 
May require accli- 
mating time for 
SRV crew 
20 minutes 
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Table H-32. Segment L. 2: Transfer BOD Crew in EVA Mode 
Required Action 
1. Assis t  BOD crew in 
moving to SRV/TM 
!. Transfer through AL 
if available 
1. Enter  through SRV/TM 
compartment, if no AL: 
a. Bleed down compart- 
ment, enter through 
hate h, r epr e s su r  ize 
~ 
Equipment Needs 
- 
Tether lines, crew with 
AMU's, EVA suits 
No special equipment 
Bleeddown valve, repres-  
surization system, EVA/ 
IVA suits for  SRV crew 
Operations Time 
* 5 minutes 
7 minutes/cycle 
20 minutes 
May require accli- 
mating time for  
SRV crew 
Table H-33. Segment L. 3: Capture BOD and Exit Crew within 
P r e s  surized Compartment 
Required Action 
i.  If BOD is of appropriate 
size: 
a. Approach 
b. Attach haul-in device 
c. Pul l  BOD into SRV/ 
TM compartment 
d. Repressurize com- 
partment and exit 
crew 
Equipment Needs 
Tether lines, attachment 
device 
or: ,Retractable arms, 
attachment device, 
power winch 
Compartment of sufficient 
s ize  to contain BOD, with 
entrance hatch of sufficient 
size, Tug to haul to SRV 
Repres surization system 
Operations Time 
5 minutes 
20-60 minutes 
10 minutes 
20 minutes 
* 
Each man 
H-61 
Table H-34. Segment L. 4: Soft Dock and Transfer via Tunnel 
Required Action 
1. Approach BOD 
2. Attach haul-in device 
3. Pull  BOD into close 
position to entry hatch 
of SRV/TM 
4. Attach transfer tunnel, 
pressurize  it, seal  it 
against SRV/TM and 
BOD hatches 
5. Open hatches and 
transfer Crew 
Equipment Needs 
Tether lines, attachment 
device 
or:  Retractable arms, 
attachment device 
Power winch 
Collapsible /expandable 
transfer tunnel, pressuri-  
zation means, sealing 
means 
Operations Time 
5 minutes 
20 minutes 
5 minutes 
30 minutes 
Hatches 2 minutesJ, 
Transfer i minute' 
Table H-35. Segment L. 5: Provide Docking Fixture 
Required Action 
1. Transfer docking fix- 
ture  to BOD exit hatch 
Equipment Needs 
Docking fixture, attach- 
ment means, crew in EVA 
with AMU's 
or:  Crew .in self-propelled 
manipulator 
or :  Teleoperated 
manipulators 
Operations Time 
Unload 20 minutes 
Transit  5 minutes 
Attachment 20 min. 
3 
L : . 
.b T(r 
Each man 
H- 62 
Table H-36. Segment M: Advise SRCC and Await Disposition* 
P r i o r  Knowledge Required Means 
Inability to resolve emergency condition and Observation, handbook 
to perform rescue 
Availability of assistance f rom SRCC Handbook, communication 
Required Action 
1. Data  gathering in 
response to SRCC 
request 
2. Data transmission to 
SRCC 
3 .  Alternate responses as 
per  SRCC instructions: 
a. Stand-by and wait for 
further instruction, 
further assistance 
b. New rescue 
methodology 
c. Dispose/secure 
DV and .return 
(See K) 
Equipment Needs 
~~ ____ ~ 
Surveys as in A and C, life 
support supplies for both 
SRV and DV 
R F  communication: 
Voice 
TV 
Telemetry 
Life support for both SRV 
and DV 
(Not determinable) 
<: 
Note: There is no flow diagram for  Segment M. 
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Operations Time 
30-90 minutes 
5-10 minutes 
Up to 48 hours 
Not determinable 
at this time 
H. 2 . 3  SRV Equipment Requirements 
The preceding tables describing required action and equipment needs of the 
various rescue operational steps depicted in the logic diagrams of Section 
H. 2. 2 served as the source of the following tabulations. The "Equipment 
Needs" columns of these tables were searched for special rescue equipment 
i tems to be carr ied by the SRV and a r e  listed in the following tables under 
the categories of avionics equipment, other hardware i tems, and special 
instrumentation equipment i tems. In the following tables, the column headed 
"Phase" refers  to the operational phase in which the equipment item was 
shown to be required and corresponds in nomenclature to the segment desig- 
nations used in the top flow logic diagram and the detailed diagrams of the 
preceding section (Figures H-3 through H-13) .  
These equipment l is ts  were used as the basis for the conceptual design studies 
reported in Section H. 3 of this Appendix. 
H. 2. 3. I Avionics Equipment 
Phase* 
C, A.2, 
A.3, D 
A . l ,  C 
A. 3 
Item Capability -
Laser/IR system Detect DV debris due to ex- 
plosion. Determine i ts  
velocity vector 
Emergency voice radio Short range, omnidirectional 
communication between SRV 
and DV 
Laser  Measure spin rate and wobble 
motion of DV or  BOD 
.I -r 
Referenced to segment codes on Top Flow Logic Diagram (Figure H-3) .  
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.... 
Phase 
A. 1 
A.3, C 
It em 
Emergency telemetry 
r e c e ive r 
T ele s copic pe r i s cope 
o r  telescope 
c, E, F Plug-in telephone set  
(external plug - in) 
B.1, E. l ,  E.5,  Command t r ansmitt e r 
K. 3 and power pack 
D, E . 4  
D 
K 
H. 2. 3. 2 
Phase 
B. 1 
B. 1, C, E.4,  
E.8,  I. 2, I. 3, 
K.3, K.4, K.5, 
L. 5 
B. 1, C, D, 
E.5,  E .2 ,  F, 
A. 2, H.3, I. 2, 
K.3, L. 1 
B . l ,  C, E.5,  
E.7,  F 
Docking guidance 
Radio direction finder 
RF and Laser  beacons 
Other Hardware 
Item 
Despin device 
Manipulator unit 
(teleoperated) 
EVA suits 
Capability 
Reception of damage sensor 
data 
To permit SRV crew to 
visually inspect DV 
To provide hard-link for 
communication with DV crew 
To actuate DV mechanisms 
from the exterior, such as 
hatch opening, undocking of 
experiment modules, RCS, 
special despin systems 
Provide for terminal guidance 
with DV spinning at  up to  
4 rpm. Docking along axis 
of spin 
To assist in locating BOD 
To be placed on DV/BOD for 
s ecuring/dispo sal action 
Cap ability 
Despin DV 
Attach despin unit to DV 
To enable SRV crew to inspect 
DV exterior 
Illumination plus power 
pack (portable) exterior and interior 
To aid in inspection of DV 
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Phase 
A.3, C 
C 
C 
L. 4 
E.3, E . 4  
It em 
Illumination source on 
SRV (fixed) 
Remote controlled TV 
car r ie r  (s elf -propelled) 
Soft docking device 
Transfer tunnel 
(flexible ) 
Transfer Module 
E.4,  E.8, H, Portable airlock 
I. i 
E. 1, E. 4, L. 5 Portable docking 
fixtures 
C, E.5, H.3,  Power dr i l l  plus power 
I. 2 pack o r  explosive 
punch 
E.6,  E . 7  Hatch forcing tool 
E.5,  E.6,  H.3, Astronaut Maneuve ring 
I. 2 Units 
Capability 
To allow inspection of DV 
when EVA operation is too 
hazardous 
To allow docking to DV with 
residual motion present 
To be used when hard docking 
and rigid connections a r e  not 
feasible 
To allow crew transfer 
between SRV and DV when 
SRV cannot dock directly 
To permit transfer of DV 
crew (not capable of EVA) 
between vehicles of differing 
atmospheres 
Or: To permit entry from 
EVA into DV not equipped with 
functioning air lock 
Or: To serve a s  contamination 
bar r ie r  between DV and. SRV 
To be attached to entry port 
of DV not equipped with 
doc king provisions 
To dr i l l  pressure-bleed hole 
into DV hatches o r  bulkheads 
To open jammed hatches 
To be used for mobility in 
EVA 
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It em Phase 
F . 2 ,  1.4, M 
Capability 
Portable 0 2  or  air 
containers 
To replenish DV atmosphere 
Bulkhead cutting tool To enter compartments with 
jammed hatches 
Hole sealing kit F. 2 
I. 1, I. 2, I. 3 
To permit repressurizing of 
damaged compartments 
Personnel ca r r i e r  To act like a stretcher in 
moving injured DV crew to 
SRV 
. 
I. 3 Transfer capsule 
(possibly expandable) 
To permit transfer of DV 
personnel without EVA and 
in absence of docking SRV o r  
TM 
Blinker set  For  communication between 
SRV and DV crew 
C, E.5,  E .7 ,  
F . 2 ,  H . 3 ,  1.2,  
K. 4, K.5 
FLSC cutting kits For hole cutting 
- Bulkheads 
- Hatches 
I. 4, M Portable Life Support 
Systems 
For  transfer into DV to 
increase i ts  shelter capability 
until rescue i s  accomplished 
Damage control kit To permit counteracting of 
effects of hazard to DV equip- 
ment and structure 
F, K. 1, K. 2 
J Medical kits For use by DV crew in f i r s t  
aid. 
f i rs t  aid, for diagnostic 
purpo s e s 
For  use by SRV crew in 
C, K.5 
F. 2 
Radiation suits o r  
shielding 
For  EVA or  IVA near radia- 
tion sources 
For  f i re  fighting when de- 
compression is infeasible 
F i r e  extinguisher 
systems 
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Phase Item CaDabilitv 
F . 2 ,  K.1 
E. 1, E.4 
Decontamination kits 
Electric potential 
equalizing kits 
K Grappling system 
B. 1, E. 5, F, Tether lines 
I. 2, K. 1, L. 2, 
L. 3 
K. 5 Reentry he at  shields 
H. 2. 3. 3 In s t r um ent at ion 
Phase Item 
A.3, C Thermal radiation 
sensors 
A.2, A.3, C, F Nuclear radiation 
sensors 
. c ,  F 
C,  F.l 
Atmospheric sampler 
kit 
Leak detector 
Plug-in visual read- 
out devices with power 
packs (external plugs) 
To combat toxic materials o r  
bacterial contamination 
To reduce o r  eliminate poten- 
tial differences between DV 
and SRV 
To capture free-floating crew 
in EVA, bail-out devices, 
tools, etc. 
To permit EVA crew transfer, 
to anchor BOD 
To prevent break-up of 
hazardous equipment on 
controlled reentry 
CaDabilitv 
Thermal mapping of exterior 
and interior of DV 
To permit mapping of the 
external and internal radia- 
tion environment of DV, to 
permit diagnosis of nuclear 
equipment failure s 
To test  atmosphere behind 
bulkhead o r  hatch for 
pres  sure,  composition, 
toxicity, radiation 
To discover source of atmos- 
phere leaks from compart- 
ments, to test  for fuel o r  
propellant leaks into compart- 
ments and discover sources 
To form hard-link connection 
with damage sensors within 
DV for damage assessment 
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H. 2 . 4  DV/BOD Equipment Requirements 
In addition to the SRV equipment requirements, the logic diagrams previously 
described also provided some insight into equipment pre-installed in a 
candidate DV which would aid a rescue effort, o r  which is required to allow 
the special SRV equipment to properly perform their functions. 
equipment items a r e  listed in the following tables in the same manner in which 
the SRV items were listed in Section H. 2. 3.  
Such 
H. 2. 4. 1 Avionics Equipment 
Phase It em 
A, c Emergency voice radio 
Laser  reflectors on 
exterior 
Emergency telemetry 
RF  beacons and laser 
beacons 
Command receivers 
Wire communication 
system with plug- ins 
at exterior of every 
hatch (internal as well 
as external) 
Capability 
Short rang e, omnidirectional 
communication sets in every 
compartment 
To permit rendezvous and 
docking, to permit measure- 
ment of spin and wobble rates 
and axes 
Automatic transmission of 
damage sensor data 
To ease acquisition and 
tracking, particularly of BOD 
separated from DV 
To permit remote control by 
SRV of mechanisms such as 
hatch opening, RCS, special 
despin devices, etc. 
To provide hard-link for 
communication with SRV crew 
in EVA or  IVA 
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H. 2.4. 2 Other Hardware 
Phase It em 
B Despin device 
E 
K 
EVA suits 
Auxiliary propulsion 
Docking AL 
Or: 
Compartment adjacent 
to docking hatch capable 
of atmosphere cycling 
EVA airlock 
Double hatches, ex- 
plosively actuated 
hatches, bulkheads 
with provisions for 
FLSC cutting 
Damage Control Kits 
Decontamination kits 
Medical Kits 
Personnel restraints 
Diagnostic equipment 
Radiation shielding for 
personnel 
Capability 
To back up RCS in overcoming 
undesirable motion; externally 
installed and capable of re- 
mote actuation by either DV 
crew o r  rescue crew 
To permit DV crew to transfer 
to SRV if docking i s  not 
f e a s ible 
To permit transfer into stable 
orbit in event of primary 
propulsion failure 
To permit transfer of DV 
crew without EVA, between 
vehicles of different atmos- 
pheres, to serve a s  
contamination barr ier  between 
SRV and DV 
To permit entry from EVA 
into DV not equipped with 
docking airlock 
To assure entry into DV and 
DV compartment in event of 
jammed hatches or  absence 
of acce s s ible hatches 
To enable DV crew to clear 
access for rescue crew 
To enable DV crew to 
administer f irst  aid while 
waiting for rescue 
To survive nuclear hazard 
until rescue 
H-7 0 
K 
Phase 
K 
Item -
Design provisions for  
quick- jettisoning of 
hazardous components 
Hazardous component 
design so a s  to promote 
non- dest ructive reentry 
(heat shields, aero- 
dynamic stability) 
Attachment fixtures 
H. 2. 4. 3 Instrumentation 
Item -Phase 
c,  F Damage sensors 
Exterior readout 
devices near hatches 
Capability 
To enable separate disposal 
of hazardous components 
such as reactors if DV re-  
entry seems unavoidable 
To allow intact reentry of 
i tems such as  reactors into 
pre- selected landing zones 
To allow attachment of despin 
devices to exterior of DV, to 
allow retrieval of BOD into 
SRV compartment, to allow 
attachment of po rt able doc king 
device, portable AL, auxiliary 
propulsion, soft docking 
tunnel, etc. 
Capability 
Detect f ire,  contamination, 
loss of pressure,  change 
in atmospheric composition, 
etc. 
To repeat damage sensor 
readings to SRV crew in EVA 
or  to TV car r ie r  
Sample ports 
H. 2.5 
In order to provide a summary of the special operations identified by the 
logic diagrams as required for rescue, the following table was prepared. 
The nomenclature is as used in the previous equipment tables. 
Res cue Operations Listing 
H-7 1 
Phase 
A, c 
M 
Ope rat ion 
Attempt to communicate 
by RF and other means 
Communicate with 
SRCC 
Circle the DV in several 
directions from stand- 
off and close distances 
- with SRV 
- with TV car r ie r  
A, c Measure motion of DV 
B, E, L, F, H, I Remote control and 
command by SRV crew 
B, E Activation by EVA crew 
B, E, I, H, K, T ran s po r t , attachment 
F, L and removal of equip- 
ment by: crew in EVA, 
t ele - ope rated manip- 
ulator unit, transfer 
module, SRV 
C Perform contact survey 
by: TV car r ie r  and 
remote controlled 
manipulator, crew in 
manned manipulator , 
crew in EVA 
Search space volume 
with SRV sensors 
E, Ls C, 1, H SRV to rendezvous and 
dock 
Purpose 
To learn status of DV and 
DV crew 
For  data transmittal and 
in st ruc tion s 
To survey DV and DV en- 
vironment for hazards to 
SRV and for  status of DV 
and DV crew 
To determine feasibility of 
docking o r  need to stabilize 
and/or despin DV 
To remotely activate despin 
unit, hatch opening mecha- 
nisms, manipulators, TV 
car r ie rs ,  etc. 
To activate despin unit, 
hatches, etc. 
For use with: despin units, 
portable airlocks , portable 
docking , fixtures , transfer 
capsules, etc. , auxiliary 
propulsion units 
To read exterior sensor 
repeaters, to plug-in hard- 
line communication system 
(telemetry and voice), to 
collect and test DV atmosphere 
samples, to determine 
feasibility of entering DV 
To locate BOD 
To dock with DV o r  BOD 
€3-7 2 
ODe ration Purpose 
Evacuate D V compart - 
ment by: opening bleed 
valve, drilling hole 
To permit entry from EVA if  
no AL available, to fight f ire,  
to decontaminate 
Open external and 
internal hatches by: 
manual means, com- 
mand links, explosives 
To enter compartments, to 
fight f ire,  to decontaminate 
To permit entry if  hatches 
non-functioning o r  non- 
existent 
Open entrance into D V  
o r  DV compartment 
through bulkhead by 
FLSC 
E, F, H, I, L Transfer crew in: SRV 
EVA, transfer module, 
transfer capsule 
To permit entry into vehicle 
of dissimilar atmosphere, to 
enter f rom EVA 
Transfer crew through 
airlock: in DV, in 
SRV, in transfer 
module, portable 
airlock 
To guard against contamination 
of vehicle atmosphere 
Transfer cargo between 
vehicles by: movement 
within docked vehicles, 
by crew in EVA, by 
manipulators (manned 
o r  remote controlled) 
in EVA 
To transport  tools and/or 
supplies to DV/BOD to per-  
form: forced entry, resupply 
damage control and repair ,  
medical aid 
Compartment by com- 
p a r tment examin at ion 
of DV 
To survey for damage, read 
sensor instrumentation 
Seal holes in bulkheads, 
hatches 
To repressurize compartments 
Replace and repair  a s  
needed 
To attempt to make DV 
ope rational 
Undock SRV from DV 
o r  BOD 
To terminate rescue mission 
Phase Ope ration Purpose 
E, H, 1, F, L Depressurize and 
repressurize 
co mp ar trne nt s 
To permit docked transfer 
without AL, to permit entry 
from EVA, to fight fire, to 
decontaminate 
c ,  B, D, E, Dress  in EVA suits, 
F, H undress f rom EVA suits 
To permit EVA operations, 
to permit cabin operations 
To enable crew to perform 
transfer to DV o r  BOD 
Place crew in IVA suits 
into manipulator unit 
To permit crew to perform 
operations on exterior of 
DV o r  BOD 
Same Place injured o r  ill 
crew on personnel 
car  r ie  r 
To facilitate movement by 
rescue crew of D V  crew 
through hatches, airlocks, 
into transfer capsules, etc. 
J Provide diagnostic 
services, medical 
aid, therapy 
To stop deterioration in  
DV/BOD crew physical con- 
dition, to enable transfer to 
SRV, to enable survival until 
permanent haven is  reached 
Grapple objects in space 
exterior to SRV by: use 
of retractable a rms ,  
nets, tether lines with 
EVA crew 
To rescue free-floating crew, 
to retrieve equipment i tems, 
to retrieve BOD 
K Reduce size of DV/  
BOD by: explosive, 
FLSC, other cutting 
means 
To facilitate safe reentry 
K 
K 
Provide AV by: docked 
SRV, auxiliary propul- 
sion system 
To dispose of/secure 
DV/BOD by: retro impulse, 
o r  bit adjustment impulse 
To remove sections of 
DV by: cutting means, 
manipulato r s 
To reduce hazard in reentry, 
to dispose of hazardous 
equipment 
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H. 3 SPECIAL RESCUE EQUIPMENT 
The rescue operations analysis described in the logic diagrams and 
supporting tables of Section H.2 led to a listing of a variety of special equip- 
ment considered either desirable o r  necessary for manned rescue operations. 
Some of these equipment items a re  obtainable essentially "off-the-shelf, 
others represent current state of the a r t  but require development or  space 
qualification, and some require advanced technology effort with some 
uncertainty a s  to the feasibility of the desired concept. 
Because of their importance to the success of the rescue mission, a s  well a s  
technological uncertainties, four major a reas  were selected fo r  further 
study. These study areas  concerned the problems of: 
a. 
b. 
Lack of information concerning the nature of the DV 
emergency 
Hazards which the SRV itself might encounter due to the 
DV emergency 
Transfer difficulties encountered by either the rescue 
crew attempting to enter the DV or the DV crew in 
leaving the DV 
Delays introduced into the rescue operation due to the 
need to control damage within the DV prior to rescue 
o r  to provide medical aid prior to removal of the DV 
crew 
c. 
d. 
Effort was also devoted to equipment items not covered by the above so that 
estimates of weight and stowage volume of interest to subsequent tasks of 
this rescue study could be made. 
H. 3 . 1  Communications and Data Surveys 
Lack of information on the condition of the DV and of its crew can prove a 
serious handicap to the rescue mission. 
tant to the planning of the mission, possibly left unanswered by a break in 
communications with the DV, are:  
Some examples of questions impor- 
a. 
b. 
What hazards would the rescue crew face in attempting to 
enter the D V ?  
Which compartment of the space station/base contains 
the survivors of the emergency? 
What equipment must the rescue crew bring into operational 
status prior to rendezvous o r  put on board the SRV prior 
to launch? 
c. 
Several alternate approaches a r e  available in assuring the availability of 
such data. 
any potential DV can be provided to avoid total blackout of communications. 
Although quantitative data a r e  not available, i t  i s  reasonable to assume that, 
in the vast majority of emergencies, such redundancy will suffice. 
however, also reasonable to assume that in a small number of emergencies 
all communications systems will be inoperative, since there will be practical 
limits to the degree of redundancy that can be provided. 
SRV equipment rimst provide a s  much a s  possible of the needed data. 
i s  done by external survey techniques utilizing sensors installed on the SRV 
or  carried to the DV (by remote control o r  by rescue crews in EVA), and 
by readout equipment also carried to the DV and operated in conjunction with 
sensors prepositioned within the DV. 
Sufficient redundancy in onboard communication equipment within 
It is 
In such an event, 
This 
This study considered both communication system redundancy and external 
survey equipment requirements to some detail to determine feasibility. 
Weight and volume requirements were also determined to support subsequent 
study effort. 
H. 3 .  1. I. 
.b 
R e dundant Communication E quipme nt *' 
Since redundant communication equipment will be utilized within the 
potentially distressed vehicle, a brief review was made to assess  i ts  
influence on the selection of equivalent SRV equipment. -. 
4. - - 
This Subsection is based on work by R. T. Luke, Ref. H-2. 
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The baseline assumptions fo r  this review were: 
a. 
b. 
A complete power failure in the distressed vehicle (DV). 
Personnel in  the DV may be incapable of communicating 
because of lack of access to the equipment o r  because of 
illness /injury. 
The space rescue vehicle (SRV) is within a 50 n mi radius 
of the DV and knows the location of the DV. 
c. 
These baseline assumptions lead to the following equipment requirements: 
a. The redundant emergency equipment should be battery 
powered. 
b. Both voice and telemetry service a re  desirable, with 
emphasis to be placed on voice communications. 
c. Omni antenna coverage must be provided. 
The characteristics of communication equipment compatible with these 
requirements a r e  outlined in Tables H-37, H-38, and H-39. 
Table H-37 shows the more important frequency tradeoff parameters which 
led to the selection of 2.2 GHz as the preferred frequency for the emergency 
equipment. This frequency will permit low-10s s communication with either 
the SRV, o r  with a ground station when the DV is within line-of-sight of the 
latter. Link calculations a re  shown in Table H-38, indicating that a trans- 
mitter power of 250 m W  will be sufficient. 
mended emergency communications equipment for the DV, together with 
weight, power, and stowage volume requirements. The SRV equipment 
would be similar, except for antenna and battery. 
Table H-39 indicates the recom- 
Other recommendations resulting from this study include the design of the 
eme rgency transmitter with transponder capability and the provision of 
battery-powered handsets in each compartment so that the emergency 
equipment would be accessible for voice communication via an R F  link 
wherever the crew might be located a t  the time of the emergency. 
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Table H-39. Emergency Communication Equipment 
Transmitter (voice /telemetry) 
Required Transmit Power: 250 m W  
3 Size : 32 in. 
Weight: 2 lb 
Prime Power: 1.5 w 
Receiver (voice) 
Required Sensitivity: 
Size : 
Weight: 
Prime Power: 
Batte ry : Nickel -Cadmium 
Max Power: 
Volts : 
Useful Life: 
Assumed Duty Cycle: 
Size : 
Weight: 
Total Package 
Weight: 
Size ( 4 X  5 Y  5 in . ) :  
0.1 pv 
20 in. 
1.25 lb 
0.75 W 
3 
2 . 0  w 
28 - 24 V 
100 h r  
20% 
3 50 in. 
10 lb  
12 lb 
100 in. 3 
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Consideration might be given to special protective shielding for this 
emergency set so a s  to assure  survival in the event of fire, explosion, 
rapid decompression, etc. 
Additional communication redundancy in the form of hard -wire links could 
be provided by installing phone contacts on the exterior of the DV near 
hatches a s  well a s  within the DV. 
could then attempt to establish communications by plugging into hardline s 
a s  they enter the DV and a s  they progress in  their search for the crew. 
A rescue crew equipped with handsets 
Another communication method, not to be neglected merely because of its 
lack of sophistication, is a conventional blinker used for many years on 
water-borne vessels and in early aircraft  applications. 
available on al l  IP vehicles and visual communications can therefore be 
established under most foreseeable conditions. 
View ports will be 
H. 3.1.2 
Both distant and close surveys of the DV by the SRV might be required as a 
prelude to the actual rescue. 
determine whether a closer approach by the SRV would be hazardous. 
primary reason for caution would be the possibility that debris generated 
by the DV a s  a result of the emergency still remains in the vicinity. 
the absence of knowledge concerning the nature of the emergency, such a 
determination of debris presence should be made routinely. 
communication with the DV might bring a warning concerning the presence 
of debris; in that event the distance survey would locate the debris and 
determine whether closer approach is feasible. 
Survey Equipment and Methods 
The distance (or stand-off) survey would 
The 
In 
However, 
The distance survey could also check for dangerous radiation on o r  near 
the DV. Here again, communication with the DV, i f  feasible, would aler t  
the SRV to this danger, but a survey might still be required to map the 
radiation field and to plot safe approach corridors,  i f  any. In the absence 
of communication, knowledge that the DV carried sources of nuclear 
radiation (i.e. , power sources) should cause a mapping survey to be 
routinely carried out. 
Close surveys would be required to determine the extent of DV damage 
caused by the emergency, to discover the best method of entry to the DV, 
to determine fxmbling characteristics, etc. All of these determinations 
might have to be made even i f  communication were available. 
of communication, the objectives of a close survey would expand to include 
determination of any residual life on board the DV, the presence of hazards 
affecting the safety of a boarding rescue crew, etc. 
In the absence 
€3.3.1.2.1 Distance Survey Equipment 
H. 3. 1.2. I. 1 
A brief discussion of the motion of debris in the vicinity of the DV has been 
provided in Appendix 1-1, together with preliminary data on the probability 
of i ts  presence in the vicinity of the DV. Nothing, however, can be stated 
about the nature of the debris and its characteristics, since this is strictly 
a function of the design and construction of the DV and the nature and force 
of the explosion o r  collision which created the debris. The final design of 
the detection system must therefore be preceded by considerable analysis, 
and perhaps experimentation, to provide an adequate target model. 
clear, however, that DV-generated debris will be a passive target, can vary 
in size from inches to several  feet, and will be travelling along a variety 
of vectors both outward from the DV a s  well a s  returning to the DV. 
.I, 
Debris Detector". 
It is 
Sophisticated electro-optical instrumentation has been proposed in recent 
years fo r  detection and identification of non-cooperative space objects such 
as the debris of interest here. 
of such techniques is classified and specific details will not be presented in 
Most of the documentation discussing details 
* 
This subsection is based on the work of J. Camus, Ref. H-3. 
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this brief survey. 
will eventually help determine a useful solution to the problem of debris 
detection and tracking. 
delineate a firm solution. 
from 5 to 10 years,  both in  the laser  and detector areas ,  to accomplish 
debris detection and tracking without the need for a major technical 
breakthrough. 
It is possible to outline some selection cri teria which 
It is not, however, possible at this time to 
Technology, it is believed, will be available in 
Five possible approaches to detect debris were considered. 
summarized in Table H-40. 
They a r e  
Considering the state of the a r t ,  multiple -use potential, and probable weight 
and storage volume limitations, it was concluded that a LWIR (Long Wave 
Infrared) system for acquisition and a scanning laser  radar for tracking 
and ranging a re  appropriate for this application. Some advancement in the 
state of the a r t  of laser  radars would be required to produce a useful range 
for the skin tracking case represented by the debris detection problem. 
It must be reemphasized that much additional study is necessary to properly 
optimize a debris detection system and that, in  particular, a good target 
model must be provided. 
indicate whether such a concept could even be considered feasible and worthy 
of further investigation, whether the physical characteristics of the system 
made its installation in a SRV practical, and whether such a system would 
be useful for other rescue mission needs. 
The purpose of this brief discussion was to 
The passive LWIR detection approach suggested operates by sensing target 
thermal emissions in  the 8 - 13 micron region. 
by the sensor can be presented on a real-time TV display. 
conditions of cold background, the IR vidicon can also be useful. 
equipment used in  long wave infrared applications requires cryogenic 
cooling which is a detriment in  long duration missions. 
The information obtained 
Under certain 
However, 
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The scanning laser  which could be used with the LWIR system to provide 
tracking and ranging capability uses  an image dissector detector and can 
be used for skin tracking over short distances. 
developments in  the state of the a r t  of YAG (Yttrium Aluminum Garnet) 
lasers ,  it is anticipated that the maximum range of the skin tracking sensor 
could be extended to about 25 miles during the next 10 years without an 
excessive increase in system weight. 
100 miles are determined to be desirable a s  a result of target model studies, 
the C02 laser could be considered. 
and range rate determinations has been reported in the literature. 
l aser  ranging is still in  its early development phase, making it difficult to 
evaluate the suitability of this system for this application. 
however, that this system will be quite heavy. 
With present and anticipated 
If skin tracking ranges of about 
Feasibility of COz lasers for range 
C 0 2  
It is likely, 
15 
2 
30 
Table H-41 provides estimates of the physical characteristics of the 
suggested debris detection system. 
1 
2 
400 
Table H-41. Physical Characteristics of LWIR /Laser 
Debris Detection System 
Characteristic 
Field of View, deg 
Minimum Target 
Size, f t 2  
Weight, lb 
Volume, f t  
Power, watts 
3 
LWIR 1 Laser  Radar 
~ ~ ~~ ~ 
Range = 100 n mi 
LWIR 
15 
2 
2 00 
10 
150 
Laser  Radar 
I 
2 
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As discussed in  Section H. 3.2. 1. 1, the laser  portion of this system may 
also be of use in connection with DV spin rate characterization. 
LWIR acquisition system a s  well a s  the laser  should also be considered for 
the rendezvous and docking guidance system. This multiple -use capability 
is an obvious advantage in spite of the weight and complexity penalty of the 
system. 
The 
H. 3. 1.2. 1.2 Radiation 
As in the case of debris, hazardous nuclear radiation which may result from 
an emergency aboard the DV can only be defined quantitatively when DV 
vehicle design and configuration a re  fixed, and when the nuclear radiation 
sources have been carefully defined. In addition, probable failure modes 
must be developed. 
isotope power sources will play a role in the IP and that a rescue vehicle 
may therefore encounter uncontrolled radiation. In consequence, means for 
surveying a DV for such radiation a re  desired, with the specific objective 
of determining safe approach corridors from a s  remote a location a s  
possible in order to reduce the hazard to the SRV crew. 
It can be safely projected, however, that reactors and/or 
Nuclear radiation sources and the type of uncontrolled radiation which may 
result from emergency situations a re  listed on Table H-42. 
The distance at which a radiation hazard can be evaluated will depend on 
the strength of the radiating source and on the background level of natural 
radiation, plus the orientation of the geomagnetic field between the source 
and the detector, in the case of charged particles. 
neutrons may be emitted in sufficient numbers to constitute a hazard. 
Additionally, they might be used as a diagnostic tool for determining the 
state of the reactor. 
The earth 's  magnetic field will not deflect the path of the neutron. 
tional neutron detectors, modified for use in vacuum, could be used. 
If a reactor i s  involved, 
Neutron counters can be made with some directionality. 
Conven- 
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Over distances of several kilometers, the deflection of the path of an  
alpha-particle due to the geomagnetic field is sufficiently small that i t  can 
be neglected in the assessment of alpha-particle hazard (due, for example, 
to a ruptured isotope power generator). Alpha-particles will not constitute 
a hazard to anything except directly exposed sensitive surfaces (bare solar 
cells, bare transistors,  film, etc. ) because of their high rate of ionization 
in materials and therefore very short path length. 
If measurements of alpha-particles a r e  desired for diagnostic purposes, 
special detectors would have to be manufactured. 
ment means is a thin-window ion chamber o r  Geiger detector. 
vacuum presents difficulties in making a thin-window gas -filled counter. 
Another type of detector is the thin-window solid state sensor. 
drawback i s  its sensitivity to light. 
circumvent this problem. 
measuring the natural alpha-particle population. 
The principal measure- 
The external 
Its principal 
Collimators and care  in use can 
Such devices a r e  already in use in space, 
If electrons a r e  being emitted by a source on the spacecraft, even though 
they a r e  emitted isotropically, they will not be isotropically distributed. 
The ambient geomagnetic field will convert their trajectories into approxi- 
mately helical form, with the axis of the helix aligned along the magnetic 
field. 
of curvature of about 200 meters  i f  the path is perpendicular to the field. 
The radius of curvature approaches zero a s  the momentum perpendicular to 
the field approaches zero. Hence, a very low energy particle would not get 
very far from the source i f  it were emitted perpendicular to the local 
magnetic field. 
to the field, it is unaffected by the field (i. e. , until the field curvature 
becomes significant). 
A 1 MeV electron in a 0. 1 gauss field will have a path with a radius 
Conversely, i f  a particle of any energy i s  emitted parallel 
Therefore, when making measurements of electrons from some distance 
away, the orientation of the geomagnetic field between the source and 
H- 88 
detector is of prime importance. 
the field lines passing through the source and only a qualitative estimate 
of source strength can be obtained without a detailed survey of the adjacent 
field lines. 
isotropically, pitch-angle distributions on all the adjacent and direct field 
lines would also be needed for a quantitative estimate. 
plus the fact that electrons would not constitute a direct hazard to personnel 
unless they a re  very energetic (i.e., from a fission source), i t  is probably 
better to ignore electron measurements in  the distant survey phase. How- 
ever, standard spacecraft electron detectors a r e  available, i f  desired. 
Measurements must be made parallel to 
If one cannot assume that the electrons a re  being emitted 
For these reasons, 
X-ray and gamma-ray measurements a re  also possible. 
electromagnetic radiations a r e  not affected by the magnetic field and a r e  
not attenuated by the vacuum, they should constitute the most useful type of 
measurement for distant survey (except for neutrons in the case of a reactor). 
Quantitative analysis may be made by making measurements with a detector 
such a s  a collimated scintillation counter and extrapolating by assuming an 
isotropic emission a t  the source with an inverse square diminution at the 
detector. 
ful in pinpointing the location of the emitting source. 
Since these 
I f  the distressed spacecraft is rotating, a survey may be success- 
In all  of the far encounter measurements, the detected levels due to a source 
a t  the DV will probably be small. 
mask the desired measurements. 
natural radiation level into consideration would have to  be used. 
Thus, natural background radiation may 
Measurement techniques which take the 
Because of the many uncertainties concerning this problem and the essentially 
low-weight nature of the instrumentation required for radiation surveys, 
effort to estimate weight and volume requirements for these items was not 
undertaken. 
H- 89 
H. 3. 1.2.2 Close Survey Equipment 
A close survey of the DV might be required to determine the best entry 
point for the rescue crew, the status of the crew, the location of the crew, 
damage to the DV, hazards to the rescue crew attempting entry, the nature 
of any motion of the DV in order to plan attachment of despin equipment, 
etc. 
navigation of the DV, by remotely controlled, self-propelled TV and 
sensor car r ie rs ,  o r  by the rescue crew in EVA. 
by visual means, by sensors such as heat sensors o r  laser  systems, by 
plug-in read-out devices, i f  the DV were equipped with contacts tied by 
hardwire to internal sensors still  functioning, and by radiation measuring 
instrumentation. 
A close survey could be performed by the SRV itself in  a circum- 
Data could be collected 
The laser  system already discussed (Section H. 3. 1.2. 1. 1) could be used 
in conjunction with corner reflectors, pre-positioned on a potential DV in 
a proper pattern, to permit precise characterization of the motion of a 
spinning and tumbling space vehicle. 
Section H. 3.2. 1. 1. 
This problem i s  discussed in 
Externally provided illumination would be desirable for a close survey. 
The spacecraft making the survey should have this capability. 
the EVA crew would be equipped with portable lighting systems for the 
same purpose. These portable systems would, of course, also be available 
for rescue crew operations aboard the DV. The EVA crew could also car ry  
portable radiation detection and field strength measurement instrumentation 
Radiation measurements from the SRV could utilize the same instrumenta- 
tion already provided for the distant survey. For radiation measurements 
by the EVA crew, it would be desirable to provide small  body shields such 
a s  lead-loaded aprons until the hazard level can be certified to be 
non-dange rous . 
In addition, 
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A portable atmospheric sampling kit would be useful for close survey by a 
rescue crew, both on the exterior of the DV a s  well a s  within the DV during 
exploratory entry o r  a damage control operation. 
the rescue crew to test  interior atmospheres for contaminants, for 
composition, and for pressure either through sampling ports already pre - 
positioned on potential DV's o r  by drilling sampling holes and inserting 
suitable sensor probes. 
analysis system for contaminant determination, pres  sure gages , and an 
atmospheric analyzer to determine the partial pressure of oxygen within 
the sampled DV compartment. 
This kit would enable 
Such a kit would probably consist of a colorimetric 
Equipment characteristics for the close survey function a r e  summarized 
be low : 
Weight, lb Volume 
3 Portable plug-in damage sensor reader 5 50 in. 
Illumination installed in SRV 
Remote controlled TV ca r r i e r  
Portable 
Portable 
Portable 
H. 3.2 
radiation detector 
atmospheric sampling 
illumination 
Transfer Aids 
20 i f t3  
300 6 f t3  
5' 0.25 ft3 
kit 35 1 f t 3  
5 0.25 ft3 
Special equipment is required during phases of the rescue operation con- 
cerned with moving the rescue crew to the DV, and returning both the rescue 
crew and the DV crew to the SRV. These requirements relate to possible 
incompatibility between the docking arrangements of SRV and DV, a s  well 
a s  to possible damage to the DV as a result of the emergency situation. 
Considerable effort was devoted during the course of the rescue study to 
the exploration of the operational and equipment requirements of crew 
transfer and is described in  the following sections. 
H. 3 . 2 .  1 Reduction of Undesirable Motion 
The causes of undesirable motion in a DV, and the characteristics of such 
motion, a r e  described in Appendix 1-1 to this report. 
existence of such motion, means to reduce i t  to acceptable levels a r e  
essential to a successful rescue mission. 
axis of rotation may permit docking i f  the rotation rate is low enough to 
permit the SRV to match angular rates and i f  the DV docking port is located 
along the axis of rotation. 
a t  least  uniform motion around a single axis but can permit some tumbling 
of the DV i f  rates a r e  low. 
crew equipped with appropriate transporter devices, entry may even be 
feasible i f  the DV airlock o r  entry hatch is not located on the axis of rotation. 
If such conditions a r e  found not to prevail upon inspection of the DV by the 
SRV, they can be achieved under certain favorable circumstanges. 
Despinning the DV o r  changing a compound motion (tumbling) to nearly pure 
rotation around a single axis would appear possible. 
ments for this purpose a re  not excessive i f  DV spin rates  a re  in order of 
4 rpm o r  less  around any axis and if  either pre-positioned despin devices 
on the DV or ,  a t  the minimum, attachment points for such devices a re  
available. 
H. 3 . 2 .  1. I 
Given the possible 
Uniform motion around a single 
Entry by EVA would also prefer no motion o r  
With sufficiently low rates,  and with the EVA 
The equipment require- 
:: 
Measurement of Motion 
Decisions concerning feasibility of docking to a tumbling spacecraft, o r  
entering such a DV from EVA, will have to be made on the basis of pre- 
determined limits on such uncontrolled motion. 
the capabilities of the docking systems of both vehicles to take instantaneous 
These limits will relate to 
* 
This subsection is based on the work of J. P. Janus, Ref. H-4. 
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torques, of propulsion systems to match motion, etc. Visual observation 
will in many instances, particularly in the case of motion around a single 
axis of rotation, be sufficient to disclose whether such limits a r e  being 
exceeded. Compound motion such a s  tumbling may present a more difficult 
observational problem for which instrument aid may be essential. 
location for despin devices to be placed by the SRV crew on the DV will in 
some instances have to be based on fairly accurate knowledge of the 
instantaneous center of rotation of the DV at the time of attachment and on 
the rate of rotation. Here, again, instrument aid will either be desirable 
o r  necessary. 
The 
A very brief review was conducted to determine whether feasible instrumen- 
tation schemes exist to aid the measurement of tumbling motion, and whether 
systems already planned for rendezvous and docking guidance and for debris 
detection would have utility for this measurement function. 
only laser  systems were considered. 
As a consequence 
Three basic techniques were examined and all  three appeared to be feasible 
means of determining the motion of a distressed vehicle. 
a passive scheme a s  well a s  two schemes requiring the passive augmen- 
tation of the distressed vehicle with some form of retro-reflectors. 
Although these solutions appear to be feasible, e r r o r  analysis was not per- 
formed nor an examination of geometric singularities which may cause 
problems with the practical implementation of the various sensor configura- 
tions. 
state of the art .  
These included 
These problems could impose sensor requirements far beyond the 
It was assumed that the spacecraft could be designed to include passive 
augmentation which would assis t  in  the determination of its motion. 
includes both painted markings and/or retro-reflectors. 
assumed that the distressed craft  was in force-free motion. 
the sensors were assumed to be capable of being positioned in  any con- 
figuration and not restricted to a particular a r ea  of the DV. 
This 
It was also 
Furthermore, 
It was also 
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assumed that the sensors were capable of measuring derived angular rate 
when retro-reflector augmentation of the target was provided. 
Of the three sensor/target configurations, the first offers the basis for the 
other two. 
figurations is  that two of these take advantage of the use of retro-reflectors 
on the target vehicle and, consequently, a r e  capable of obtaining angular 
rate data by tracking a particular point on the distressed vehicle. 
The primary differences between the three sensor/target con- 
The first configuration, shown on Figure H-14, consists of three sensors,  
each of which take three measurements to points on the target vehicle. 
These 9 measurements, taken simultaneously, consist of position (range 
and two angles) and range rate. 
f rom each sensor a r e  assumed not co-planar. 
The lines of sight of the measurements 
The second sensor configuration uses augmentation of the target o r  distressed 
vehicle to make i t  possible to obtain angle rate. 
three sensors to measure range, range rate,  angle, and angle rate of various 
points on the distressed spacecraft. 
configuration is shown in Figure H-15. 
sighting a separate retro-reflector, al l  'three sensors may also be sighting 
the same reflector. 
This configuration uses 
The measurement geometry for this 
Although each sensor is shown to be 
The third sensor configuration is similar to the previous configuration in 
that it requires passive augmentation of the target to provide angle rate 
data. 
Figure H-16. 
The measurement geometry for this configuration is shown in 
Configuration I has the basic advantage of not requiring passive augmenta- 
tion of the target vehicle because i t  uses skin tracking. 
reflectivity of the target may require fairly large sensor power to provide 
adequate illumination. 
However, the poor 
In order to obtain sufficient accuracy, i t  may be 
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necessary to average the measurements over a reas  of the skin, tending to 
increase computational requirements . Also , this technique require s 
instantaneous range rate measurements , which would require the use of 
heterodyne o r  doppler techniques. 
required to track three points on the vehicle simultaneously in the so-called 
acquisition mode. 
ments in a short  enough time interval. 
essentially simultaneous measurements requires further study. 
In Configuration I the sensors a r e  
A fast scan in this mode might not give three measure- 
The feasibility of a sensor giving 
Configurations I1 and 111 have many points in common. For example they 
both require retro-reflector augmentation of the target. However, Con- 
figuration I11 requires that three of these reflectors be simultaneously 
visible to a single sensor. Configuration 11 needs to see only one reflector 
i f  the sensors a r e  arranged so that their lines of sight to a single reflector 
a r e  not co-planar. 
on a single reflector, it may be necessary to have them all operate on 
slightly different wavelengths. 
on the sensor design i f  heterodyne o r  doppler techniques were used to 
obtain range rate data. 
Also, i f  the sensors in Configuration I1 a r e  to be used 
This could conceivably have some impact 
An area  of uncertainty in Configurations I1 and I11 is that of obtaining line- 
of-sight rate data. This could only be done by smoothing the angle data, 
and, consequently, it would require tracking of a reflector for some period 
of time. 
Configuration III, like Configuration I, must operate in  the acquisition mode, 
which imposes some of the previously mentioned disadvantages. 
Configuration I1 operates in  the more accurate track mode where each 
sensor is tracking only a single point on the target vehicle. 
However, 
The brief nature of the review of this problem precludes an indication of 
preference for one of the three alternate systems, just  a s  it precludes a 
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firm conclusion concerning feasibility o r  state of the a r t  implementation 
requirements. However, ROM estimates of equipment weight and storage 
volumes were made to give an  indication of the feasibility of installing such 
a sensor system in the SRV. 
selected, since it could utilize the single sensor likely to be provided for a 
laser  rendezvous and docking system. 
present for other purposes, only about three o r  four retro-reflectors would 
have to be provided on the DV, with a total additional weight of about 2 lb. 
If the sensor system were not already present on the SRV, its addition 
would provide a weight increment of about 30 lb, and would require an 
3 installed volume of about 2 f t  , for a range capability of about 1 n mi. 
Because of likely commonality with other vehicle functions, onboard com- 
putational requirements associated with this function were not separately 
e s tima ted 
For  this purpose, Configuration 111 was 
For such a system, if already 
H. 3.2. 1.2 Despin Devices 
The causes and magnitudes of uncontrolled motion of a distressed vehicle 
have been discussed in Appendix I. 
motion can be taken by either the DV o r  the SRV. It i s  also possible to 
postulate a scheme for despinning which, in the event of total failure of 
DV command systems, and/or of the DV crew, could be activated by the 
SRV either remotely o r  by sending a crew in EVA. 
Action to reduce this uncontrolled 
Three basic schemes for despinning were considered; the application of 
external torques, energy dissipation within the DV, and inertia augmenta- 
tion. All three schemes lend themselves to pre -positioned devices within 
or on the DV; only the first and the third method could also be applied by 
the SRV. 
Examples of external torques are the use of reaction control systems 
already provided on the DV, o r  the application of external thrusters attached 
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by the SRV crew. If the size relationships between SRV and DV a re  
appropriate, grappling mechanisms on the SRV may be able to couple the 
two vehicles to allow the propulsive capability of the SRV to reduce the 
motion. 
Without provision of special equipment, energy dissipation within the DV 
is often available in the form of sloshing propellants or magnetic forces 
such a s  eddy forces. 
slowly, possibly requiring weeks to produce the desired stabilization. 
Special energy absorbers in  the form of fluid hoops a r e  also conceivable, 
which may speed up the stabilization process. 
Such inherent dissipating processes tend to act  very 
Inertial augmentation can be provided by extendable masses  on booms o r  
weights on cables (YO-YO System). 
A brief analysis was performed to size two such feasible systems which 
also offer the possibility of being brought to the DV by an  SRV and attached 
either manually by a crew or by a remote-controlled manipulator. 
both systems, the characteristics of the uncontrolled DV motion must be 
known to reasonable accuracy to permit the sizing of the control forces 
and the proper locating of the attachment point. The mass-on-cable and 
the rocket thruster concepts were selected for analysis and were applied 
to a tumbling space station. 
For 
The assumptions concerning the characteristics of the space station were 
as follows: 
a. Weight of the station ................ 120, 000 lb 
b. 
C. Rate of motion ..................... 4 rpm 
Motion around the major axis of rotation 
........ 
It was also assumed that attachment aids had been provided on the station 
in  anticipation of the need. 
p 
Figure H-17 shows the required characteristics of the two remedial systems 
examined. 
If the tumbling mode requires despin device attachment at unpredictable 
positions, the concept of prepositioned despin aids is not applicable. 
Further study of this problem is necessary pr ior  to the selection of any 
de spin device. 
H. 3.2.2 Transfer in EVA 
Movement of personnel in  EVA may be required for several  operations of 
the rescue mission. During the close survey phase, the rescue crew may 
have to examine the exterior of the DV for symptoms of the specific 
emergency situation. 
DV crew through plug-in hardwire links, read diagnostic instrumentation 
repeaters on the exterior,  etc. P r io r  to entry into the DV, despinning 
equipment may have to be attached and entry hatches may have to be forced. 
If  the entry hatch is occupied by a device such a s  an experiment module, 
the rescue crew may have to remove this module with the aid of tools o r  
manipulators. 
available o r  a r e  not compatible, t ransfer  of the rescue crew into the DV, 
and their return together with the DV crew, will require EVA. 
control work must be performed external to the DV, both the crew and 
equipment may have to be moved in EVA. 
after completion of the rescue operation may require movement of personnel 
and equipment in EVA. 
Also, attempts may be made to communicate with the 
If the SRV i s  unable to dock because docking fixtures a r e  not 
If damage 
Finally, disposition of the DV 
All of these activities will, in the minimum, require pressure garments 
for the crew. 
and equipment between the vehicles. 
units may be required to perform operations beyond the capability of the 
crew. Finally, manipulator units large enough to house a crew in shirt-  
sleeve environment may be desirable in order to extend crew work time 
for difficult assignments. 
In addition, transporters will be required to propel both crew 
Mechanical aids such as manipulator 
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This study subtask briefly reviewed hardware concepts , both off-the -shelf 
a s  well as requiring development, which may aid in  such EVA activities. 
H. 3.2.2.1 EVA Transit 
Environmental protection and life support for the crew outside of a space 
vehicle is currently provided by pressure garments of conventional 
design, with 3. 5 psia of pure oxygen for breathing from either an umbilical 
tether o r  a portable life support system. 
the breathing oxygen in  an open loop mode o r  from a closed loop system 
utilizing heat exchangers and radiators. The problem of utilizing these 
available garments, when SRV and DV a r e  operating a t  14.7 psia sea level 
atmosphere, has already been discussed in Appendix F. F o r  reasons 
there stated it is likely that suit design will be changed before the IP 
becomes operational and that suit weights will therefore also change. 
For purposes of this study, however, a weight of 70 lb and a stowed volume 
of 4.5 f t  has been estimated for the standard EVA suit. 
line carrying oxygen, power, and communication f rom the SRV to the 
crewman in the suit is estimated to weigh about 40 lb. In the absence of 
such an umbilical, a portable life support system (PLSS) sufficient for 
from two to four hours of operation would weigh about 50 lb. 
Cooling is available either from 
3 A 60 f t  umbilical 
Astronaut maneuvering units ( M U )  have been designed and developed for 
Gemini which combine PLSS and small rocket thruster systems in a 
backpack configuration to provide maneuverability over several  hours of 
operating time. Such units, when improved, a r e  estimated to weigh 
about 150 lb  and require 4 f t  of storage volume. 3 
Other varieties of AMU have been conceived which add mechanical ass i s -  
tance in the form of powered manipulators for the crew. 
which can be called a space work platform, is shown in Figure H-18. 
This unit could also provide the mission controller, either in the SRV o r  
Such a system, 
0 0  
m r c )  
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on the ground, with TV coverage of the operations to be performed and may 
in return supply the rescue crew with guidance f rom experts via an R F  
link in any specialized operation to be performed. 
tools and has provisions for anchoring itself to the DV so a s  to provide a 
torque-free work base for the crewman. 
the platform o r  to perform manual operations a s  well. 
requires that the crewman perform in  a pressure garment and thus will 
limit his work shift to an estimated 2 t o  4 hours. 
The unit can car ry  
It permits the crewman to leave 
It still, however, 
Although not truly falling into the category of an EVA device, another 
AMU shown in conceptual form on Figure €3-19 will permit operations on 
o r  near the DV exterior with the crew in a shirtsleeve environment, and 
will  thus allow longer work shifts. 
crewman to leave and perform some operations manually. 
However, this unit would not allow the 
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H. 3 . 2 . 2 . 2  Entry to DV* 
As already indicated, entry to the DV from EVA may require EVA operations 
to force entry hatches, the removal of modules already docked against the 
entry hatch, etc. 
type may be required in this operation. 
the instance when the DV hatch through which entry is to be made is not 
equipped with a working airlock. 
made into a DV which has retained all o r  some of its atmosphere, and where 
continued retention of the atmosphere is essential, an airlock cycle must be 
performed either in a nominal airlock o r  by evacuating and repressurizing 
the DV compartment behind the entry hatch. If compartment pressure 
cycling i s  infeasible due to lack of functioning equipment, or due to the 
presence of a shirtsleeve crew, a portable device may be required which can 
serve as an  airlock. 
design in order to reduce stowage volume requirements in the SRV and could 
have other additional functions. It could, for example, be utilized between 
docked spacecraft to serve a s  an atmospheric contamination bar r ie r  between 
DV and SRV. Equipped with appropriate chemical spray systems, it would 
also prevent biological contamination of the SRV, if the DV emergency has 
created such a hazard. Used as a BOD or  as a quarantine device it would 
require more extensive EC/LS provisions, 
The use of manipulators of either open platform or  capsule 
One other consideration applies in 
When entry under EVA conditions is to be 
Such a portable airlock (PAL) could be of expandable 
A conceptual arrangement of a PAL sized for two astronauts is shown 
collapsed for stowage in Fig. H-20. The flexible center section, made of 
material that can be folded, is extended by pressurization to a length long 
enough to accommodate a suited astronaut in a stretched-out position. 
The PAL consists of two active ring-and-cone assemblies, an extendible 
cylindrical member, a cylindrical structure which encloses the collapsed 
flexible member, and a breathing and pressurization subsystem. The two 
.I -I. 
This subsection is based on the work of K. G. Ludlow, Ref. H-5. 
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active ring -and-cone assemblies incorporate the docking mechanism and the 
hatches and are connected by the folded flexible cylindrical member. 
airlock thus permits entry into the DV by an astronaut operating in an EVA 
mode or  by direct  transfer to the DV from a rescue vehicle docked to the 
opposite end of the portable airlock. 
required structural  and packaging properties is the Goodyear "Airmat. 'I The 
PAL is extended initially by using the pressurization system which also 
provides the breathing atmosphere. 
The 
A typical flexible material  having the 
The docking hatches combined into the docking mechanism at each end of the 
portable airlock are identical in size and provide a clear 5. 0 f t  diameter 
opening for transfer of equipment. 
together in the stowed position by the rigid cylindrical structural member 
which encloses the collapsed flexible member. 
incorporates a circumferential joint, located midway along its length, which 
is held together by spring loaded locks which are released either electro- 
mechanically o r  by the internal pressure used to extend the airlock into the 
operating position. The rigid cylindrical member also provides protection 
for the extensible material during stowage. 
the airlock after use include telescopic tubes, cable retraction devices, 
The two docking mechanisms a r e  fastened 
The rigid cylindrical member 
Possible methods for retracting 
extendible booms, etc. 
i ts  weight is estimated at about 1600 lb. 
The stowed volume of the airlock is about 380 f t5  and 
H. 3 . 2 . 2 .  3 
Much of what has already been discussed under transit  and entry into the 
DV will, of course, also apply to the exit phase of the rescue mission. 
is as necessary to exit as to entry unless the rescue crew has been able to 
provide every member of the DV crew with a pressure garment, thus 
permitting the decompression of the DV compartment prior to exit. 
suits a r e  a lso required i f  the vehicles a r e  not docked. 
medical situations can be postulated for  a crew disabled by the emergency 
which may prevent dressing at least  some of the DV crew in pressure suits. 
Exit f rom DV 
A PAL 
Pres su re  
However, many 
h, 
i 
Broken a rms  and legs a r e  examples of such situations. 
the concept of a transfer capsule might be valuable. 
a lso be stowed in the collapsed condition within the SRV in order to reduce 
storage volume requirements. 
In such an instance, 
Such a device would 
A capsule design concept for transferring men and equipment between the 
rescue vehicle and the DV is shown in Figure H-2 1. 
Rockwell hatch design, featuring a hatch within a hatch, was selected as a 
representative design. The 5. 0 f t  outer diameter hatch corresponds to the 
transfer tunnel diameter used in the space station design. 
hatch is  approximately 3. 0 f t  in diameter. 
permit passage of a personnel ca r r i e r  defined in Appendix G for transporting 
an  injured astronaut. 
emergency equipment into the crew transfer capsule. Modifying the North 
American Rockwell docking hatch to include a latch ring permits attaching 
the crew transfer capsule directly to the hatch, thus eliminating additional 
docking fixtures. 
and reduced weight. 
A North American 
The inner auxiliary 
This hatch is large enough to 
This inner hatch is a l so  large enough for transporting 
This concept results in a smaller diameter attachment 
The transfer capsule consists of two major components, an inflatable member 
and a cylindrical metal shell structure approximately 36 .  0 inches long attached 
to the inflatable member. The par t  of the shell structure that attaches to 
to the DV hatch latch ring i s  designed to incorporate a number of docking 
latches located radially around the shell. 
inside l ip of the latch ring and achieve attachment to the hatch in a manner 
similar to that described for the attachable docking fixture. 
p ressure  seal  is provided between the capsule and the hatch. The cylindrical 
metal shell structure contains a removal hatch that is mounted approximately 
midway inside the shell. 
Gemini heat shield hatch. 
to that shown in the sketch by pressurizing the capsule with breathing 
atmosphere provided from high pressure storage containers. 
These docking latches engage the 
An inflatable 
The hatch is removable in a manner similar to the 
The inflatable section is  inflated to a shape similar 
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In the stowed position, the inflatable portion of the capsule is folded and 
packed inside the metal shell portion of the capsule. 
weight a r e  estimated at 50 f t 3  and 500 lb. 
The stowed volume and 
After the astronaut has been placed into the capsule, the hatches a r e  resealed 
and the capsule is transported to the SRV by manipulators o r  by the rescue 
crew with AMU's. Attached to the SRV, the astronaut may be removed from 
the capsule or  may be restricted to the capsule for a quarantine period, with 
life support provided from the SRV. 
H. 3.2. 3 
The SRV may face several  problems when attempting to dock to the DV. 
Transfer by Docking (Ref. H-5) 
The 
problem of a tumbling o r  spinning DV has already been discussed. 
of despin devices may be effective in reducing this motion but it is likely that 
the motion will not be reduced to zero. This then results in the requirement 
that the SRV be capable of docking to a DV with some degree of residual 
motion, not all of which may be around a single axis of rotation. 
detailed discussion of this requirement is presented in Appendix 1-3 with the 
most important conclusions repeated below. 
The use 
A more 
The angular velocities and attitudes of the DV must be measured precisely 
and must be matched by the SRV. The same spin characterization system 
discussed ear l ier  would be applicable here  as well. 
Forces and torques of docking under conditions of low residual motion a re  
reasonable and can be accommodated with proper design. 
Axial forces a re  reasonable for spacecraft not too excessive in weight and a re  
similar to axial docking forces encountered in stable docking situations. 
The residual DV wobble which is likely to accompany residual rotation wil l  
present a complex SRV control problem. 
H. 3. 2. 3,  1 
A brief conceptual analysis was undertaken to determine whether SRV's 
could be equipped with soft docking fixtures capable of reducing the difficulty 
of docking to a DV with some residual wobble. 
non-quantitative; s t r e s s  analysis was not performed and the design was not 
matched to specific values of DV motion. 
Docking Interface 
The analysis was 
The soft docking fixture shown in Figure H-22 is configured to accommodate 
slight motions between the rescue vehicle and the DV. 
greater than can be accommodated by the docking fixture, these motions must 
be reduced to a tolerable level. The concept calls for  flexibly mounting the 
North American Rockwell docking design with a neuter docking device and a 
passive ring. 
assembly. 
can be mated with another active ring/cone docking assembly to form a 
complete neuter docking subassembly. 
If the DV motions a re  
The docking port on the DV is assumed to be a passive ring 
This concept cpuld be modified into a ring/cone assembly which 
Further study of this concept is required to derive methods for extending the 
flexible bellows toward the DV shell to provide a pressure seal and the 
correct stiffness at the flexible connection to minimize vehicle dynamic 
interactions resulting from differential vehicle motion. 
of this type of docking fixture over the conventional design would be about 
250 lb. 
The weight increment 
A damaged spacecraft implies the possibility of a situation where docking 
facilities a r e  unavailable. 
its docking ports will be occupied by experiment modules. 
have logistic vehicles such as space tugs o r  the EOS docked to them. 
the emergency situation calling for rescue may have destroyed some of the 
ports or may have closed the passage between them and the space station 
compartment which the rescue crew is attempting to reach. 
may be provided on the station but may not have been equipped with docking 
If a space station is taken as an example, many of 
Other ports may 
Finally, 
EVA airlocks 
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fixtures. 
opening against which it could dock. 
already available such as an EVA air lock, or  that of an opening that must 
be cut into the hull, a docking fixture must somehow be placed over the opening 
to permit SRV docking. The concept of such a portable docking fixture was 
briefly investigated. 
The SRV m y  thus be faced with the necessity of creating an 
In either case, that of an opening 
The portable, attachable docking fixture shown in Figure H-23 permits docking 
to a distressed vehicle via an EVA port. 
diameter opening, 12 inches la rger  than the standard hatch opening, w a s  
assumed. This larger  opening permitted the use of the North American 
Rockwell docking design with minor modifications, and also permitted the use 
of ramp-shaped docking pawls identical in c ross  -sectional shape to the North 
American Rockwell docking cone. 
diameter hatch for transfer of personnel and cargo. 
fixture is secured within the 6 f t  diameter opening by the eight docking 
pawls located radially about the opening. 
the pawl tips: continued movement of the fixture farther from the port opening 
causes the docking pawls to rotate over center about the pivot points as 
pressure  is exerted on the ramp portian of the pawl. 
rotate about their respective pivots until the end points of the ramps have 
been reached; the spring-loaded pawls then snap into place behind the DV 
opening, thus securing the fixture between the back face of the pawl and the 
docking fixture seal face. 
DV port area prevents pressure loss  as the DV is repressurized. 
of the locking devices to permit withdrawal is provided through the use of 
ele c trome c hanical o r  completely mechanical device s . 
For  purposes of this study, a 6-ft 
Space is also available for a standard 5 f t  
The portable docking 
The pawls a r e  engaged initially at 
The pawls continue to 
An inflatable seal between the seal face and the 
Retraction 
The basic concept can also be applied to an opening specifically cut into the 
pressure hull of a space vehicle, providing the structure had initially been 
designed to  permit this. 
provides some discussion of this point. 
Section H-3. 3. 3, dealing with damage control, 
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The weight of such a portable docking fixture is estimated a t  800 lb, with a 
3 stowage volume of about 265 f t  . 
H. 3.2. 3.2 Atmospheric Incompatibility 
Another problem which may on occasion interfere with a docking transfer 
is that of dissimilar atmospheres between the SRV and the DV. 
the SRV may be at 7 psia to reduce acclimation time requirements prior to 
performing EVA in a 3. 5 psia pressure suit. If the DV is operating at 14.7 
psia sea level atmosphere, docking transfer between the vehicles requires an 
airlock. 
vehicle, the compartments on each side of the docking hatch could be adjusted 
to match pressures  and composition. 
changes is not available o r  functioning, the portable airlock already discussed 
in Section H. 3.2. 2. 2 could be used. 
slightly higher pressure than the DV is preferred to reduce chances of SRV 
contamination. 
For  example, 
If such an airlock is not available behind a docking hatch on either 
If the equipment for such atmospheric 
As a general principle, a SRV with 
H. 3. 3 Damaged DV 
The possibility is  rea l  that the emergency situation requiring a rescue mission 
has also caused damage to the DV. 
operations to be performed by the rescue crew before the DV crew can be 
aided and removed from the DV. 
survey phase to determine the extent of the damage and to permit planning of the 
damage control effort. Operations to permit entry to the DV in the event conven 
tional entry methods can not be used may be required as well as damage control 
itself, The survey phase has already been discussed in Section H. 3 . 1 . 2  in con- 
nection with the problem of lack of communications with the DV crew. 
additional detail concerning equipment aids for such a survey follows. 
Such damage may require additional 
These additional operations will involve a 
Some 
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H. 3. 3. 1 Survey* 
A damage survey from either the exterior of the DV o r  during an interior 
exploration of the DV would attempt to determine both the past occurrence of 
events as well as the current status of theDV. Past events of interest to the 
rescue crew relate to the incidence of fire, contamination, explosion, and 
decompression. Current status refers  to the presence of fire, contaminated 
atmospheres, lack of atmosphere, and the capability of various onboard 
systems. 
emergency systems a r e  functioning and can be activated by the rescue crew, 
where the DV crew is located, and what the condition of the DV crew is. 
would, of course, be preferred if the DV had been designed with sensing 
equipment which would record such events and the degree of the resulting 
damage, and which would also monitor current status. 
sensing equipment by R F  command over telemetry links would be desirable. 
In the event that R F  communications could not be established, sensor readout 
repeaters located in accessible areas,  such as the exterior of entry hatches, 
would be read visually or  through plug-in readout devices a s  already mentioned. 
Additionally, a rescue crew would wish to know whether onboard 
It 
Interrogation of such 
Major onboard and rescue crew sensor requirements in this category a re  
discus sed below. 
H. 3.  3 .  1. 1 Fi re  Detection and Alarm 
Various fire detection systems have been considered for past, current, and 
future spacecraft. The five most feasible, as indicated by recent NASA 
"Fire  Hazards Steering Committee" studies, include ultraviolet (UV) 
detectors, correlation spectrometers (analysis of constituents, such as CO 
and CH4), smoke detectors, condensate nuclei counters, and continuous wire 
(CW) overheat detectors. 
planned for the Skylab program) involves the use of multiple UV detectors 
located throughout the vehicle combined with a CW overheat detector warning 
A system suitable for future programs (and currently 
J. -4. 
This subsection is based on the work of M. Donabedian, Ref. H-6. 
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circuit for wire bundles. 
visual and audible alarm system which alerts the DV crew that some positive 
action is required and which records and monitors status for the rescue crew. 
This detection concept can be combined with a 
H. 3. 3. i. 2 
A cursory review of atmospheric contaminant sensing devices was also made. 
Candidate t race contaminant sensing devices useful for spacecraft application 
include a gas chromatograph, mass spectrophotometer, IR spectrophotometer, 
colorimetric indicators (chemical), and oxidation rate sensors. Based on 
previous studies made at Aerospace (Ref. H-7) and a l i terature review, the 
use of an  IR spectrophotometer or a gas chromatograph appears to be the most 
attractive concept for onboard systems. 
Atmosphere Contaminant Sensing 
For use as a backup system or for use by rescue team members, colorimetric 
indicators appear to be the most attractive concept. 
of two parts ;  a bellows-type hand operated pump which draws a sample of gas,  
and a gas  detector tube which has  a calibrated scale in mg/meters3 or in 
percent. 
chemicals within the tube. 
types of gases a r e  available and the tubes a r e  disposable. 
application to situations where a simple, portable detection system is required. 
These devices consist 
The presence of a toxic gas is indicated by a color change of the 
A large number of tubes designed for different 
This concept has 
H. 3. 3. i. 3 
Other sensing and alarm system requirements include oxygen partial pressure 
sensing and cabin total pressure sensing. 
systems should be included. 
at approximately 2. 75 psia as should any significant change in total cabin 
pres  sure. 
Oxygen and Total P res su re  
Both visual and audible a l a rm 
The oxygen sensing a la rm should be triggered 
H. 3. 3. f .  4 
Radiation monitoring and alarms should include a variety of equipment. 
particle spectrometer would normally be provided externally to monitor 
increases in particle flux primarily resulting from solar  flares. 
Radiation Monitoring 
A 
A normal 
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threshold level above the background would be selected to provide a visual 
and audible alarm to the crew of potentially hazardous increases. 
a portable direct  reading instrument to monitor interior radiation levels is 
required for both onboard and rescue crew use. 
dosimeters should be provided for each member of DV and rescue crews and 
worn on clothing and pressure garments to maintain a record of accumulated 
body dose. 
In addition, 
As a final item, passive 
H. 3. 3. 2 
The normal entry hatches and airlocks of the DV may not be available, either 
because of damage from the emergency situation,or blockage by objects such 
as experiment modules or  inactivated logistics vehicles. 
design provisions as well as special equipment brought by the rescue crew 
could be of assistance in gaining entry. 
Entry Into the DV 
In such cases, prior 
A double hatch design, such a s  recommended by North American Rockwell 
for the space station, is considered desirable from the rescue point of view. 
This hatch consists of an outer latch ring of 5 f t  diameter. 
this latching system would be activated to yield the larger,  preferred opening. 
If DV damage has made this outer latching system inoperative, a 3 f t  diameter 
inner hatch can be removed, offering sufficient diameter to enter and exit 
f rom the DV under emergency conditions. 
of emergency equipment likely to be brought on board by the rescue crew to 
a maximum dimension of 3 f t .  Although the primary mode of operation for 
both hatches is manual, an  explosive actuation mode should be provided for 
backup. 
ordnance undesirable, the design should permit insertion of the explosive 
actuator from the exterior of the hatch by the rescue crew. 
If functioning, 
This approach also calls for sizing 
If safety considerations make permanent installation of explosive 
.z 
.. .. 
In order to ease entry into the DV when hatches a re  not available, appropriate 
design provisions a r e  required. Cutting through an exterior bulkhead utilizing 
hand tools operated by crews in EVA would be extremely difficult. 
the use of force-augmenting manipulators would assist such an operation, 
Although 
pre-design consideration of such a need could make it possible for a rescue 
crew to manually perform this operation easily and quickly. 
utilizing a flexible linear shaped charge (FLSC) for this application is shown 
on Figure H-24 (Ref. H-8). 
designed for penetration by providing designated and clearly marked sections 
not containing service lines vital to the DV, and incorporating built-in charge 
holders a s  indicated. 
bulkhead would initially be filled with coherent strips of absorber material  
which could be easily removed by the rescue crew from the exterior, o r  the 
DV crew from the interior. Depending upon the need, either crew would then 
insert  an FLSC into the channel accessible to it. 
would cut both the bulkhead as  well a s  the channel root, permitting removal 
of the cut section of bulkhead. 
cutting charge would prevent blast and fragmentation damage to the compart- 
ment being entered. 
A concept for 
It would require bulkheads and outer walls 
Both charge holder channels on either side of the 
Activation of the charge 
The absorber on the opposite side of the 
It i s  estimated that, for  current types of bulkhead construction, an FLSC 
weighing about 0.05 lb per linear foot would supply sufficient cutting action. 
The total added structural weight to the bulkhead would amount to  about 
5 lb for  a 3-ft diameter opening. 
This cutting method is applicable to exterior walls a s  well a s  interior 
bulkheads. 
The equipment brought by the rescue crew depends, of course, upon knowledge 
of the design provisions of the DV. 
the explosive ordnance need to be brought. 
in the unjamming of slightly damaged latching mechanisms. 
would be useful in creating sampling ports, if not already provided, in 
order to check the atmosphere behind the latch o r  to bleed down the interior 
compartment prior to creating the opening. 
explosively actuated punch could also be used, offering easier manual operation 
F o r  the concepts indicated above, only 
Prying tools may also be useful 
Drilling tools 
Instead of a drilling tool, an 
ABS0 1RBER 
FLSC 
4EAD 
FLSC = FLEXIBLE LINEAR SHAPED CHARGE 
Figure H-24. Penetrable Bulkhead Design 
and lower weight. 
feasible 
with a combustible o r  explosive atmosphere. The pressure differential 
across  the bulkhead should be minimal to avoid damage due to explosive 
decompression, and crew hazards due to rapid fragment expulsion. 
H. 3 . 3 . 3  
Desirable items under this category include fire suppression equipment, 
capability for remote decompression and recompression of the primary 
pressurized volumes, and the capability for remote power shutdown and 
activation of emergency power systems by either DV o r  rescue crews. 
most practical fire suppression equipment involves the use of a small  
portable (approximately 8 lb  per  unit) water/foam extinguishers. 
depressurization/repressurization capability is desired to permit the rescue 
crew to perform necessary actions on the affected compartment f rom remote 
locations, such a s  airlocks o r  adjacent compartments, after personal safety 
has been assured. 
a decompression, fire, o r  smoke o r  other contamination. Remote power 
shutdown capability would be a significant aid in minimizing the extension of 
such events to other compartments. 
The use of the FLSC approach, for example, would not be 
i f  the compartment behind the bulkhead to be penetrated were filled 
JI 
Damage Control Within the DVeP 
The 
Remote 
Typical situations requiring this type of action might be 
Design provisions could be incorporated into the DV which would permit the 
rescue crew to power-up as well as to command operations such as described 
above. 
Barring the ability to remotely command such operations, it remains for the 
rescue crew to perform them manually o r  with mechanical and powered aids. 
Firefighting would have to be performed by the portable units discussed above, 
i f  depressurization of the affected compartment were not practical. 
pressurization by venting to outer space i s  preferred,  however, and could be 
De- 
This subsection is based on the work of M. Donabedian, Ref. H-6, and 
A. A. Hanson, Ref. H-8. 
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accomplished by manual opening of valves accessible to the rescue crew o r  
by punching o r  drilling holes as already discussed in the previous section. 
Depressurization to outer space would deal effectively with smoke o r  vapor 
type decontamination. Nuclear radiation decontamination would require the 
ability to wash down affected equipment o r  bulkheads, and/or the cutting out 
and removal of radioactive components and materials. Although feasible, 
this approach is not necessarily easily accomplished o r  fully effective. 
Radiation decontamination would also require protection for  the rescue crew 
in the form of portable shielding such a s  leaded aprons, estimated to weigh 
about 50 lb each. 
Cutting structure, either fo r  the purpose of decontamination o r  to clear a 
path through an a rea  which suffered explosion damage, will require power 
tools developed for  space application in addition to explosive devices such 
a s  FLSC. 
References H-9 and H-10 report the results of design and development studies 
in which prototype power tools, hand tools, and kit assemblies were tested and 
evaluated. 
battery pack, and performed such operations a s  drilling, hole cutting, linear 
sawing, and torquing. 
reaction to the operator, and could be operated in a hands-off mode for  most 
functions. 
a work light.) This kit weighs about 40 lb. 
The power tools were electrically powered from a kit-contained 
The design reported in Ref. H-9 imparted negligible 
Table H-43 lists the contents of the tool kit. (Note the inclusion of 
Decontamination for bacterial infection requires a chemical kit, the content 
of which of course would be tailored to the type of bacterial infection to be 
expected. An allowance of 10 lb  for disinfectant to be brought with the SRV is  
probably sufficient. 
Reference H- 11 reports a detailed study and experimental program for  the 
design of a remotely operated manipulator unit (RMU) capable of performing 
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Table H-43. Tool K i t  Contents (Reference H-9) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8, 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
3 0. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
3 7. 
3 8.  
Motor Unit 
Impact Attachment 
Socket - 1/2 inch drive - 3/4-inch 
Socket - 1/2-inch drive - 5/8-inch 
Socket - 1/2-inch drive - 9/16-inch 
Socket - 1/2-inch drive - l/Z-inch 
Socket - 1/2-inch drive - 7/16-inch 
Socket Holder 
Extension Bar - 5 inches 
Spare Saw Blades 
Saw Blade Holder 
Allen Wrench - 3/32-inch 
Allen Wrench - 1/8-inch 
Saw - 5/8-inch diameter (2) 
Saw - 1/2-inch diameter 
Saw - 3/8-inch diameter 
Saw - 5/16-inch diameter 
Saw - l /4-inch diameter 
Needles 
Saw Attachment 
Dr i l l  Attachment (Trepanner) 
Hammer 1 - 1 /4  pound dead blow 
Screwdriver Ratchet Handle - 1/4-inch drive 
#2 Phillips Head Bit 
Short Bit 1 1/4 x. 032 
Extension Bar  - 6 inches 
Work Lights - 6.9 Watts (2) 
Adhesive Restraint Buttons 
Applicator Holder 
Applicator Control Unit 
Applicator Temperature Sensor Electronics Package 
Storage Rack 
Restraint  Button 'Attachment Cables 
Small P a r t s  Manipulator 
Small Parts Holder 
Battery - 12 Volt - Silver Zinc Cells (8) - 163 Watt Hours 
Battery Case - Pressur ized  to t 6  ps i  differential 
Astronaut Tether 
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maintenance, repair, and damage control operations on orbiting spacecraft. 
The RMU could be controlled from the SRV. 
such subsystems as  illumination, television, communications, power, pro- 
pulsion, attitude control, and thermal control. 
location by the SRV in a folded configuration (all appendages in stowed posi- 
tions). 
made to the design described in Ref. H-11 in order t~ configure an RMU 
for space rescue. 
This manipulator vehicle contains 
It is delivered to the DV 
Figure H-25 depicts the configuration and reflects small changes 
Larger,  manned manipulators, already discussed in Section H.3.2.2. i 
would also be useful in a damage control situation, but because of size 
would probably be restricted to exterior work. 
Table H-44 summarizes the major i tems of damage control equipment and 
their stowed volumes which an SRV might have to ca r ry  on a rescue mission. 
H.3.4 Medical Needs 
A detailed discussion of incidence of illness and injury, and consequently 
required medical supplies and equipment, both on board and to be brought 
by the SRV, a r e  provided in Appendix G in this report. 
summarizes the conclusions of that appendix. 
? 
This section merely 
The specific medical objectives of the rescue mission a re  to prevent deter- 
ioration of a medical problem and to permit  transport of the disabled crew 
to the SRV. It is also intended that, i f  required, additional medical aid be 
provided aboard the SRV to enable the affected crew to survive until arr ival  
a t  a safe haven where full-scale medical assistance should be available. 
The amount of equipment to be carried with the SRV thus depends in part  
upon estimates of likely emergencies, upon the available medical supplie s 
and equipment within the DV,: and also upon the degree of self-help possible 
by DV crew. 
should be possible unless the emergency situation has destroyed that capability. 
If the DV is a space station/space base, considerable self-help 
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Transporter vehicles within the IP, such a s  the EOS, the Tug, and the Space 
Shuttle, will have minimal first aid capability but no effective surgical o r  
other treatment facilities. 
available on the space station/space base, it is not likely that transporter 
vehicle crews consisting of two to three men will include a medic. 
In addition, although medical personnel may be 
The medical equipment to be carried aboard the SRV will fall into two 
categories, kits  which can be carried by the SRV crew into the DV and 
equipment and supplies which remain on board the SRV. 
be carried into the DV will consist of essentially first aid equipment and 
aids such a s  personnel car r ie rs  for  transport of injured personnel. 
The material to 
Table H-45 summarizes medical kit requirements and indicates those i tems 
which will remain aboard the SRV. 
illnesses and injuries, a medically trained rescue crew member would seem 
highly desirable. 
might allow assistance from the ground in the diagnosis of medical emer-  
gencies. Diagnostic instrumentation should be developed for use by the 
rescue crew which either provides a direct R F  telemetry link with the 
ground o r  a voice link, for the purposes of obtaining expert prognosis and 
treatment prescription from a medical specialist. Such equipment might 
be desirable whether o r  not medically trained personnel were included in 
the rescue crew, 
Because of the nature of the possible 
Consideration might also be given to equipment which 
H . 3 . 5  Miscellaneous Equipment 
In addition to the major equipment categories described above, a SRV may 
be required to car ry  a variety of miscellaneous items intended to facilitate 
i ts  mission. 
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H.3.5.1 Extended Survival (Ref. H-6) 
Survival depends, of course, upon the availability of breathing oxygen, food 
and water, and some degree of control of the atmospheric pressure and 
constituents a s  well as the temperature of the environment. 
hanced by special equipment provided by the SRV o r  prepositioned in the DV. 
w 
It can be en- 
H.3.5.1.1 Portable Oxygen Source 
In addition to a spacecraft's pr imary source of oxygen, a secondary supply 
for short-term usage will normally be stored aboard the spacecraft against 
the event of a malfunction of the pr imary supply. 
instances an oxygen supply that can be transferred from a rescue vehicle 
may be required to provide additional time to the crew of a disabled spacecraft. 
However, in certain 
Oxygen can be stored a s  a high-pressure gas, a s  a cryogenic liquid o r  solid, 
o r  can be obtained from solid chemical sources. Some of the characterist ics 
of each type of system will be discussed f i r s t  in general t e rms .  
details and various tradeoff cr i ter ia  will then be examined to determine the 
most appropriate concept. 
Specific 
H.3.5.1.1.1 High-pressure Gaseous Oxygen 
In addition to the storage container weight and bulk, compressed gaseous 
oxygen requires substantial regulating equipment with attendant periodic 
maintenance, frequent quantity checks, and recurring logistics to replace 
the inevitable losses  even though the system may not be used for weeks o r  
months at a time. A high-pressure system also poses a fire and rupture 
hazard. 
H.3.5.1.1.2 Cryogenic Liquid Oxygen 
Liquid oxygen provides substantial weight and volume saving over a gaseous 
O2 supply. 
space programs and in the subcritical state is  used in military and some 
commercial aircraft. 
In the supercritical state,  it has been widely used in past manned 
Cryogenic storage system requirements a re  extensive, 
H- 13 1 
including need for insulation, pressure regulation, and heat control. 
addition, the losses due to tank venting which may range from one to five 
percent per day, become prohibitive as storage time increases. 
In 
H.3.5.1.1.3 Cryogenic Solid Oxygen 
Many problems associated with the storage of cryogenic liquid oxygen can 
be avoided by the use of cryogenic solid oxygen. Although storage of solid 
oxygen has not been studied extensively, some experimental work has been 
accomplished on solid storage of nitrogen, argon, and carbon dioxide. That 
technology is directly applicable to solid oxygen. 
The major advantages of solid oxygen over liquid oxygen a r e  reduced storage 
pressure,  higher storage density, and lower venting losses.  Recent experi- 
mental studies (Ref. H-12) show that this concept is technically feasible and 
offers a potential for increased storage time when compared with liquid 
oxygen. 
pumping of the low-pressure vapor to a condition suitable for breathing 
purpo se s . 
Engineering design problems remain and are associated with 
H.3.5.1.1.4 Chemical Oxygen Sources 
Solid chemical oxygen sources offer appreciable weight and volume savings 
over liquid chemical O2 sources in continuous flow operations and avoid the 
problems of cryogenic sources. 
oxygen weight and bulk are more nearly equal. 
indefinite storage life and therefore a valuable logistics improvement. 
some applications, it totally eliminates regulators, reducers, valves, gauges, 
complex containers, and system leakage maintenance problems. It offers 
considerable safety improvement with respect to fire. It is  virtually free 
from pressure  and contamination hazard and presents no low-temperature 
fluid problem. 
In demand systems, liquid and solid chemical 
Solid chemical oxygen offers 
In 
. : :  
...., 
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Two types of solid state chemical oxygen sources warrant serious 
consideration for  use in spacecraft emergency oxygen systems. 
the active sodium chlorate generators and the passive alkali metal super- 
oxide gene rat0 r s. 
These a re  
H. 3.5.1. I. 4.1 
The idea of using alkali chlorate to produce breathing oxygen is not new. 
During World War 11, the Japanese used chlorate generators for fighter 
plane oxygen supply. 
been using chlorate candles a s  an emergency oxygen source in conventional 
and nuclear submarines (Ref. H- 13). 
Sodium Chlorate Generators 
For a number of years, the United States Navy has 
These submarine oxygen generators are  called candles because of their 
resemblance to conventional candles in appearance. 
cylindrical blocks compressed o r  cast  of an intimate mixture of sodium 
chlorate salt and finely divided iron. 
diameter and 11.4 inches long, and produces 12 1.8 cubic feet (at standard 
temperature and pressure) of oxygen gas over a period of about 45 minutes 
or  a total oxygen mass  of approximately 10 lb. 
They a r e  dark grey 
Each 26 l b  block is 6 . 6  inches in 
The equivalent mass  of one such candle configured in small diameter 
cylinders would provide oxygen necessary to support 12 men for about eight 
hours. 
mechanically against an iron starting plug embedded in the top of the candle. 
Because of the extreme simplicity and reliability of the system and the 
indefinite stbrage life, this approach appears to be the most attractive for 
portable emergency oxygen systems. 
be tailored to the desired requirements merely by changing the cross  
sectional a rea  of the moulding. 
a s  CO, can be controlled to the necessary levels by the use of catalytic filters. 
To initiate the process, a simple phosphorous match is rubbed 
The burning rate of these candles can 
Contaminants produced by the reaction, such 
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H. 3.5.1.1.4.2 Alkali Metal Superoxide Generators 
The second type of solid chemical oxygen supply is the passive alkali metal 
superoxide. 
man, closed circuit, rebreather systems for use in non-breathable environ- 
ments, chiefly in mines, submarines, and fire fighting applications. These 
materials a r e  believed to constitute the pr imary oxygen supply for the 
Russian manned space vehicles. 
Potassium superoxide has been used for many years in one- 
These superoxides may be supplied a s  beds of granules, pressed discs, 
corrugated plates, e tc . ,  through which a i r  containing the exhalation products 
of water and carbon dioxide is passed. 
be effected by lung power o r  by auxiliary blowers. 
the water and carbon dioxide in any one of a large number of complex re-  
actions depending upon the local condition. The gaseous product of these 
reactions is pure oxygen which is released into the passing a i r .  
of the water is removed from the expired a i r  prior to passing it through the 
superoxide, an excess of oxygen is produced which gradually enriches the 
clo sed atrno sphe re. 
Circulation of this expired a i r  may 
The superoxide absorbs 
Unless some 
The three principal materials that have been found to be potentially feasible 
are: 
(1) KO2 (potassium superoxide) 
(2) Li202 (lithium peroxide) 
(3) Na02 (sodium superoxide) 
After many years of research a t  the Aerospace Medical Research Laboratories 
at  Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, a number of development type units have been 
made and tested (Ref. H-14). KO2 units utilizing pressed discs and corrugated 
plates weighing a s  little a s  12 lb have been successful in controlling GO2 and 
humidity while providing the necessary oxygen for  one man for  up to 24 hours 
in a sealed capsule (Ref. H-15). 
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H. 3. 5. 1. 1. 5 Concept Cornnaris on s 
Weight and volume comparisons of the various concepts discussed a r e  
presented in Table H-46. 
and disadvantages of the four basic concepts a r e  summarized in Table H-47. 
The initial weight penalty per  unit of oxygen stored i s  lowest initially f o r  
the cryogenic liquid and solid. However, due to the continuous boil-off and 
sublimation losses,  respectively, the weight becomes prohibitive f o r  periods 
beyond a few months. 
become the most attractive from both a weight and storage volume standpoint. 
Considering all  factors with emphasis on indefinite storage life, reliability, 
and simplicity, the sodium chlorate generators have been selected as the 
most attractive concept. 
mately 100 lb, including 22 lb f o r  f i l ters and controls, wil l  provide the 
oxygen necessary to support 12 men f o r  up to 24 hours. 
Basic characterist ics and various advantages 
In such an application, the solid chemical sources 
Using this concept, a total system weight of approxi- 
H. 3. 5. 1.2 Portable EC/LS 
For periods longer than 24 hours, the use of oxygen alone wil l  be insufficient 
f o r  a crew atmosphere. 
humidity control must  be provided. 
f o r  the IP vehicles is 14.7 psia of a sea level mixture of oxygen and nitrogen, 
it may be desirable to maintain this atmosphere. 
was made to develop pertinent characterist ics of a system meeting these 
needs and capable of being moved by the rescue crew into the DV upon demand. 
C 0 2  removal is also required and temperature and 
In addition, if the planned atmosphere 
A brief concept analysis 
The selected EC/LS system, shown schematically in Figure H-26, is a closed 
(i. e. , processed atmosphere) shirtsleeve system. 
removal and oxygen generation is provided by potassium superoxide (KO2) 
while a condensing heat exchanger (condenser/sublimator) is used f o r  
humidity and temperature control. 
f o r  initial pressurization and f o r  purging if the atmosphere is contaminated. 
Carbon dioxide ( C 0 2 )  
A high-pressure a i r  supply is  provided 
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Table H-47. Portable Oxygen Supply Characteristics 
Source 
High-Pres sure  Gas 
Cryogenic Liquid 
~~ __ 
Cryogenic Solid 
Solid Chemicals 
sodium chlorate generators 
alkali metal  superoxides 
Character is t ic  s 
High storage container weight/volume 
Good reliability 
Requires regulators /valves/ 
maintenance 
Safety hazard 
Low weight /volume 
Average reliability 
Requires complex heaters / controls / 
r eg ulat o r s 
Maintenance / boil -off restricts 
storage life 
Safety hazard 
Low weight /volume 
Requires controls /pumps /regulators 
Unknown reliability 
Limited storage life 
Good weight/ volume 
Extreme simplicity/ reliability 
No maintenance 
Easily transportable 
Indefinite storage life 
Complete safety 
H- 137 
u w 
a, 
P 
cd 
k 
d 
c, 
i 
" ... 3 
... 
H- 138 
The rationale f o r  this system selection was based in par t  on a number of 
tradeoff studies conducted by North American Rockwell (Ref. H- 16) on 
similar EC/LS requirements f o r  a Space Escape Vehicle. Various types 
of open and closed systems were evaluated. For  this type of application 
where a long inactive storage period may exist, the solid chemical systems 
a re  again most attractive and also a r e  weight and volume competitive with 
stored high-pressure gas o r  cryogenic systems of this size. 
chlorate (NaC103) a r e  the two most attractive chemicals. 
further advantages of being metabolically controlled, as  water and C 0 2  a r e  
absorbed in the reaction to yield oxygen, while NaC103 produces only oxygen. 
However, on a weight and volume basis, NaC103 has a definite advantage 
per  unit yield of oxygen. 
provisions a r e  available f o r  CO 
over KOZ. 
KO2 and sodium 
KO2 has the 
Where only an oxygen source is required and other 
removal, NaCl O3 is ,  therefore, preferred 2 
The requirement for a self-contained portable EC/LS system that can sustain 
12 men for up to 48 hours was established a s  a baseline. Utilizing an overall 
average metabolic rate of 400 Btu/hr,  the total system weight, including 
expendables, was estimated a t  475 lb. Based on an average requirement of 
100 watts, the power supply utilizing silver-zinc batteries was estimated to 
weigh 50 lb. 
a 3-ft-diam cylinder approximately 3 -  I /2 ft long. 
The entire EC/LS package, including power supply, requires 
Survival for a t  least  48 hours is aided by food and water. Based on a mini- 
mum of 3 lb/man-day of water and 1 lb/man-day of food, a total of 96 lb of 
provisions would sustain 12 men f o r  48 hours. 
H. 3. 5.2 
Another useful equipment item is  a device to reduce sparking between docking 
vehicles o r  between EVA crew and vehicles being contacted. 
Other Equipment Items 
No information was  found in the literature concerning equalization of electric 
potentials among adjacent o r  mating space vehicles and/or astronauts. 
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However, appropriate measures  had been taken in the Gemini program when 
the Gemini and Agena stages mated. 
voltage (on the order of 3 volts) a s  a consequence of passage through the 
electron plasma in orbit. In some instances, such a s  where the vehicle 
shape i s  elongated and/or possesses grossly irregular features, potentials 
a s  high a s  200 volts can be reached. 
could also reach a high surface voltage. 
EVA can reach a potential differing from his mother ship. 
Space vehicles typically reach a low 
A DV with an electrical malfunction 
Similarly, an astronaut involved in 
The Gemini was equipped with a dissipative element ( res i s tor )  which contacted 
the Agena just before docking was completed, thus equalizing the potentials. 
Such a unit should be provided as par t  of the basic SRV configuration a s  well. 
Furthermore, the astronaut in EVA should utilize such a device before 
coming into close contact with either the DV o r  SRV. 
15-megohm, 10-watt resistor would easily accomplish this purpose. A 
small  kit including such a res is tor  and short  leads and attachments o r  probes 
would weigh about 3 lb. 
t 
It is estimated that a 
Other miscellaneous equipment items to be carr ied on an SRV a r e  shown in 
Table H-48. 
H. 3 . 6  
The previous sections of this Appendix have discussed the special equipment 
requirements of a space rescue vehicle without discussing the characteristics 
and configuration of the SRV itself. 
was treated under another task of this study and considered a number of 
factors, including utilization of planned IP elements. 
tion of the equipment requirements reported in this Appendix have given clues 
concerning idealized characterist ics of an SRV with respect to maneuvering 
and docking requirements, storage requirements, and operational 
characteristics. 
A Special Rescue Vehicle 
The selection of this vehicle configuration 
However, the explora- 
i 
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Table H-48. Miscellaneous Equipment 
Equipment 
High-Intensity Portable Light 
Flashlight 
Resistor Kit 
Per s onnel Carr ier  
EVA Suit 
IVA Suit 
O2 Mask, Emergency 
O2 Mask, Full Face 
EVA Umbilical 
Characteristics 
Unit Weight, lb Stored Volume, f t3  
5 
0 .3  
3 
10 
70 
15 
3 
4 
45 
0.25 
0.10 
0.25 
0.75 
4.50 
I. 50 
0. 25 
0 .25  
2.00 
H- 141 
The SRV may have to operate in several mission regimes, i. e . ,  low-earth 
orbit, geosynchronous orbit, and lunar orbit, and may have to dock to a 
variety of IP elements of varying bulk and configuration. The most desirable 
concept appears therefore to be one of a relatively small, highly maneuverable 
vehicle with propulsion capability limited to that required f o r  terminal ren- 
dezvous and docking with the DV. 
ported close to the DV by another element of the IP such a s  the EOS, the Space 
Tug, o r  the Space Shuttle. In order  to be transportable by the EOS, the SRV 
configuration must be compatible with the cargo bay of the EOS. 
probably the configuration- limiting requirement, since dimensional limitations 
imposed by on-orbit transportation a re  considerably more liberal. 
This requires that the vehicle be trans- 
This is 
The crew/cargo module envisioned f o r  use with the EOS has similar config- 
urational requirements and appears to offer a suitable baseline configuration 
f o r  application to the SRV. 
to serve a s  the SRV i s  briefly described in the following paragraphs. 
How such a crew/cargo module could be modified 
An ar t is t ' s  conception of the SRV i s  presented in Figure H-27. 
i s  capable of performing the maneuvers necessary to dock with a DV and 
houses rescue equipment necessary to perform specific emergency operations. 
The SRV conceptual arrangement i s  comprised of three distinct compartments : 
a partially pressurized forward compartment, an unpressurized center com- 
partment, and a pressurized aft compartment. A centrally located crew 
transfer tunnel extends from the forward docking fixture to the aft compart- 
ment thus allowing crewmen to enter the aft compartment when the rescue 
vehicle is docked to a DV by the forward docking fixture. 
This vehicle 
The forward section includes an environmentally controlled two-man crew 
compartment. This compartment includes visual displays (TV, sensor and 
instrumentation, etc. ), maneuvering controls, a manipulator control console, 
EVA hatch, etc. In addition to the EVA hatch, another entry hatch connects 
to the centrally located crew transfer tunnel to provide access to either the 
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r ea r  compartment o r  the DV, a s  required. The remaining unpressurized 
portion of the forward compartment contains the power supply subsystem 
2 components (fuel cells, etc. ), life support subsystem components (0 and H 
spherical containers, molecular sieves, etc. ) and thermal control subsystem 
components (pumps, reservoirs,  etc. ). 
2 
The unpressurized center compartment contains retractable maneuvering 
propulsion nozzle clusters and the maneuvering propellant tankage. 
compartment also contains separate cavities storing i tems of rescue equip- 
ment such a s  the portable airlock, f i re  extinguishing equipment, an attachable 
docking fixture, and crew transfer capsules. Hinged doors, attached to each 
cavity containing rescue equipment, can be opened a s  required from the crew 
compartment. 
making removal and transfer to the DV a more manageable operation. 
The 
The rescue equipment items could be stored therein on pallets, 
The aft pressurized compartment is provided with a shirt- sleeve environment 
and a soft docking device, medical supplies, injured astronaut restraint 
devices, hygiene compartment fo r  cleansing purposes, and spare suits and 
undergarments, a s  well a s  recovery equipment. 
The manipulator a rms  a r e  attached to a ring gear on the outside of the for -  
ward docking fixture and a r e  stowed against the front face of the forward 
compartment when not in use. 
automatically by rotary motion with any pre-selected item of rescue 
equipment. 
the a rms  to extend rearward to the center compartment fo r  attaching and 
withdrawing the required items of equipment. The a r m  movements could 
be pre-programmed for  automatic retrieval of specific items of equipment 
from the stowed position. 
The ring gear aligns the manipulator a rms  
The manipulator a rms  incorporate several joints which permit 
H- 144 
H. 4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The various items of equipment discussed in the preceding sections of this 
Appendix represent the special equipment which a space rescue vehicle 
should c a r r y  to be prepared f o r  any eventuality posed by a rescue mission. 
It i s  important to reiterate that event probabilities played no role  in deter- 
mining these requirements; in other words, all emergency situations were 
considered equally likely and means of countering each of them were discussed. 
Under these assumptions, the special equipment to be carried by a manned 
space vehicle serving as a rescue vehicle is summarized in Table H-49. 
total weight clearly represents a considerable payload penalty to any of the 
projected transporter vehicles of the IP. 
rational elimination cr i ter ia  f o r  some of this rescue equipment, based upon 
estimates of emergency situation event probabilities and upon threshold 
values of these probabilities below which remedial means would not be 
provided, is obvious. 
The 
The importance of developing 
It can be concluded that means can be found to deal with most of the anticipated 
emergencies. However, the effectiveness of some of these rescue systems 
and devices i s  dependent upon the speed with which they can be applied; i. e . ,  
the response time which can be expected from a rescue mission. 
factor is  difficult to estimate a t  this stage of the IP formulation and definition. 
The effectiveness of specialized rescue equipment will also depend upon the 
training received by the crews. A decision will have to be made whether to 
train a l l  astronauts in the IP, o r  whether to train a nucleus of rescue 
specialists. 
training in the context of possible international aspects of IP rescue needs. 
This time 
Consideration might also be given to the need for language 
It i s  also concluded that considerably more study effort should be  devoted to 
the question of rescue equipment requirements before any final selections 
a r e  made and before final decisions concerning rescue equipment development 
a r e  made. In this connection it should be  noted that state-of-the-art advances 
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Table H-49. SRV Equipment Weights for Rescue of a 
12-man Space Station Crew 
Wt, lb 
Communication and Survey Equipment (various) 
(installed and portable) 
Despin Devices (2) 
Soft Docking Fixture (1) 
Attachable Docking Fixture (1) 
Portable Airlock (1) 
EVA Suits (4 t 3* = 7) 
AMU Backpack (4 t 3* = 7) 
Manipulator (shirtsleeve) (I) 
Transfer Capsule ( 3 )  
Sampling and Analysis Ki t  (1) 
Damage Control Equipment (various) 
Remote Manipulator (1) 
Medical Ki t  (2) 
Extended Survival Kit  ( 1 ) 
Tethers (Umbilicals) (2) 
Personnel Car r ie rs  (3) 
Miscellaneous 
Spare Provisions 
700 
500 
250 (weight increment 
over standard) 
800 
1600 
500 
1050 
2000 
1500 
50 
150 
1000 
100 
500 
90 
30 
100 
100 
* 
For  Rescue Crew 
11,020 
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appear required only in the debris detection technology. .The remaining 
rescue equipment falls into the category of current technology and requires 
mainly the consideration of rescue needs in the initial design of the IP 
elements, and the design and development of a number of items which in 
many cases  will have application to other needs in addition to rescue. 
IP hardware design should be influenced by the following factors: 
- Escape by means of a bail-out device is a desirable 
capability because it may greatly simplify rescue. 
The ability to dock even under adverse conditions 
will reduce rescue equipment needs and will shorten 
rescue operations timelines. 
The ability to cycle cabin atmospheres will also 
reduce rescue equipment requirements and speed 
crew transfer when compared to airlock transfer. 
The ability to determine damage to the DV and the 
status of the DV crew f r o m  the exterior of the DV 
will reduce rescue hazards and rescue time. 
Vehicle and station design should provide f o r  
multiple access  into the vehicles and between 
compartments within a vehicle. 
should be considered. 
Vehicle design should consider the possibility of 
uncontrolled motion and the need to reduce such 
motion. 
f o r  IP transporter vehicles should also consider the 
needs of debris detection and spin characterization 
as a possible additional use f o r  the same system. 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- In bulkhead design, the need f o r  cutting access holes 
- The selection of rendezvous and docking guidance 
H. 5 RECOMMENDED STUDY AREAS 
The pr imary requirement f o r  additional studies relates to the need to establish 
event probabilities for the various potential emergency situations. 
studies depend upon knowledge of equipment failure probabilities, and cannot 
be performed until IP element design definition is available. 
Such 
However, 
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parametric studies of the probability of encounter of debris a s  a function of 
distance from the DV generator of the debris, the approach vector, debris 
characterist ics,  and debris ejection velocity may now be initiated. Since 
debris characterist ics cannot be firmly established until design definition of 
the potential DV has been completed, this type of analysis must remain incom- 
plete until perhaps Phase C of the vehicle development contract. 
study a rea  for early attention is the problem of medical emergency probability 
which, in a large measure, will be independent of final vehicle configuration, 
since most medical emergencies relate only to physiological and bacterio- 
logical considerations and past  medical experience. 
Another 
A parametric approach can also be taken with respect to debris detection 
systems which could be analyzed a s  a function of variable debris character- 
istics. 
the preparation of a reasonable target model which, in turn, must await 
Final selection of the optimum system would, however, have to await 
completion of vehicle design and possibly some test  activity. 
Recommended studies independent of the derivation of event probabilities 
include the derivation of damage data reporting systems. 
consist of sensors  combined with both automatic and demand-type data links 
to assure  that the SRV crew, a s  well as ground control, would be apprised 
as quickly as  possible of the nature of the emergency situation and the extent 
of damage o r  injury. 
Such systems would 
After fairly extensive design definition of IP elements has been completed, 
studies a r e  recommended to address their dynamic characterist ics under 
conditions of uncontrolled motion, a s  well a s  their self-damping character-  
istics. 
systems, both integral with the DV o r  brought by the SRV, and of spin 
characterization instrumentation. 
Data thus obtained would permit detail design studies of despin 
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Optimization studies should address the question of crew transfer modes 
under various assumptions of interference by factors such a s  inability to 
dock, residual motion, etc. The results of such studies could lead to 
standardization of emergency transfer methods for  all IP elements. 
The question of emergency entry and exit methodology deserves additional 
study with respect to hatch design, bulkhead design, etc. 
be performed independent of event probabilities. 
This study can 
An important study area  not treated in this report deals with the question of 
DV disposal after evacuation o r  rescue, and the equipment requirements 
which such operations would impose on the SRV. 
It i s  also recommended that studies be made of the medical problems per se 
in addition to the medical event probability already discus sed. Equipment 
requirements f o r  ground-assisted diagnosis and prognosis, the feasibility 
of providing specialized medical equipment such as X-ray, traction devices, 
fluid administration devices, etc. , should be considered. 
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APPENDIX I 
MISCELLANEOUS 
I. i HAZARDS DUE TO SELF-GENERATED DEBRIS* 
I. 1 . 1  General 
Among the emergency situations defined in Appendix A were several  which 
could result in the generation of spacecraft debris. 
collision, explosive decompression, and explosion. It seemed desirable to 
These situations included 
investigate the behavior of the resulting debris because of the hazards it might 
pose to the distressed vehicle (DV) and to other nearby spacecraft such as a 
Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV). Since only a brief overview was possible within 
the time constraints of this study, the scope of analysis of the debris problem 
was restricted to an exploratory review of debris motion after ejection by the 
DV and the probability of debris presence as a function of ejection velocity 
and distance from the DV. 
To thoroughly define the nature of the debris hazard would require data on 
particle size, mass  distribution, particle velocity and vector distribution, 
and consideration of the secondary effects of atmospheric and gravity forces. 
The availability of much of this data depends on the completion of design 
definition of those elements of the IP  which may become disabled, and the de- 
termination of event probabilities of the emergency situations causing debris 
ejection. 
to allow further definition of the nature of the debris hazard. 
It is recommended that such data be developed as soon as is feasible 
I. I. 2 Debris Motion 
I. 1 .2 .  1 Analysis 
P r io r  work by other organizations as well as this brief analysis indicate that 
the possibility of a spacecraft collision with a particle ejected from the 
~~ 
.l. -r 
This section is based on the work of V. A. Chobotov, Ref. 1-1. 
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spacecraft exists if the particle is ejected radially o r  in a cross-track 
(out-of-plane) direction. 
order approximation, is periodic in nature, implying that the particle will 
return to the ejecting body in either a fraction of an orbit period o r  after a 
complete period. The in-track (forward o r  backward) ejection, however, 
results in secular increase of the particle distance from the ejecting body. 
These effects a r e  illustrated in Figures 1-1 and 1-2 (reproduced from Ref.1-2). 
where the positions of a mass ejected from the center of an earth-following 
coordinate frame (space station) a r e  shown. The results a r e  for a circular 
orbit of 300 statute miles (260 n mi) with the angle 
The resulting motion of the particle, to a first  
defined as 
-1 yo 
(Y = tan - f 
0 
where 2 and jr 
relative to the orbiting DV. 
a r e  the initial velocities of the ejected particle measured 
0 0 
Additional analytic results derived in this study a r e  given in Figures 1-3 to 
1-5. Linearized equations for the mass motion were used to compute the 
distance p f rom the spacecraft of a mass ejected with 10 fps f rom the vehicle. 
These figures show the position of the mass  at  each quarter-orbit period for 
the cases of in-track, radial, and cross  -track ejection, respectively. 
I. 1.2 .2  Conclusions 
The analytic results lead to the following conclusions. 
For  Radial Ejection: 
Separation is periodic in time 
Maximum separation occurs in one-half orbit after ejection 
Separation is reduced to zero upon completion of each orbit; 
conversely encounter probability is maximum at that time 
Inward ejection i s  subject to atmospheric perturbation 
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For  Tangential Eiection: 
Separation is always finite and is  variable with time 
Separation increases with succeeding orbits 
Fo r  Out-of-Plane Ejection: 
Out-of-plane separation i s  periodic in time 
Maximum separation occurs 1 /4 and 3 /4 of an orbit period 
after ejection 
Separation is reduced to zero every half-period; conversely, 
encounter probability is maximum at that time 
Debris ejected radially and out-of-plane thus poses a hazard to the DV as well 
as to an SRV. 
with which it was ejected (except for perturbative forces such as for the case 
of radial inward ejection where atmospheric drag forces may decelerate the 
particle), the danger to the DV could be significant. 
Since the debris returns to its source with the same velocity 
The debris ejected tangentially is primarily a hazard to any vehicle following 
in-track and trying to close with the DV for rendezvous and docking. Even if 
the initial ejection velocity of the debris were low, the relative velocity 
between an SRV trying to rapidly complete terminal rendezvous and a 
particle of debris could reach damaging levels. 
It i s  concluded from the data presented that further study of the debris problem 
is  appropriate. It is also indicated that consideration should be given to means 
of allowing the SRV to detect the presence of debris, to characterize i ts  motion 
in order to determine the degree of hazard posed by the debris, and to avoid such 
hazard. 
I. 1. 3 Probability of Debris Presence 
The results presented above suggest that the probability of a collision with an 
ejection particle can eventually be computed for a given velocity vector of 
ejection and the volume of space occupied by the spacecraft o r  of a larger 
sphere surrounding the spacecraft. However, with the data currently available, 
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this goal could not be attained for the general case, and only the probability 
of a debris particle being present in a given volume of space could be computed. 
For the specific case of a volume of space being occupied by a space station 
(i. e . ,  the DV) the computed debris presence probability is also the probability 
of collision with that DV. 
It is to be noted that the following analysis deals with particles ejected in a 
random manner, i. e . ,  in an arbitrary direction, and thus differs from the 
results reported above and shown in Figures 1-3, 1-4, and 1-5 which treat  
particles ejected in specified directions. The problem is much simplified 
if only the linearized equations of motion a r e  used and if the probability of 
collision is computed a t  a time corresponding to one orbit period following 
the mass ejection in an arbitrary direction from the spacecraft. 
of the results is reasonably good for a time not exceeding one orbit period but 
degrades considerably with time thereafter. 
parison of the trajectories obtained by solving exact and linearized (approximate) 
The accuracy 
This can be seen from the com- 
equations of motion. For example, Reference 1-2 shows a 10% e r r o r  in the ; 
altitude (radial coordinate) of a mass  one orbit period later fo r  the in-track 
ejection case. 
how ever . 
The in-track (or x-coordinate) e r r o r  is considerably smaller, 
I. i. 3. i Analysis 
The procedure for calculating the collision probability of an ejected mass 
particle with a sphere of radius ps centered at  the spacecraft can be formulated 
as follows. 
The linearized equations of motion f o r  a mass ejected from a circular orbit 
with an initial velocity V (with components io, +o, ko relative to the rotating 
x, y, z axes in Figure 1-6) are given in Reference 1-2 as 
1-4 
4 2 x = (-3t t -s in  at) 2 t - (1 - cos wt) Po 
0 o w  
YO sin wt t -2 y = 'c; (-1 t cos ut) k 
0 0  
i 
0 z = -  sin a t  
w 
. (I. 1-1) 
If wt = 8 = the angular position of the coordinate frame (spacecraft) in orbit, 
then the equations (I. I -1) can be written as 
y =--(-I 2 t cos e ) &  t -  +O sin e 
0 0  
i 
0 z = -  sin 8 
w 
(I. 1-2) 
One orbit period later,  i. e. , when 8 =  IT, the position of the mass (relative 
to the frame x, y, z )  is  given by the equation 
(I. 1-3) 0 x = - -  
6 1 6  
w 
This result shows that the mass wil l  be leading (negative x) the spacecraft for 
a backward ejection at  the initial time t = 0 and lagging for a forward ejection 
at t = 0. 
A sphere of radius p = x can thus be defined as centered a t  the coordinate 
(spacecraft) origin which will not be entered by the ejected mass one orbit 
period later if  lkd 1 wx/6n. 
The x component of ?can be defined a s  
S 
.-, 
Consider now a given ejection velocity vector V. 
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= v cos p (I. 1-4) 
where V is the magnitude of the velocity vector and p is a half cone angle 
measured from the x axis as shown in Figure 1-7. 
The lkol 2 wx/6n condition wil l  be satisfied if, and only if, 7 falls within the 
cone LY described by half-angle p (either along the positive o r  negative x axis) 
and the probability of this occurring can be expressed as 
where 
A = an effective a rea  of a spherical zone defined by the cone (Y 
= 2 n v  
Z 
2 (1 - cos p) 
(I. 1-5) 
A = an effective spherical a rea  
= 4 n v  
S 
2 
.b + -8. 
assuming an equal probability of V occurring along any direction. 
probability that a mass initially ejected with a velocity "v in an arbitrary 
direction will be outside a sphere of radius p, one orbital period following 
the ejection is 
Thus, the 
:;s 
Note that V i s  eliminated in Eq. (I. 1-5) and can therefore be replaced by 
any variable. 
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P = ( i  - cos p) 
(I. 1-6) 
The probability that the ejected mass will be within the sphere of a radius p, 
is  then 
P = i - P  
P S  (I. 1-7) 
This has been plotted in Figure 1-8 for i 5 V 5 io00 fps and ps  = 0. O i  to 
100 n mi a s  a parameter for  the space station circular orbit a t  270 n mi 
altitude. 
I. i .  3. 2 Conclusions 
Figure 1-8 indicates that within the effective radius of a space station, i. e . ,  
between 0. 01 and 0. 015 n mi (60-90 ft), debris particles with velocities large 
enough to cause serious damage have relatively small individual existence 
probabilities. As indicated ear l ier ,  an exact analysis would probably show 
even lower probabilities, particularly with the passage of time after the 
generating event. The degree of danger to a space station o r  other I P  
element will then become a strong function of the number of debris particles 
which the source emergency has generated. 
ejected with velocities in the range of 5-10 fps could conceivably offer hazardous 
total probabilities of encounter with a space rescue crew operating in EVA on 
o r  near a DV. 
because of lower debris presence probability. 
Large numbers of particles 
The higher the ejection velocity the lower the hazard, however, 
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An SRV would probably be guided to a terminal rendezvous position between 
1 and 10 n mi from the DV, with low thrust propulsion used to complete the 
docking approach. There is a very high probability of debris particles being 
ejected with velocities between a few fps and over 100 fps remaining within a 
volume of space also containing the SRV. The mitigating factor is that unless 
a large number of particles have been ejected, the probability of encountering 
debris is  very low in such a large volume of space. 
Further parametric analysis of DV-generated debris encounter probability 
is  recommended. 
particle size and mass and should be based on more realistic estimates of 
ejection velocities. Exact analysis methods, accounting for drag and gravity 
forces and time effects, should be used. 
Such studies could determine probability as a function of 
I. 2 UNSTABLE MOTION OF THE DISTRESSED VEHICLE* 
I. 2. I General 
In deriving requirements for special equipment and operations of a Space 
Rescue Vehicle (SRV), the problem of transferring a rescue crew into a DV 
was found to be difficult, if not impossible, if the DV was in uncontrolled 
motion. 
if the DV were in a tumbling mode, that is, simultaneous rotation about more 
than one body axis a t  the same time. 
to determine the kind of uncontrolled motion that might be expected of IP 
elements and what means were available to reduce such motion to permit crew 
transfer. 
Particular difficulty would be faced in performing such a transfer 
A brief analysis was therefore performed 
76 
This section is based on the work of V. A. Chobotov, Ref. 1-1. 
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I. 2 .2  Analysis 
I. 2. 2. 1 
There exist several  potential causes which can induce appreciable spin o r  
tumbling of spacecraft such as the Space Station or  the EOS. 
Sources of Uncontrolled Motion 
These are: 
(I) Escaping spacecraft atmosphere 
(2) 
(3) Malfunctioning de-spin mechanism 
(4) 
(5) Collision with orbiting debris, meteroids, or  other spacecraft 
( 6 )  Docking impact 
(7) 
(8) 
Malfunctioning reaction control thruster o r  momentum exchange 
devices (reaction wheels o r  control moment gyros) 
Separation from counterweight in the artificial G mode of the 
station /base 
Loss of attitude control system (power failure, etc. ) in low earth 
orbit 
Movement o r  redistribution of masses within the spacecraft 
(crew or  payload) 
The first six causes listed above were examined in Ref. 1-3 where it was 
concluded that each cause may induce a 3 to 4 rpm tumble in a space station. 
This appears to be a reasonable estimate for. the Space Station as well as 
other large spacecraft. A detailed study of the Space Tug o r  EOS was not made. 
The seventh cause listed above is particularly significant if the spacecraft 
attitude control sys tem failure occurs within the atmosphere. Tumbling will 
certainly result under such conditions with the spin stabilizing about the axis 
of maximum moment of inertia. 
value, a range of 1 to 4 rpm is probable, based on observed tumbling rates of 
spent booster stages in low ear th  orbits. 
Although the tumbling rate can have any 
The induced tumble of the spacecraft may be about an arbitrary axis initially 
but will tend to approach pure spin about the major principal axis of the vehicle 
if there is any energy dissipation in the system. Such energy dissipation may 
be caused by internal sources (sloshing fluids, structural damping) or  external 
sources (atmospheric friction, induced eddy currents, etc. ), and will tend to 
decrease the vehicle nutation (wobble) as well as spin. 
dissipation may o r  may not be sufficient to provide a noticeable effect over a 
single orbital period. 
The amount of energy 
I. 2 . 2 . 2  Reducing Unstable Motion 
A tumbling or  spinning spacecraft can be despun by application of an  external 
torque, by energy dissipation within the spacecraft or  by inertia augmentation 
i. e. , the extension of booms with tip masses  or the deployment of cable- 
connected masses  (yo-yo). 
than the distressed spacecraft could also conceivably grapple the tumbling 
vehicle and exert  a torque on the vehicle to despin it. Such a procedure, 
however, is not recommended for the general case'because the resulting 
motion of both spacecraft would be very difficult to predict and control. 
A rescue vehicle of a size comparable to or greater 
The amount of impulse J required to detumble o r  despin a spinning spacecraft 
can be determined from the relation 
H = Iw 
= FRAT 
= JR 
where 
H = angular momentum 
I = moment of inertia 
F = force (thrust) 
AT = burn time o r  time of force application 
J = impulse = FAT 
w = angular velocity 
R = moment arm (about mass center) 
(I. 2-1) 
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The mass properties and geometry for three typical vehicles are shown in 
Figures 1-9, 1-10, and 1-11. The impulse J required to despin each of the 
vehicles in Figures 1-9, 1-10, and I - i l  from a 4 rpm spin (w = 0.419 rad/sec) 
about its major axes is  listed in Table 1-1. 
If a mass unwinding from a cable (yo-yo) is  used to despin the space station 
after being attached to it, then the required length d of the cable is given by 
Ref. 1-4 as 
for R 2 1  << - 
m m m (I. 2-2)  
where m is the mass of the yo-yo, R is the radius of the unwinding drum, 
and I is the momentum of inertia of the spinning mass. 
6 2 100 and a yo-yo mass m = 32.2 For  a station inertia I of 4. 50 X 10 
= 3. I slugs for a 100 lb weight, 
slug-ft 
I w  1.2 X I 0  3 f t  (I. 2 - 3 )  
The results of the above simplified analyses suggest that a yo-yo method may be 
a practical means of stopping a space station o r  a smaller vehicle tumbling 
in orbit. 
100  lb. 
released from the vehicle after unwinding. If the mass is not released, the 
system may achieve gravitational stabilization in attitude, o r  perform slow 
oscillations about the local vertical. 
can, of course, also be used but will probably be heavier in total weight. 
The cable length is on the order of 1200 ft if the despin weight is 
Centrifugal force aids the unwinding of the cable and the mass can be 
As an alternate solution, small rockets 
I. 2. 2. 3 
I. 2.2.3. 1 
Docking With Spinning o r  Tumbling Spacecraft 
In -plane D o cking 
If a distressed vehicle has pure spin about an axis of symmetry, then the SRV 
could approach it in the plane of spin (co-rotate with the DV) and attempt to 
1-11 
dock with it. 
centrifugal force acting on the SRV as it rotates about the DV. 
of magnitude of the forces involved is  shown in Figure I-12.and demonstrates 
the impracticability of this approach. 
I. 2 . 2 .  3.2 
The variation of the classical Euler angles 0 (nutation), 4 (spin), and 4 
(precession) measured with respect to an angular momentum vector H of a 
torque-free spacecraft for the general case of unequal moments of inertia 
i s  given by 
The major problem in this approach is the overcoming of the 
The order 
Docking Along Spin Axis 
i, = H sin e sin 9 cos 9(1- A B  - ") 
$ = H c o s e ( &  - B (I. 2-4) 
These equations show that only in the case of dynamic symmetry, i. e. , if 
A = B or  when two moments of inertia of a spacecraft a r e  equal, the equations 
reduce to 
i = O  
$ = H ( &  - $-)cos 0 (I. 2-5) 
which indicate that 6 ,  4 and 4 a r e  constant. This suggests that docking with 
a tumbling spacecraft having no dynamic symmetry (three different moments 
of inertia) would not be feasible in view of the complex nature of the motions 
that would result. 
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In the case of dynamic symmetry, however, and the presence of a docking 
port along o r  near an axis of spin, hard docking could be attempted. 
matic diagram of this technique is shown in Figure 1-13 where a dynamically 
symmetric space station (DV) is shown precessing with an angular rate (4) 
and nutating about the angular momentum vector H2 with a nutation (wobble) 
half angle e. A rescue vehicle is  shown matching the spin and wobble of the 
DV with the required centripetal force and gyroscopic torque indicated. 
A sche- 
-+ 
.I 
Assuming in Figure 1-13 that 4 = 4 rpm, d = 50 f t ,  e = I O "  , mi = 50,000 lb'r, 
2 2 5 2 AI = 51, 600 Slug-ft , C = 21,000 slug-ft , A2 = 5. 53 X I O  Slug-ft , 
5 2l C2 = 4.42 X 10 
T are:  
slug-ft , the centrifugal force F and the gyroscopic torque 
.2 F = mid sin e 4 
where 
= 2370 lb  
6 I 2  = 4 = H2(& - &)cos e and H2 = A24 
(I. 2-6) 
Hence T = -780 ft-lb (I. 2-7) 
Although the force F and the torque T a r e  not excessive in this example, the 
requirement for precise sensing of the relative attitudes and dynamic symmetry 
(equal moments of inertia about the transverse axes) makes the feasibility of 
-1, .P 
Tug of Figure 1-9 is assumed half-full. 
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docking under such conditions questionable, i f  not impossible. The following 
conclusion? apply: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3 )  
(4) 
( 5 )  
(6) 
The angular velocities and attitudes of the DV must be measured 
precisely and matched by the SRV. 
Forces  and torques a r e  relatively low. 
Axial force is  similar to normal requirements for docking. 
DV wobble is likely to occur. 
Wobble presents complex SRV control problems. 
Both the DV and the SRV must absorb docking forces, torques, and 
energy levels which a r e  generally greater  than under normal 
conditions. As a design problem, however, this is believed 
soluble. 
I. 2 . 3  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The problem areas associated with spacecraft tumbling and SRV docking to 
tumbling, distressed vehicles have been briefly examined and identified. The 
examination of the possible tumbling causes suggested that a 4 rpm spin is a 
likely value for  the space station. It was concluded that: 
(1) Hard docking to a tumbling (spinning) spacecraft does not appear 
feasible because the target is likely to have complex motions not 
easily matched by the SRV. 
devices should be internally or externally activated and located to 
oppose spin about the principal axes. 
devices by the SRV should also be considered. 
The feasibility of hard docking to a tumbling DV should be 
reexamined if the SRV can be rotated about an axis passing 
through a docking port  and the DV can have a docking port  along 
each of the principal axes (or very close to them). 
Should spin o r  tumble of the DV be reduced to a relatively low 
value, hard docking o r  grappling may be attempted. The grappling 
and docking mechanisms should 
(2) Self -contained despin solutions should be emphasized. The despin 
Externally attachable 
(3)  
(4) 
(a) be simple, lightweight and reliable 
(b) 
(c) 
not damage target o r  SRV 
have positive target capture and retention 
,.’ 
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(d) 
(e) 
( f )  
(g) 
be capable of self -disengagement 
be operable with some misalignment between target and 
rescue vehicle 
provide for multipoint contact and large energy absorption 
capability 
have final (docked) configuration dynamically stable and 
controllable. 
It is recommended that future effort be concerned with 
(1) 
(2) 
( 3 )  
(4) 
Determination of wobble (nutation) and spin decay times for 
actual IP spacecraft designs 
Evaluation of candidate means (external) for reducing wobble or  
spin 
Evaluation of methods for attaching grappling o r  despin equipment 
to the DV (if not self-contained) 
Evaluation of soft-docking designs fo r  cases where wobble cannot 
be entirely eliminated 
4. 
I. 3 F L Y  -AROUND SATELLITE INSPECTION METHODS "* 
I. 3.  1 General 
The space rescue study indicated a requirement for surveying the DV f rom 
the SRV, particularly if communication cannot be established between these 
vehicles. This survey could be performed from a distance of several  miles 
if conditions hazardous to the SRV a r e  suspected. It might also be required 
within a few hundred feet o r  closer to the DV if detailed information on the 
damage status of the DV is desired. Because of the possibility that such a 
survey could impose rigorous propulsion requirements upon the SRV, a brief 
study of this problem was performed. 
Visual inspection of a Distressed Vehicle (DV) in orbit by the Space Rescue 
Vehicle (SRV) can be performed by flying around the DV. 
maneuver can be an  in-orbit plane inspection initiated by an  impulsive radial 
velocity change imparted to the SRV. 
orbit identical to that of the DV, and should be ahead for  radial outward and 
The simplest 
The SRV should initially be in a circular 
4, -r 
This section is based on the work of V. A. Chobotov, Ref. 1-5. 
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behind for radial inward impulse application. 
be an ellipse about the DV with a period equal to the orbital period of the DV. 
The ratio of the major axis of the ellipse, referenced to the initial position 
of the SRV, to the minor axis is  2 and its magnitude is directly proportional 
to the radial incremental velocity AV applied to the SRV. 
The resulting trajectory wil l  
If a faster inspection is required, it can be performed by flying around the 
DV in a circular motion (trajectory) a t  any radius, in any plane or specified 
maneuver time. If the fly-around time is much shorter than the orbital 
period of the DV, then the maneuver can be performed by application of a 
continuous radial thrust by the SRV equal to the centrifugal force required to 
maintain the circular motion desired. 
time (period) is not short  compared to  the orbital period, the required thrust 
becomes a function of time (or position relative to the DV). 
For the cases when the fly-around 
I. 3 . 2  Analysis 
I. 3 . 2 .  I Impulsive Elliptical F ly  -around Maneuver"' 
For the in-orbit plane case, the equations of motion are (Ref. 1-2): 
21io 
(1 - cos w t )  x = -  
w 
and 
sin w t  f0  Y =o (I. 3-2) 
(I. 3-1) 
where w is the orbit rate, x and y a r e  the in-track and radial relative (to DV) 
displacements of the SRV, respectively, and 9 
velocity (relative to the DV) as shown in Figure 1-14. 
is the radial impulsive 
0 
.I, - 
This subsection is  based on the work of Eggleston and Beck, Ref. 1-2. 
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Let 
- -  '0 +(I - cos at)' t sin' wt 
w 
(I. 3-3 )  
which states that if after a quarter-revolution (at = 9 0 " )  p is to be a given 
value, then 
If, for example, p = 100 ft and o = 1. 11 X 
space station orbit), then 9 = 0. 0496 fps. 
the relative distance p will be a maximum and equal to 
rad/sec (270 n mi circular 
Half a revolution later (wt = 180") 
0 
= 179 f t  Pmax 
If a maximum distance of 5 n mi is desired, then -jT 
radial impulse relative to the DV. 
it is given by the equation Vy = 9, t xo where x is assumed zero initially. 
= 8.43 fps is the required 
0 
This is  also the absolute impulse, since 
The trajectory of the SRV relative to the DV is  shown in Figure 1-15 for the 
case of an initial 9 = 8.43 fps applied radially at a point 2. 5 n mi  ahead of 
the DV. 
0 
I. 3.2.2 Circular Flv-around Maneuver 
The thrust requirements for performing a circular fly-around maneuver in 
orbit can be determined from the rendezvous equations given in Ref. 1-2. 
exact equations for the displacement of a mass particle relative to a frame 
The 
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x, y, z rotating at a constant angular velocity o in a circular orbit as shown 
in Figure I - f4  a r e  
L 
(I. 3-4) 
(I. 3-5)  
(I. 3 - 6 )  
2 Here, r = [(Is t y) t x2 t z2] '",  rs is the orbit radius, and ax, a a a r e  
f Y' - 
the acceleration components along the x, y and z axes, respectively. If now 
only in-plane motion is considered, then z = 0 and Eqs. (I. 3-4)  and (I. 3-5) 
can be solved on a computer for ax and a 
where p is a constant radial distance of the SRV relative to the DV and CY is 
a polar angle which may be given as cy = h t as shown in Figure 1-15. 
by letting x = p cos Q, y = p sin CY, 
Y 
0 
An approximate solution can be obtained, ho\kever, by considering the linearized 
form of the rendezvous equations. These can be written as: 
y t 2 w j , - 3 0 Y = m  2 - Y = a  T y
(I. 3-7) 
(I. 3-8) 
a .. 2 2 -  z t w  z = - -  rn Z (I. 3-91 
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Equation (I. 3-9) describing the out-of-plane motion is uncoupled from the 
x and y equations and may therefore be examined separately. Considering 
Eqs. (I. 3-7) and (I. 3-8) first (in-orbit plane motion), let x = p cos CY, y = p 
sin a. 
z axis, 
Then if a = Lrt where & is a constant relative angular rate about the 
2 = -p& sin a 
jr = ptr cos CY 
.. .2 x = - p a  cos (Y 
.2 i; = - p a  cos a 
Substituting these relations into Eqs. (I. 3-7) and (I. 3-8) there results 
( 3 2 = -p& 1 t 2- cos &t 
a -  a Y a 
(I. 3-10) 
(I. 3-11) 
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The in-plane (x, y plane) acceleration is then 
a =, /aXtay 2 2  
XY 
= pir 2 ds 
to f irst  order terms in a/&. 
(I. 3-12) 
The value of a is  approximately accurate only for a/& << 1. 
of the approximate result is  that the absolute acceleration a 
approaches the pir 
The meaning 
is constant and 
XY 
2 XY 
term, which is  the relative centrifugal acceleration. 
The out-of-plane circular motion is  described by Eqs. (I. 3-7) and (I. 3-9)  with 
y = 9 = 0, x = p cos p, z = p sin p where p is an angl,e in the xz plane. 
p = bot where bo is a constant angular rate and p is a constant radius as 
before, Eqs. (I. 3-7)  to (I. 3-9) reduce to 
If 
(I. 3-13) - 2  a = -ppo cos Pot 
X 
a = -2appO s in  Pot (I. 3-  14) 
Y 
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Therefore, 
a -   +- 
X xz 
(I. 3-15) 
(I. 3-16) 
and the time-dependent te rms  a r e  neglected. 
2 Eqs (I, 3-12)  and (I. 3-16) were normalized (divided by g = 32.2 f t /sec ) and 
plotted in Figure 1-16 for different values of the period P = 2a/iYo = 2v/pO 
with p = 5 n mi and 100 f t  a s  parameters.  
I. 3. 3 Conclusions 
The results show that the required average acceleration, o r  thrust/weight 
ratio, is nearly constant in magnitude and radial in direction. 
for the in-orbit-plane case is slightly higher than that for the out-of-plane 
case and is of the order of 0. 12 g for a 10-minute constant rotation at a 
distance of 5 n mi f rom the DV. 
capable of performing this fast fly-around, particularly at distances close 
to the DV. For  example, at 5 n mi distance, a 10-minute fly-around would 
require about 1900 fps of AV, while only 350 fps is required at 100 ft f rom the 
DV over a period of 30 minutes. Due to limited available AV, the EOS orbiter 
will  have to use the impulsive, elliptical maneuver at a AV of about 5-10 fps 
which will  require a full orbital period in time. 
The magnitude 
Vehicles such a s  the Space Tug will thus be 
1-2 1 
I. 4 GROUND-BASED ASCENT TIME CHARACTERISTICS6 
1.4. 1 General 
The time required f o r  a Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) to reach a Distressed 
Vehicle (DV)  includes time segments such as the time required to prepare 
the SRV prior  to departure and the time required to reach the DV after 
departure f r o m  the point of origin. In the instance of a ground launch, the 
EOS serving as the SRV must  be prepared for  the launch. Some discussion 
of the duration of this pre-launch phase is given in Volume I1 of this report. 
Additional time delays a r e  introduced by the need for  waiting until the next 
available launch window and by the rendezvous phasing operations carr ied 
out in orbit. These ascent time delays a r e  a function of the orbital position 
of the DV ( i ts  phase relative to the launch site), the orbit parameters of the 
DV, and the AV capability of the EOS. 
A brief analysis was undertaken of the ascent times of the EOS as a function 
of AV available in the orbiter in a 50 by 100 n mi initial transfer orbit. The 
target was assumed to be in an orbit of 270  n mi altitude a t  55" inclination. 
The DV is in a random (not subsynchronous orbit) position within this orbit when 
the emergency occurs and a rescue mission is requested. The EOS is assumed 
to be in a ready condition when such a mission is requested and can be launched 
whenever the next launch window becomes available. This ideal situation 
was assumed for the purpose of isolating the preparation and countdown times 
from the ascent times which depend upon orbital and flight mechanics factors 
and upon the AV capability of the ascending vehicle. 
I. 4 . 2  h a l y  s is 
The rendezvous mode with the lowest velocity requirement is the in-plane 
ascent mode w h e r e  the SRV is launched when the launch site lies in the track 
.I, -a* 
This section i s  based on the work of W. A. Fey, Ref. 1-6. 
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of the target orbit plane. 
inclination orbit and launch from ETR, the maximum time between launch 
opportunities is 15 hours. In the general case, the target may not be in the 
proper phase position in its orbit for rendezvous at that launch opportunity. 
An SRV phasing maneuver must be accomplished by waiting in a parking 
orbit (which has a different orbital period than the target orbit) for the 
appropriate phase relation between SRV and target to occur. Because of 
atmospheric drag effects, a circular parking orbit at 100 n mi altitude is 
about the lowest feasible and was  used in this study. 
100 and at 270 n mi a r e  not greatly different and therefore phasing may con- 
This occurs twice every 24 hours; for a 55" 
The orbit periods a t  
sume considerable time. 
phase between target and SRV of almost 360 degrees. 
synodic period, is 21. 6 hours for the problem under study. 
The worst case corresponds to a change in relative 
This time, called the 
More rapid phasing may be accomplished by making a direct  ascent, requiring 
a plane change during ascent a t  the expense of a greater AV expenditure. If 
the SRV waits on the ground for the proper phasing to occur, approximately 
one target orbit period is  the maximum wait required. A plane change is 
necessary because the launch site wi l l  not be in the target orbit plane; an 
orbit intersecting the target plane must be flown and a plane change to enter 
the target orbit made a t  the intersection. As an example, rendezvous with a 
all  possible target phase relationships requires launch a t  any time from 0. 76 
hour prior to the coincidence of launch site and target plane (target northbound) 
to 0 .90  hour after coincidence. 
from -7.9 degrees to t8. 5 degrees. 
velocity of 3260 fps is required for the plane change. 
rotational velocity, launches after the occurrence of launch site - target plane 
coincidence a r e  more easterly than those before, thus accounting for the 
asymmetry in the above plane changes. 
Corresponding plane changes required a r e  
In either case, a maximum increment in 
Because of the earth 's  
F o r  on-orbit vehicle AV capabilities between those required for in-plane ascent 
and those for direct  ascent, a hybrid technique was followed in computing 
ascent times. It assumed that the SRV is launched into an orbit which utilizes 
1-2 3 
the maximum plane change of which the vehicle is capable. 
use is made of the more rapid phasing associated with plane changes. 
SRV ascends to a 100 n mi circular parking orbit and there completes the 
remainder of the phasing which cannot be achieved by a plane change because 
of AV limitations. Ascent to 270 n mi orbit is then made, and the plane change 
is performed in combination with the circularization maneuver at 270 n mi. 
Thus, maximum 
The 
Additional features of the rendezvous procedure can be seen from Figure 1-17. 
Lift-off from ETR is shown at @ with burnout in a 50 x 100 n mi orbit a t  0. 
Ascent is immediately made to 100 n mi altitude to avoid atmospheric drag 
effects. Circularization in a 100 n mi circular orbit is  performed at @ and 
parking for phasing begins. After sufficient phasing is accomplished, injection 
into a transfer orbit to 270 n mi  altitude can be made at the next nodal crossing, 
(9. At @ a combined impulse for the circularization and plane change is 
added. 
optimum split of plane change at points : 4 and 5 but this refinement was 
not considered in this preliminary study. The line of nodes where the ascent 
trajectory intersects the target orbit plane was selected to be 90" downrange 
from the launch site in order to minimize the plane change required. 
desired 100 n mi  altitude was  not achieved by the first nodal crossing because 
departure from the Hohmann Transfer shown would cause an increased AV 
requirement. 
Some reduction in velocity requirement could be achieved by an  
3 0  
The 
In determining the SRV AV requirements subsequent to the 50 X 100 n mi orbit, 
an allowance of 100 fps to  circularize at 100 n mi was  included. 
return reentry from 270 n mi was assumed, which requires 390 fps. 
allowance for terminal rendezvous maneuvers was made. 
A direct  
No 
The time from launch to rendezvous was determined on a worst case basis. 
The basic factor is the maximum time between in-plane launch opportunities of 
15 hours. This time is reduced by the ability of vehicles with plane change 
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capability to launch before or  after the in-plane situation. 
an allowance must be made at each launch opportunity for the target to change 
its phase by 360 degrees in order to account for all possible target phases. 
If the entire phasing is accomplished by a ground wait and plane change the 
time required is 1. 66 hours, which slightly exceeds the orbital period of the 
target (I. 57 hours) because the launch site moves in the same sense as the 
target in its orbit. 
time spent in a 100 n mi parking orbit must be added, i. e . ,  1.47 hours for 
each revolution. 
f romthe  times connected with phasing, I. 93 hours were allowed for the 
However, 
When all the phasing cannot be done on the ground the 
This changes the relative phase by 24.5 degrees. Aside 
ascent. This includes 0. 1 1  hour from points @ to @ , 0.71  hour f rom @ 
to 0, 0. 35 hour f rom @ to a, and 0.76 hour f rom 4 to 5 . 0 0  
No time allowances were made in this analysis for launch preparations between 
the declaration of emergency and rescue vehicle launch o r  for time required 
for terminal rendezvous after gross rendezvous is achieved at point 
These items would add to the times as determined by this study. 
0.  
I. 4. 3 Conclusions and Re commendatiom 
The relation between velocity available in a 50 X 100 n mi orbit and the 
maximum time to achieve rendezvous after declaration of emergency is shown 
in Figure 1-18. 
ment situation (1080 fps); it requires the same AV as ascent without consider- 
ation of phasing requirements. 
maximum of all cases,  38. 5 hours. 
shortened f rom that obtained in parking orbit by substituting the more rapid 
phasing provided by waiting on the ground and accomplishing a plane change 
in orbit. A rapid decrease in time can thus be achieved. Fo r  example, if 
4300 fps of velocity is available, the time to rendezvous is reduced to 18. 7 
hours. At this point, no wait in parking orbit is required and all phasing i s  
accomplished by waiting on the ground. 
An in-plane ascent corresponds to the minimum AV require- 
The time required for in-plane ascent is the 
If more AV is available, the time can be 
This is referred to as direct  ascent 
1-25 
rendezvous. 
plane change capability and thus allow ear l ier  launch. 
capability of 15, 000 fps only reduces the time to rendezvous to 14.4 hours. 
Further increases in available AV serve only to increase the 
However, a AV 
Additional analysis is recommended to determine the rescue requirements at 
other points in the low earth orbit mission profile, such as in the case where 
an EOS orbiter had an emergency in a 100 X 270 n mi ascent orbit. 
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Trajectories of a number of point inasses 
ejected from the center of the rotating coordinate system 
at t=O (0=0), each with a total relative velocity of 
10 feet per second, but with differeht velocity compo- 
nents. The solid lines are discrete trajectories; the 
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Figure 1-2. Trajectories Relative to Origin (Distressed 
Vehicle) vs Initial Velocity Components 
(Reference 1-2) 
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APPENDIX J 
REMEDIAL SYSTEMS SELECTION 
J. 1 GENERAL :k 
J. i. 1 Objectives 
One of the tasks of the Space Rescue Operations Study was a review of escape 
and rescue systems suitable f o r  use with the manned hardware elements of 
the Integrated Program (IP). The objective of this task was to recommend a 
set  of applicable remedial systems for more detailed consideration a t  a later 
time. These remedial systems were to provide techniques f o r  resolving the 
emergencies identified in Appendix B, including an escape and rescue capa- 
bility if necessary. 
developed by this study and reported in Appendix H were to be used in 
deriving and sizing the remedial systems. 
The Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) equipment requirements 
The remedial systems were to be derived in the gross sense. 
magnitude estimates of size, capacity, performance capability, and develop- 
ment and unit costs were to be provided if readily available, but major effort 
was not to be devoted to detailed estimates. 
Order-of- 
This Appendix describes the procedure used in arriving at  a recommended 
set  of remedial systems, using the weight and cost  estimates presented in 
Appendix K and the performance requirements established in Appendix E. 
The te rms  "remedial means" and "remedial systems" will be used frequently 
in this Appendix. These terms a r e  defined a s  follows: 
Remedial Means (RM) - -  
which provide the desired relief for a given emergency situation. 
Functional o r  operational concepts 
Remedial System (RS) - -  
ment which implement the remedial means concept. 
The hardware elements and equip- 
* 
This Appendix i s  based on the work of E. J. Rattin and M. G. Hinton. 
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J. 1.2 
The problem initially faced in planning the RS selection effort was the very 
large matrix of systems, emergency situations, and mission classes from 
which the most effective systems were to be selected. 
classes with which this study was concerned were discussed in detail in 
Appendix A and a r e  listed below: 
Ground Rules and Assumptions 
The I 1  mission 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6.  
7. 
8. 
9.  
10. 
11. 
Low Earth Orbit Space Station (LEOSS) and operations 
associated with i t  
Geosynchronous Orbit Space Station (GEOSS) and 
a s  s ociated operations 
Space Tug in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) operations 
Space Tug in Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO) operations 
Space Tug in Lunar Orbit (LO) operations 
Space Tug on the Lunar Surface (LS) 
Lunar Surface Base (LSB) and Orbiting Lunar Station 
(OLS) operations 
Earth Orbit Shuttle (EOS) in LEO operations 
Space Shuttle in LO o r  in transit  between earth and moon 
Space Shuttle in GEO o r  in transit to and from LEO 
Space Shuttle in LEO 
Emergency situations resulting from a variety of hazards were discussed in 
Appendix B. These fall into 10 general categories: 
1. I11 o r  injured crew 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
Metabolic deprivation due to Environmental Control and 
Life Support (EC/LS) failure o r  shortage of food and water. 
Stranded o r  entrapped crew due to equipment failure, 
illness o r  injury occurring in EVA, etc. 
Inability to  communicate due to equipment failure o r  crew 
disability 
Out-of-control spacecraft due to equipment failure o r  
collision 
Debris in the vicinity due to collision o r  failure of nearby 
spacecraft 
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7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Radiation in vicinity due to reactor o r  isotope power 
source malfunction on spacecraft 
Non-habitable environment due to accidental decompres- 
sion, contamination, or  ECLS failure 
Abandonment of spacecraft forced by equipment failure, 
fire, etc. 
Inability to reenter atmosphere (EOS only) due to propulsion 
failure, collision, or  other damage to the heatshield, con- 
trol  systems failure, etc. 
The Remedial Means (RM) potentially applicable to the mission/emergency 
situation matrix resulting from the above a r e  shown in Table J-i .  
nine R M  categories cover a variety of RS of varying sizes and capabilities. 
This makes the selection process monumental in size unless a method can be 
found to intensively screen the resulting matrix. 
limited because emergency event probabilities a r e  not available, the IP 
hardware elements a re  not fully defined, and many of the RS a r e  still in a 
conceptual status only. 
These 
Quantitative methods a r e  
It was necessary, therefore, to assume equal probability for all  the 
emergencies that can occur, and that the RS a r e  therefore required to 
handle a l l  anticipated emergencies. 
some medical equipment so  tha.t they could serve as  interim havens f o r  ill 
or injured crews pr ior  to  their return to the permanent haven of safety on 
earth. 
launched either manned or unmanned, as  required by the emergency. 
crew of the Distressed Vehicle (DV) is functioning, an unmanned vehicle 
might be sufficient, and exposure of a rescue crew to possible hazards 
would be avoided. 
an unmanned rescue vehicle may be the only permissible rescue means 
regardless of DV crew conditions. 
Space stations a re  assumed to contain 
Space Rescue Vehicles (SRV) a r e  assumed to be capable of being 
If the 
In some instances, as  in the case of radiation hazard, 
Other assumptions a r e  listed in the sections to which they relate. 
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J. 1. 3 Approach 
A qualitative approach was chosen for  reduction of the multi-dimensional 
matrix of candidate RM and RS for the reasons discussed above. This pro- 
cess  consisted of two phases, a s  shown in Figure J-I. The f i rs t  phase was 
concerned with derivation of the minimum possible number of RM that could 
cope with all mission classes and emergency situations under study. 
second phase defined the hardware systems needed to perform these 
remedial functions, then reduced the number of hardware systems to the 
minimum number that would be able to cope with all anticipated emergencies. 
This second phase emphasized the use of planned or modified IP elements 
rather than all-new developments. 
The 
Being non-quantitative, the selected study approach relied on ranking pro- 
cedures that were often based on judgment rather than measurement. The 
following discussion briefly summarizes this approach. 
As  discussed in Section J. 1 .2 ,  the 10 separate emergency categories must 
be initially assumed a s  applicable to each mission class. One particular 
aspect of each emergency situation will be most critical f o r  each mission 
class.  
aspect or  condition. 
aspects of the emergency situation, i t  was backed up by others. 
remaining emergency situations were similarly analyzed for the same 
mission class. 
single mission class,  the set  of RM thus derived was screened to remove 
duplications. 
all  of the emergencies applicable to that mission class. 
repeated f o r  a l l  of the mission classes.  
was then screened to eliminate duplication between mission classes. 
final se t  of R M  would be effective over the entire mission spectrum and f o r  
all  of the applicable emergency situations. 
An RM was selected to provide a solution f o r  this most critical 
If this RM could not also cope with the remaining 
The 
After all ten emergency situations had been analyzed for a 
This resulted in a minimum set of RM that could respond to 
This process was 
The total set  of RM thus derived 
This 
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The second phase of the analysis was concerned with selection of the RS 
matching the functional o r  operational concepts represented by the final se t  
of RM. The process was initiated by defining crit ical  requirements such as 
performance, size, and mission duration fo r  the R S  that matched the final 
set  of RM. Candidate RS were then selected from planned elements of the 
IP, and modified where needed. Where this proved impossible, considera- 
tion was given to a new RS development to meet specific requirements. A 
set  of selection cr i ter ia  was then applied to reduce the resulting R S  possi- 
bilities to the minimum number able to meet  a l l  of the functional o r  operational 
requirements of the final R M  set. The remaining RS group was again screened 
to determine which RS could combine more than one remedial concept in a 
single hardware item, thus resulting in a further reduction of the candidate 
RS set. 
Cost cr i ter ia  could be used to a r r ive  at  a least-cost set. 
cedure, although desirable, was not performed because sufficiently detailed 
data were not available a t  this time. 
However, this pro- 
J. 2 ANALYSIS 
J .2 .  1 Remedial Means (RM) 
J. 2. 1. 1 
In selecting remedial means from those listed in Table J-1 f o r  application to 
the mission/emergency situation matrix discussed in Section J. 1. 2, certain 
characterist ics were considered more  desirable than others. 
was given to the ability to return a distressed crew directly to a safe haven. 
This characterist ic is exhibited by the "Mission Abort'' and "Bailout and 
Return Device" (BOR) categories. 
RM Characteris tics 
Top preference 
The BOR i s  carr ied by the mission vehicle, can be  detached upon need, and 
contains sufficient propulsion to travel to a safe haven. 
such havens could be postulated to exist for emergencies in LEO. 
F o r  example, two 
A BOR 
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designed to re t ro  directly to ear th  might require a AV of about 300 fps. If 
i t  were planned for rendezvous with the LEOSS, it might require about 600 
fps of AV to permit phasing, altitude adjustments, and rendezvous and 
docking . 
The Mission Abort category of RM allows the crew to remain on board the 
DV while returning to safe haven, and is thus the most preferred RM. 
However, i t  applies to IP transporter elements only. 
A lower ranking is given to an R M  which permits the crew to abandon the DV 
but has no means f o r  reaching a safe haven independently. A Bailout and Wait 
Device (BOW), attached to the DV, falls into this category of remedial means. 
It allows prompt shirtsleeve escape from a rapidly deteriorating emergency 
situation on board the DV. The BOW may be able to cast  off and provide some 
separation distance between itself and the DV, but i ts  propulsion i s  essentially 
limited to an attitude control system. 
pairing with a retrieval vehicle. 
To be effective, this concept requires 
Concepts which permit aid to be brought to the DV, o r  which retrieve the DV 
crew for return to a safe haven a r e  next in the preference ranking. Although 
emergencies may require such external aid i f ,  f o r  example, the DV crew 
has no means of self-help, the retrieval concept requires time f o r  aid to 
reach the DV. This time may be critical in  te rms  of crew survival. Included 
in this class of RM concepts is  an unmanned assistance package which is  
shipped to the DV upon request and requires that the DV crew be able to 
receive the shipment and utilize its content. 
breathing oxygen supply of a lunar space station results in a call f o r  
assistance, a space shuttle o r  a tandem space tug, using an automatic 
rendezvous and transfer procedure, might be sent to the station with 
replacement oxygen. 
I€, for example, damage to the 
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In addition to a supply package, such an unmanned shipment might also 
include an Unmanned Rescue Module (URM) to be operated by the DV crew. 
This concept would be employed if abandonment of the DV i s  required and if  
the crew i s  f i t  to operate the return vehicle. 
approach to the DV is considered hazardous and the risks to a rescue crew 
a r e  believed unnecessary. 
It might also be employed if 
The manned Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) concept ranks last  in this preference 
l ist  because i t  represents the most complex RM. First, it may take longer 
to respond than an urimanned vehicle. Secondly, i t  requires a more capable 
transportation system, since i t  weighs more than an unmanned vehicle. And 
finally, i t  will  expose additional personnel to hazard. However, this vehicle 
is a las t  resor t  and must  be used when the preferred means cannot cope with 
the rescue need. 
matrix. 
For this reason, it wil l  remain prominent in the selection 
Other characterist ics a r e  also considered in the selection process. F o r  
example, the BOR and the manned/unmanned rescue and retrieval means 
should preferably return the DV crew directly to the final safe haven, earth. 
In some instances i t  may be necessary to use an intermediate haven such as  
a space station, but since the final destination will in a l l  cases  be earth, 
preferential ranking will be given to those R M  which can reach this final 
haven directly. 
R M  selection should also emphasize speed of response to an emergency. 
Here again BOR and BOW rank higher than unmanned assistance o r  manned 
rescue vehicles. RM should also provide maximum speed of return to a 
safe haven. 
The BOR and the Buddy system rank highest from this point of view because 
they a r e  a t  the scene of the emergency when i t  occurs, and in most instances 
can immediately depart for a safe haven. Rescue vehicles sent to the DV 
must consume additional time in reaching it. 
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Finally, the R M  should be able to offer aid specific to the emergency situa- 
tion. 
be equipped pr ior  to departure with equipment required for dealing with the 
specific emergency, to the extent that its nature i s  known. 
Here the SRV ranks highest because i t  can offer manned aid,and can 
Among RM categories, the Buddy system is unique in that it exhibits mixed 
characteristics. 
vehicle. 
may ca r ry  part  of the mission payload and crew. 
sufficiently close to the other  vehicle to offer almost immediate aid. 
degree of aid is somewhat less  than that of the SRV (except f o r  speed of 
response), because it will not contain specialized rescue equipment to the 
same extent a s  the SRV. It is  also somewhat less effective than the BOR, 
except in the case where the vehicles a r e  joined, which is not treated here. 
Docking between the two vehicles may not be feasible, so that transfer may 
have to  be by EVA whereas transfer into the BOR could be made in shirt-  
sleeves. 
It is defined as another vehicle travelling with the mission 
It may simply accompany the mission vehicle a s  a backup, o r  i t  
In either case, i t  travels 
The 
The Buddy system is more effective than the BOW, since the Buddy 
can provide return to a haven and can also offer some manned assistance. 
Another RM included in this study is the concept of a Prepositioned Aid 
Package (PAP).  As used here, this concept applies to non-transiting 
vehicles such as a space station o r  lunar exploration site, and assumes that 
shelter and supplies a r e  placed in a dormant state nearby. The P A P  may 
consist of a BOW o r  a BOR placed within easy reach of the crew by EVA from 
the mission vehicle, or i t  may consist merely of crew survival equipment 
such a s  breathing oxygen f o r  use by a crew stranded in EVA. 
advantage over the BOW o r  BOR concepts is that i t  is not attached to the 
mission vehicle, and thus may escape the effects of the emergency situation 
to which the other RM have been subjected. 
used where the mission vehicle configuration prevents the docking of a BOR 
o r  BOW. 
Its only 
The PAP concept may also be 
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One category of RM assumed to be present in a l l  IP elements consists of 
onboard supplies and equipment of a backup nature, dedicated to emergency 
use only. 
communication equipment would fal l  into this category. 
a r e  assumed to be so equipped, the selection process used f o r  this study did 
not consider this R M  as a variable. 
Emergency oxygen supplies and emergency subsystems such a s  
Since all vehicles 
Table J- 1 places the RM discussed above into three classes representing 
self-help, unmanned aid, and manned aid concepts. 
do not represent a ranking system, but a r e  merely used to identify each RM 
in subsequent analyses. 
The numbers assigned 
J. 2. 1. 2 
As indicated in Section J. 1. 3,  the RM must be selected from Table J-1 f o r  
each of the 11 mission categories on the basis of being best able to respond 
to the most cri t ical  aspect of a particular emergency situation. 
R M  meet this recpirement, they a r e  selected by giving preference to the 
self-help means, followed by the unmanned means, and finally the manned 
assistance means. 
only if  the mission or the emergency situation requires such a backup. The 
assumption is made that the R M  always functions a s  intended, and therefore 
requires no backup f o r  itself. 
missible is an emergency situation involving disability of the crew, which 
voids their  self-help capability. For example, in a "metabolic deprivation" 
emergency, the condition may have so  deteriorated that the crew is  disabled, 
preventing abort or use of the BOR. 
which a preferred RM i s  impractical because of mission payload constraints 
preventing the use of a BOR, o r  where the limited number of vehicles in the 
fleet does not permit  use of a Buddy RM. 
RM Application 
If several  
The selected R M  may be backed up by other RM, but 
An example of a case when backup is per-  
Other examples include the case  in 
Figure J - 2  provides an example of the R M  application procedure. 
ticular emergency situation chosen, the case of a stranded or entrapped crew, 
The par-  
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shows that the cri t ical  condition will vary depending on whether the mission 
vehicle is a stationary space vehicle o r  a transporter vehicle. 
assumed here that EVA was more likely in the instance of the space station 
than in that of the transporter, and that being stranded in EVA was more 
cri t ical  than being merely trapped within the space station. 
sidered to be applicable a r e  indicated by number codes in the three columns 
on the right. 
Table J- i. 
It was 
The RM con- 
This code corresponds to the numbering system used in 
If an astronaut is stranded in EVA outside a space station, the most rapid 
means of aid will be required, since portable life support systems have 
limited duration. 
station would be a suitable RM, a s  would additional oxygen supplies o r  P U S -  
type equipment located in a position accessible to the astronaut. 
concept, which includes this capability, was therefore selected as  the most 
desirable RM f o r  this condition. 
astronaut to a safe haven, an unmanned rescue module (URM),  a t  the least, 
is also required to provide the retrieval capability. 
up, but is  paired with the P A P  to form a single RM concept. 
contains a BOR, the URM is not required. 
A BOW o r  other temporary shelter external to the space 
The P A P  
Since the P A P  by itself cannot return the 
The URM is not a back- 
If the P A P  
When the emergency condition considered most cri t ical  involves entrapment, 
the implication is that a rescue crew will be  required to open a path to the 
sealed DV crew compartment and effect the rescue. The SRV has therefore 
been selected as the RM for this condition. R M Q ,  onboard supplies and 
equipment, i s  assumed to be on board all vehicles and is  therefore not speci- 
fically listed. 
Similar considerations were applied to the remaining nine categories of 
emergency situations included in this analysis. 
conditions selected as  a function of mission class  f o r  each of the emergency 
situations. For the purpose of this table, as well a s  Figure J-3 ,  i t  was 
Table J-2 shows the cri t ical  
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convenient to combine the mission classes  f o r  shuttle in LO, GEO, or  in 
Transit  into a single class. 
a r e  similar. 
The RM requirements of these classes 
The RM selected to cope with these cri t ical  conditions a r e  shown in Figure 
J-3. The number code is again that of Table J-I ,  and triangles have been 
used to indicate the preferred RM concept. The URM @frequently appears 
paired with the BOW @ o r  with the P A P  @ . When it i s  shown associated 
with the BOR @ , however, i t  is used a s  a backup instead of being paired. 
For  example, in the instance of the EOS suffering a non-habitable environ- 
ment, the URM would be  used only if the BOR, after hardware system 
sizing, proved too heavy o r  too bulky to be carr ied on o r  within an EOS. 
number of the backup situations shown in Figure J-3 were resolved during 
the subsequent RS analysis in which weight and size estimates were used to 
A 
select applicable systems. 
Table J -3  summarizes the data of Figure J-3 by listing the number of 
missions in which each R M  i s  applied in the pr imary o r  desired role, and 
those missions in which the R M  serves  a s  a backup. 
that the only RM which seems to have no application is @ , the "Shipped 
Supplies and Equipment" concept. As already mentioned, onboard emergency 
supplies and equipment a r e  desired across  the board (by definition). 
either desired o r  backup in a l l  of the mission classes. 
the SRV. The URM, however, seems to be required only a s  a backup, either 
by itself o r  paired with the BOW. 
It is of interest  to note 
BOR is 
The same i s  true f o r  
This summary indicates that performance and design requirements need to 
be developed for eight of the nine RM categories. 
missions have different performance and size requirements, a sizable 
matrix of requirements f o r  RS results. 
Since the different 
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J. 2 .2  Remedial Systems (RS) 
J. 2.2. 1 RS Requirements 
The consideration of candidate RS and their subsequent reduction to a recom- 
mended set  was semi-quantitative in the sense that precise specification of 
RS is not feasible a t  this stage of the IP development. 
information was necessary,  however, to ass i s t  in the selection of preferred 
RS. 
depend, for  example, upon the mass characteristics of the RS and upon the 
discretionary payload capability of the vehicle. 
Some quantitative 
The ability of a particular mission vehicle to accept a specific RS might 
For the purpose of this study, the large set  of characteristics which could 
be used to describe a specific remedial system was reduced to those listed 
below: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Crew and Passenger Capacity -Applicable to BOR, BOW, 
URM and SRV; also applicable where a "Buddy" is not the 
same as  the mission vehicle 
Response Time Limits - Applicable to  those mission and 
emergency situation combinations for  which the URM o r  
SRV concepts were selected 
EC/ LS Sizing - A mission duration-dependent characteristic 
applicable to BOR, BOW, URM and SRV; also applicable to 
onboard emergency equipment and life support equipment 
contained within a P A P  
AV Requirements - Applicable to BOR, URM and SRV; also 
of interest where a "Buddy" is not identical to the mission 
vehicle 
Structural Requirements (reentry shielding, water impact, 
etc. ) - Applicable primarily to BOR 
Docking System Requirements - Applicable to BOR, BOW, 
URM, andSRV 
Table J - 4  shows an abbreviated listing of the cri t ical  requirements derived 
f o r  the BOR. 
grouping of missions into classes of similar requirements i s  feasible and, as  
Although a great variety of requirements appear on this table, 
will be shown, 
were prepared 
can result in a reduced set  of candidate BOR. 
f o r  BOW, URM, SRV aqd other equipment needs. 
Similar listings 
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The candidate RS based on these listings a r e  discussed in the following 
section. 
J. 2 .2 .2  Remedial Systems Candidates 
J. 2.2.2.  1 
Table J -5  shows the BOR selected to match the characterist ics of Table J-4. 
The earth reentry systems a r e  designed to apply to IP elements in low earth 
a s  well a s  in geosynchronous orbits, o r  in transit  between these orbits. 
relatively low weights of these BOR devices, and their proposed use in a 
dormant state over long time periods docked to vehicles such a s  space 
stations, led to selection of storable-propellant re t ro  systems. Details of 
these systems a r e  provided in Appendix K. 
small  ear th  reentry systems with the same AV capability (300 fps) was to 
permit exploration of several  designs. 
indicated in Table J-5,  is derived from the current Apollo command module, 
and i s  a North American Rockwell concept. 
capability i s  a candidate f o r  GEOSS application. The XM, which represents 
an expandable module concept, was a l so  proposed by North American Rock- 
well and was selected since it offered the most likely BOR capability f o r  the 
EOS Orbiter. 
an externally-mounted BOR is not appropriate, which leaves only storage 
within the cargo bay a s  a possible approach. Payload volume considerations 
make i t  desirable to consider an expandable concept, which requires removal 
from the cargo bay pr ior  to expansion and rigidization of the structure. This 
concept 
the EOS to  permit shirtsleeve transfer of the crew to the BOR after its 
deployment. The SERD, o r  small  earth reentry device, is a Lockheed con- 
cept which differs f rom the MAP primarily in that it is a new design speci- 
fically created f o r  space escape. 
Bailout and Return Systems (BOR) 
The 
The reason for evaluating three 
The Modified Apollo CM (MAP), a s  
The MAP with a 5000-fps AV 
Because of the ascent and reentry mission mode of the EOS, 
does increase reaction time, and may require special provisions in 
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The BOR with space docking systems a r e  designed to find a haven a t  one of 
the orbiting elements of the IP (space stations o r  OPD), and a r e  sized f o r  
two propellant systems in order  to compare weight and cost  differences. 
Where the AV i s  very large, as in the MTCM 111, the cryogenic system was 
arbitrari ly chosen to minimize BOR weight. 
a cryogenically fueled BOR could only be utilized in missions where resupply 
was frequent enough to permit replenishment of boil-off losses. 
The assumption was  made that 
Brief 
descriptions of the Modified Tug Crew Module (MTCM) and the individually 
sized Propulsion Module (PM) a r e  provided in Volume 11 (Section 7) and 
Appendix K. 
vided by North American Rockwell and Boeing. 
i s  specially sized f o r  this application. 
The MTCM is  based on space tug crew module concepts pro- 
The Propulsion Module (PM)  
The BOR systems with 4000-fps AV capability a r e  designed to reach a safe 
haven a t  the OLS from a vehicle in transit  to the moon. 
sized to return a crew from GEO to LEO, and can also be used between lunar 
orbit and the lunar surface. F o r  example, when used with the Lunar Surface 
Base (LBS) it can reach the OLS even in the worst  plane change case. 
MTCM I i s  able to provide a BOR function between vehicles ie the same 
orbit, i. e . ,  between space station and OPD, or  a space shuttle in lunar orbit 
and the OLS. In the latter instance, the BOR is assumed to be attached to 
the shuttle on arr ival  in lunar orbit and to remain with it until departure. 
The MTCM I11 is 
The 
J. 2.2.2.2 
Both rigid and expandable BOW systems have been sized for this study. 
BOW i s  characterized by being attached to the mission vehicle and serving as  
a temporary haven. 
primary vehicle because of an emergency which makes continued operation 
of the vehicle impossible. 
BOW has no propulsion other than an attitude control system. 
Bailout and Wait Systems (BOW) 
The 
It permits shirtsleeve transfer of a crew fleeing the 
The BOW may also be used in a P A P  mode. The 
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t 
The expandable design listed in Table J -6  is based on in-house studies by The 
Aerospace Corporation. 
Tug crew module shell, with sufficient subsystems to permit survival of the 
crew until rescued by some other vehicle. 
The rigid BOW design is based on the basic Space 
The smaller crew capacity vehicles of Table J-6 a r e  associated with trans- 
porter type IP elements such a s  tugs and space shuttles without passengers. 
The 15-man capacity BOW is  used with transporters,  such as  a space shuttle 
carrying a full rotation crew, or with space stations. 
on response time assumptions, since the BOW can provide only a temporary 
haven and must depend upon other vehicles to complete the R S  function of 
returning the crew to safe haven. 
The EC/LS life is  based 
Details of BOW configurations and equipment complement a r e  provided in 
Volume II (Section 7) and Appendix K. 
J. 2 .2 .2 .  3 Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) and Unmanned Rescue 
Module (URM) 
Table J-7 shows the candidate RS selected under this category. 
except one, the basic module used is that of the Crew/Cargo Module (CCM) 
being considered f o r  use with the EOS. The modifications required to con- 
ver t  the CCM into either URM or  SRV a r e  described in Volume I1 (Section 7) 
and Appendix K. 
the amount of special rescue equipment carried on a specific mission. 
rescue need can be satisfied with URM if the DV crew ( o r  par t  of the crew) 
a r e  functioning, can transfer themselves into the URM, and can operate the 
URM. In this case,  only about 1200 lb of equipment i s  carried on board the 
URM. Table J-8 shows a l is t  of such equipment. 
formed in a manned mode, and if  the maximum capability is to be provided, 
about 11,000 lb of equipment might be  required, as shown in Table J-9. 
This la t ter  weight was used in sizing the propulsion requirements for the SRV. 
In a l l  cases  
The essential difference between these two vehicles is in 
The 
If the rescue is to be per-  
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In the one instance in which the MCCM was not used, the candidate system 
selected was the Space Tug Crew Module with a Space Tug Propulsion 
Module. This vehicle, however, was used here  a s  the standard tug, not 
equipped with special rescue equipment. Nevertheless, this vehicle will 
undoubtedly be able to respond satisfactorily to some of the emergency 
situations that might occur, for example, the need to abandon a DV. 
this reason, it is retained in the l is t  of candidate vehicles. 
For  
A s  indicated ear l ier ,  the 4V allowances shown for each of the candidate 
systems relate to the mission regime for which the system i s  intended. The 
14,200-fps figure identifies a vehicle based in GEO and returning to a LEO 
haven; AV of 18,000 fps identifies a rescue mission f rom OLS to LS and 
return; and s o  forth. In one instance, that of the MCCM with a Staged Tug, 
the actual AV capability available was in excess of the required 18,000 fps. 
The Staged Tug refers  to a propulsion module of the space tug under con- 
sideration, with a gross weight of about 71, 000 lb. 
two of these propulsion modules in tandem. 
The staging consists of 
When the EOS is used to transport an SRV to the vicinity of a DV in LEO, the 
AV capability required is minimal, and is used only f o r  docking o r  station- 
keeping maneuvers. 
provide AV increments of the order  of 200 to 300 fps. 
is shown, the vehicle is based in the same orbit a s  the DV and wil l  require 
AV f o r  phasing, terminal rendezvous, and docking maneuvers. 
The attitude control system of the MCCM is expected to 
Where a 1000-fps AV 
For some rescue situations, Appendix E shows AV requirements greater 
than those provided f o r  in Table J-7. 
showed excessively large propulsion module weights. 
not been shown on Table J -7  because of the very low probability of their 
eventual application. 
Vehicle sizing f o r  these requirements 
These vehicles have 
J- 16 
J. 2.2. 3 Remedial Svstem Selection 
J. 2. 2 . 3 .  1 
Section J. 2 . 2 . 2  indicated that the RM selection process reduced the candidate 
set  somewhat, but left  5 BOW, 8 BOR, 10 URM and SRV, the Space Shuttle and 
the Buddy System in the candidate set. Further reduction i s  needed in order  
to reduce the set  to an economically feasible number. 
Sys tem Selection Criteria 
The selection cr i ter ia  used in this next reduction process consisted of 
general cr i ter ia  a s  well as  cr i ter ia  for  relative ranking of systems. 
general s e t  of cr i ter ia  was concerned with questions of practicality. 
practicality criterion was applied, for  example, when the candidate RS 
would reduce the basic performance capability of the mission vehicle to a 
degree that made i ts  acceptance unlikely. 
payload mission to the moon, i f  15,000 lb of payload capability was required 
f o r  a BOR, this remedial system was considered impractical f o r  that 
mission. In contrast, it was considered practical to attach a 15,000-lb BOR 
to a Space Shuttle while in either LEO, GEO, o r  LO in order to provide crew 
escape capability while in standby orbit. 
to transfer orbit injection. 
The 
The 
F o r  example, on a 50, 000-lb 
The BOR would be removed pr ior  
Another practical consideration introduced a s  a criterion was that of re -  
quired stowage volume. It was considered impractical, f o r  example, to 
store a r igid BOR or  BOW in the cargo bay of an EOS a s  a permanent 
arrangement. 
volume the EOS mission might tolerate would be that of an expandable 
structure. 
It was assumed that the maximum degradation in payload 
The relative ranking procedure used i s  described in the next section of this 
Appendix. 
offer, i ts  reaction time, the complexity of i ts  operation by the distressed 
crew, its development status, and how many other applications the RS would 
have within the total mission context. 
RS was also considered, with current o r  planned IP state of the a r t  being 
preferred. 
This ranking considered the degree of aid which the RS could 
The state of the a r t  represented by the 
J- 17 
J. 2.2. 3 . 2  Remedial System Ranking 
Figure J-4 shows the characteristics considered in assigning the "Degree 
of Aid" ranking, as well as  the rankings assigned to the various RS. 
The highest numbered rank i s  the preferred system. 
ranking system a r e  the ability to  respond immediately to the emergency 
situation, exhibited by the BOR, and the ability to return the DV crew to the 
final earth haven without intermediate havens. 
vide shelter while waiting f o r  another system to retrieve the crew is valued 
least  in comparison with other characteristics. However, the usefulness of 
the BOW i s  not to  be ignored when i t  i s  the only system feasible. 
Most valued in this 
The ability to  merely pro- 
Although the SRV offers many categories of aid, i t  ranks relatively low 
because of the necessarily longer response time, and time f o r  return to 
haven. 
the purpose of this analysis, to be present except where the BOR o r  the 
Buddy system was listed. All  other remedial systems require the BOW to 
assure  survival of the crew in the worst-case emergency until retrieval can 
be accomplished. 
It is also important to note that the BOW was always assumed,for 
Table J- 10 is an example of the ranking sheets prepared for each mission 
class  included in the analysis. It shows the ranking cr i ter ia  used in addi- 
tion to the "Degree of Aid" criterion. 
account of a l l  the mission classes ,  a s  shown in Figure J-5. 
rating f o r  this criterion would therefore be 11, indicating that the candidate 
system can be  applied to a l l  mission classes under consideration. 
reaction times shown a r e  estimates of the actual time required, and a r e  
based on the assumed system location. 
basing was assumed to be either on the ground, o r  in LEO. 
Tug/MCCM system cannot be launched f rom the ground in, the cargo bay of 
the EOS Orbiter, the time shown assumes that the MCCM is brought into 
LEO by the EOS, and the Space Tug Propulsion Module i s  then 
rendezvoused and docked with it. 
The "Multiple Use Factor" takes 
The highest 
The 
In the example of Table J-10, 
Since the Space 
J- 18 
The "Development Status" criterion permits three levels of ranking, based 
on whether the candidate system represents a totally new development, can 
be modified from a planned IP element, o r  can utilize a planned IP element 
without modification. The latter is, of course, preferred. 
The "Complexity Factor" criterion also allows three levels of ranking and 
measures the difficulties the DV crew might face in operating the RS. 
highest ranking here  would obviously go to the manned SRV because this 
system requires nothing from the DV crew except to  communicate where 
possible. 
able to reach the shelter, to close the hatch behind them, and to initiate 
operation of the emergency systems, such as EC/LS, that might be on board 
the BOW. 
require considerable activity on the par t  of the DV crew to remove i t  from its 
stowage area,  inflate it, dock it against a hatch ( i f  not already attached), and 
enter it. Entry might even require EVA in extreme cases. Finally, the crew 
must operate the XM to  perform reentry and landing. 
lowest rating under this criterion. 
The 
The BOW does require the crew to function t o  the extent of being 
The XM, on the other hand, is an expandable BOR which would 
It therefore has the 
"State of the Art" (SOA) i s  self-explanatory and has only two levels of ranking. 
The XM i s  not only a new development but also represents some possible 
extension in the state of the art since such devices have not a s  yet been 
developed to operational status. 
IP elements and will therefore be state of the a r t  when the IP becomes 
ope rational. 
The other RS  of Table J-10 a r e  based on 
The "Degree of Aid" criterion has been discus sed previously. 
F o r  the example of the LEOSS mission class,  the XM, although not state of 
the a r t  and requiring new development, is considered the preferred system 
because it renders the highest degree of aid, that i s ,  it has zero reaction 
time and returns the DV crew to ear th  haven directly. If the XM cannot 
J- 19 
be provided, the Space Tug/TCM o r  the EOS/MCCM systems would probably 
constitute the second choice. The latter is somewhat higher in ranking since 
i t  can provide aid of which the TCM i s  not capable. Because of its multiple 
uses,  however, the Space Tug/TCM may be more readily available, and with 
i ts  shorter response times i s  thus also a desirable RS. 
J. 2 . 2 .  3 .  3 
Figure J-5 shows the results of the ranking procedure completed for all i i  
mission classes. 
by development status. 
also identified on this figure by use of the same number code used in Table 
J-1. 
code under the appropriate mission class  heading. 
Space Tug/TCM, the same system can function under several  R M  concepts. 
Remedial System Application 
It also shows the order of the final RS in the candidate set  
The RM represented by the various systems a r e  
Applicability of the specific RS is indicated by entry of the R M  concept 
In one: case,  that of the 
Al l  of the systems indicated in Figure J-5 a r e  applicable, but some ca r ry  
the further designation of "Preferred,  I '  identified by a triangle, others a r e  
"Second Choice, ' I  identified by a square. 
In the case of the Standby Shuttle, which i s  the Space Shuttle kept in LEO in 
standby status, the word "Paired" appears several  times. 
that the mission class  prevents the Space Shuttle from performing the 
rescue mission by itself, and that it requires an SRV in association with it. 
This alternative mode occurs when the DV is a space station against which 
the nuclear Space Shuttle cannot dock, o r  when the DV i s  on the lunar sur-  
face, which the Space Shuttle cannot reach. In the latter case,  Figure J-5 
shows that the Space Shuttle i s  paired with the Staged Tug/MCCM, since a 
single propulsion module has insufficient AV capability to reach the LS and 
to return under the worst  conditions of plane change. 
This indicates 
Two of the RS listed have only a single mission application. 
BOW systems designated a s  RBOW I1 and RBOW 111. 
These a r e  the 
Although other systems 
J-20 
a r e  also shown under their respective mission class  categories, i t  should 
be noted that none of the alternates represent BOW. 
LSB/OLS mission class,  a BOR is shown which could replace the BOW. 
the other case,  that of the Space Shuttle in LO o r  in Transit, RBOW 111 must 
be retained since all of the other applicable systems except the 
require a BOW capability f o r  maximum effectiveness. 
In the case of the 
In 
Buddy 
It is of interest  that the "Preferred" systems a r e  those functioning in the 
BOR mode o r  the Buddy mode. Another RM highly rated during the 
analysis of Section J. 2. 1, that of "Mission Abort, I '  is still a preferred con- 
cept where feasible, but does not appear on this figure since it i s  not a 
separate hardware system. 
available on those IP mission vehicles where i t  is meaningful. 
Mission abort capability i s  presumed to be 
Figure J-5 clearly shows the wide applicability of systems such as the Space 
Tug/TCM or  the Space Tug/MCCM. It also shows that the wide spectrum of 
mission/emergency situations which were examined in this study can, for 
the most part, utilize planned or  modified planned IP  elements for escape 
and rescue. 
the two new development systems, only one, the XM, also represents new 
state of the art. The other new system, the MTCM I /PM,  consists of a 
modified Space Tug Crew Module and requires new development only for the 
propulsion module. A more careful review of available propulsion sys tems 
than was  feasible during this study may disclose current  systems that would 
be suitable f o r  the PM application. 
New development needs a re  thus reduced to the minimum. Of 
J. 3 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Table J- 1 1 relists the RS of Figure J-5 with their ranking characterist ics 
added, and with estimates of both development and recurring costs. The 
derivation of the costs is discussed in more detail in Appendix K. It is not 
feasible to reduce this set  further on the basis of either ranking factors o r  
cost  a t  the current level of definition of the IP  and its elements. 
5-2 1 
The XM represents the only RS which will meet the configurational and 
payload restrictions of the EOS, and f o r  that reason should be considered 
for development. 
wide application that they should also be part  of the final se t  of RS. 
Buddy system is desirable; mission planning should make allowance f o r  this 
concept wherever possible, particularly in the instance of lunar missions 
where Figure J - 5  shows this to be the preferred system f o r  manned Space 
Tug /TCM application. 
The Space Tug/TCM and the Space Tug/MCCM have such 
The 
The cost shown f o r  the MCCM includes that of the special equipment listed 
in Table J-9. 
have a development cost of $175 million. 
a s  the cost of developing the special rescue equipment of Table J-9.  
latter cost may be reduced upon future consideration of the event proba- 
bilities of the various emergency situations postulated by this study. 
The modifications to the Crew/Cargo Module a re  estimated to 
A total of $75 million i s  estimated 
This 
A number of tradeoff studies would ass i s t  in the final selection of RS, based 
upon event probability data and a more definitive mission model. 
also be desirable to explore the economics of using the Buddy system for 
those applications where Figure J -5  suggests the application of the new 
design BOR, the standby Space Shuttle by itself o r  teamed with the Space 
Tug/MCCM, o r  the Staged Tug/MCCM. 
It would 
Cost and rescue success tradeoffs should be explored for basing the Space 
Tug/MCCM a s  an SRV a t  space stations in LEO, GEO, and LO, versus SRV 
basing in LEO o r  on earth. 
crew would be trained to perform rescue missions and would enter the SRV 
only when required, the vehicle remaining in a dormant state between 
emergencies. 
transport the SRV to GEO and LO, with ground basing also requiring an EOS 
flight. The rescue crew, if par t  of the LEOSS crew, would perform normal 
mission functions until declaration of an emergency. 
In the former instance, par t  of the space station 
In the latter instance, a standby shuttle would be required to 
J - 2 2  
Another trade of interest  involves studies of the economics of developing 
new BOW systems instead of modifying IP elements. 
and specialized functions expected of a BOW, new development may provide 
a more effective remedial system without extensive cost increases. 
Because of the limited 
i 
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Table 5-4. Critical Remedial Systems Requirements for 
Bailout and Return (BOR) 
' SPACE SHUTTLE 
IN L E O  
MJSSlON CLASS STRUCTURAL NEEDS 
CREW & 
Life,  hr S A F E  HAVEN PASSENGER CAPACITY (approx. ) 
LEOSS 
GEOSS 
TUG IN L E O  
EARTH GROUND 
O P D l T C M  
EARTH GROUND 
LEOSSlOPD 
TUG IN GEO 
300 
12 
600 
5000 
3-15 
14200 
TUG IN L O  
12 WATER LANDING 
SPACE DOCK 
12 WATER LANDlNG 
36 SPACE DOCK 
TUG ON LS 
C E O  
LEOSS/OPD 
EARTH GROUND 
OLS 
LEOSSlOPD 
LSB IOLS 
600 SPACE DOCK 
14200 12 SPACE DOCK 
3-15 
8300 WATER LANDING 
400 4a 
3-15 SPACE DOCK 
14400 72 
EOS IN L E O  
4000 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
IN L O  OR IN 
TRANS1 T 
72 WATER LANDING 
SPACE SHUTTLE 
IN C E O  OR IN 
TRANSIT 
LEOSSIOPD 
EARTH GROUND 
3-9 2ODOO-26000 120 
10,000 - 16,000 WATER LANDING 
LEOSSlOPD I 
6000-12pOO 
600 
14poo 
9- 12 
I 600 I 12 I SPACEDOCK 1 
120 SPACE DOCKILS 
LANDING 
1Z SPACE DOCK 
72 SPACE DOCK 
3-15 
TO EARTH 
GROUND 
LEOSSlOPD 
EARTH GROUND 
OLS 
LEOSS/OPD 
EARTH GROUND 1 I 300 I I WATER LANDING. I 
3-15 600 12 SPACE DOCK 
300 WATER LANDING 
4000 72 
lODO0 120 
3-15 SPACE DOCK 
C E O  6000 
EARTH GROUND 
12 
I 
I I I I 
I t 
300 
I SPACEDOCK I 
12 SPACE DOCK 
12 WATER LANDING 
EACH OTHER 
OLS TO LOPD 
OLS TO LEOSS 
120 I WATERLANDING I I 1ODOO-lbp00 I 
EARTHGROUND I 
~ 
LEOS f OPD 
EARTH GROUND 
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APPENDIX K 
REMEDIAL SYSTEMS WEIGHTS AND COSTS 
K. i GENERAL * 
A number of potential remedial systems a r e  summarized in Volume I1 with 
regard to configuration, weight, and cost aspects. 
appendix is to present the more detailed results of supporting analyses upon 
which the remedial system weight and cost data in Volume I1 are based. 
The purpose of this 
The objectives of this effort were: 
a. 
b. 
to conceptually define selected remedial systems considered 
appropriate for the Integrated Program 
to provide estimates of the gross costs for development, pro- 
curement, and/or implementation of the selected remedial 
sys tem s 
The remedial systems considered fell  into three general categories: 
a. rescue vehicles 
b. systems necessary o r  desirable to supplement o r  act in con- 
junction with a rescue vehicle 
c. systems promising as alternate, independent solutions to the 
rescue vehicle 
In the second category were such systems or  devices as emergency life 
support systems and bail-out-and-wait (BOW) devices (lifeboats). 
category, the single concept examined was the bail-out-and-return (BOR) (to 
safe haven) device. 
In the third 
It is important to s t r e s s  that this effort was f'conceptual'' in nature and did 
not result in preliminary designs, per  se. 
"bound" the problem by selecting "reasonable" o r  "representative" approaches 
for reducing the various remedial concepts to  hardware systems. 
where previous results existed for any remedial device, they were utilized 
The approach followed was to 
Therefore, 
to the maximum extent possible. 
rlr 'I. 
This Appendix is  based on the work of M. Hinton. 
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One of the study ground rules emphasized that concepts utilizing selected 
o r  planned Integrated Program (IP) hardware or  elements a re  preferred. 
Consequently, known o r  projected IP hardware characteristics were em- 
ployed, where possible. 
K. 2 RESULTS 
K. 2. 1 Remedial System Configuration and Weight 
K. 2. 1. 1 General 
The following sections briefly describe the purpose, salient features (con- 
figuration, contents, gross  weight), and background material (where appro- 
priate) which were used to develop the weight estimates given for each of the 
remedial concept classes examined. 
K. 2 . 1 .  2 IP Elements 
Both the EOS and Space Tug have remedial system application. 
as they were treated in Volume I1 (Section 7), they will not be discussed here. 
Inasmuch 
Two other IP hardware elements, the space tug crew module (TCM) and the 
crew/cargo module (CCM) used in conjunction with the EOS, were identified 
as potential rescue/escape devices. 
their basic functions include the shelter and life support of crew/passengers. 
In addition, their basic structure can provide the basis for modified versions 
incorporating specific rescue/escape capabilities not present in the standard 
o r  baseline configuration. 
Their utility arises from the fact that 
K. 2. 1. 2. 1 Space TUB Crew Module 
Within the framework of Integrated Program planning, it is proposed that a 
crew module (TCM) will be utilized with the space tug propulsion module 
(PM) to provide shelter and life support for various numbers of crew/paseengers 
while performing numerous earth-orbit and lunar-orbit missions, including 
descent to and ascent from the lunar surface. 
completely defined, a limited amount of definition is available fjrom pre- 
Phase A design activities. 
Although the TCM has not been 
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The space tug system weight breakdown is given in Ref. K-1 as: 
Propulsion Module 
Gross Weight 
(incl. propellants) 71, 000 lb 
Propellants (02 /H2) 60,000 
Crew Module 10,000 
,Guidance and Control Module 5,000 
Total (incl. propellants) 86,000 lb 
Pre-Phase A definition studies conducted by Boeing (Ref. K-2) and North 
American Rockwell (Ref. K-3) provide a limited insight into potential crew 
module configurational arrangement, subsystems, and weight allocations. 
Figure K- I illustrates a representative crew module (TCM) concept (from 
Ref. K-2) and, as shown, incorporates a docking port, side hatch and airlock, 
and manipulator a r m  kit, in addition to providing a habitable haven for  crew/ 
passengers. The basic size (volume) of the TCM tentatively selected i s  for a 
3-4 man crew performing a reasonably-long-duration space mission (-28 days). 
It is postulated that the TCM could accommodate larger  numbers (14-15 men) 
for short-duration missions, particularly in an emergency situation. 
With regard to subsystems and subsystem weight allocations, specific data 
f rom Refs. K-2 and K-3 a r e  summarized in Table K-I. 
for essentially the same design considerations, the overall TCM weights a r e  
in excellent agreement from the two sources, although the distribution between 
subsystems is not exact. The fuel cell and OZ/H2 consumables weights shown 
were not part of the reference weight statements. 
0 2 / H 2  consumables may well be stored in (or a part  of) the space tug guidance 
and control module, the reference TCM weight of 10,000 lb given in Ref. K-1 
was considered appropriate for purposes of this study. 
As can be seen, 
As the fuel cells and 
K-3 
K. 2. I. 2. 2 
The present consensus is that ,transfer of passengers and cargo from the 
EOS to the space station will be effected via a crew/cargo module (CCM) 
which i s  deployed from the EOS cargo bay. 
K-2), the CCM hard-docks at one end to the station while supported by the 
erecting and transporter mechanism extending from the EOS cargo bay. 
Under another approach, the EOS can be remote from the station with the 
CCM being propelled (by either a space tug or  CCM-integral propulsion) 
from the EOS to the station where the dock is accomplished. 
EOS Crew/Cargo Module 
Under one approach (see Figure 
Preliminary definitions of such CCM's were not available to define configura- 
tion details and weight breakdowns; therefore, a CCM was synthesized for 
the present study. In effect, the CCM, as defined herein, i s  comprised of a 
forward section which i s  very similar in configuration and capability to the 
space tug TCM, and an after section which is an enclosed cargo-carrying 
structure. 
Table K-2 summarizes the various subsystems in the CCM and gives initial 
weight estimates used for conceptual design purposes. 
propelled and a self-propelled version a r e  included. 
propulsion comparable to the Apollo Service Module reaction control system 
(RCS) o r  the Manned Orbiting Laboratory reaction control system is utilized. 
Note that both a non- 
For  the latter, a type of 
K. 2. 1. 2. 3 
A space tug crew module (TCM) incorporating a docking port, side hatch, and 
airlock and weighing ~ 8 5 0 0  lb (less crew, fuel cells and 0 2 / H 2  consumables) 
was selected as a representative baseline. 
support capacity for  3 - 4  men for  28 days o r  for 14-15 men for 2-3 days. 
Summary 
It is  estimated to have life 
A baseline crew/cargo module (CCM) for  use with the EOS was selected 
which had a forward section similar to the space tug command module outer 
shell combined with an aft cargo- carrying section. Without onboard propulsion 
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i ts  weight was estimated to be 11,500 lb. 
incorporating an Apollo RCS o r  MOL RCS type propulsion system was 
estimated to weigh 14, 000 lb. 
A self-propelled version 
While preliminary and conceptual in nature, these baseline TCM and CCM 
selections a r e  felt to be sufficient for purposes of providing reference 
systems to be used for sizing purposes in remedial system comparison 
efforts. 
K. 2. 1. 3 
Two different types of emergency life support systems were examined during 
the course of the study. 
carried on board a space rescue vehicle (SRV) for subsequent use in a dis- 
t ressed vehicle (DV), while the second i s  a package system to be stored on 
board potentially-distressed vehicles. 
subsystem selection i s  given in Appendix H. 
Emergency Life Support Systems 
The f i r s t  i s  an assemblage of life support i tems 
A detailed discussion of life support 
K. 2. 1. 3. 1 
In conceptual te rms ,  the SRV emergency life support system is an assemblage 
of items to provide (1) breathing oxygen, (2) a portable environmental control- 
life support system (EC/LS), and (3) spare  provisions. 
in a manner to facilitate i ts  transfer f rom the SRV to the DV for subsequent 
use in the DV. 
SRV Emergency Life Support System 
It would be packaged 
The oxygen source i s  provided by potassium superoxide. 
unit provides for oxygen distribution, dehumidification, C02 removal, cooling, 
and power requirements. 
Table K-3 summarizes the weight and volume characterist ics as applied to 
sustaining 14 men for a 48-hour period. 
The portable EC/LS 
The spare provisions a r e  limited to food and water. 
K. 2. 1. 3. 2 
Conceptually, 
assortment of 
DV Emergency Life Support Systems 
the DV emergency life support system is a prepackaged selected 
EC/LS subsystems stored on board the potentially-distressed 
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vehicle. 
storage requirements. 
in fact could be attached to the vehicle via a porthole o r  "plug-in" arrange- 
ment to facilitate its use, instead of physically being within the confines of 
the vehicle's nominal structural  envelope. 
The subsystems a r e  selected to be compatible with long-term 
Although termed "on-board" generically, the package 
To provide atmosphere supply and control, an EC/LS unit utilizing sodium 
chlorate candles for oxygen consumption (and leakage) is employed. 
pressurization is provided by high-pressure (-2000 psi) bottled gaseous 
oxygen. C02 control is accomplished with molecular sieves. 
Initial 
Waste management is similar to the Gemini approach. 
an overboard dump system (with tubes, valves, and accumulator tank) while 
solid disposal is via a commode with a collector and blower. 
Urine disposal is via 
Thermal control i s  provided by radiators, heat exchangers, and associated 
plumbing, 
Power is provided with a battery- solar a r r ay  combination. 
The food provided is dried and the water is stored in tanks. 
Table K-4 summarizes the resultant weight characteristics of such emergency 
life support "packages" for 3,  6, and 12  men for  both 14- and 28-day life- 
support periods. 
K. 2.1.4 Bail-Out-and-Wait Devices (Lifeboats) 
The bail-out-and-wait device (BOW) o r  !'lifeboat'' has often been suggested 
as a useful device to permit an otherwise effective crew to disembark (escape) 
from an uninhabitable spacecraM and await aid (rescue) from a remote source 
(ground-based or  space-based). 
provides a habitable structure with incorporated subsystems to provide for 
continued survival, stabilization, and communications during the waiting 
period. 
In concept then, the BOW device merely 
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Based on the foregoing definition, such a device is carried on board (or  
attached to) the potentially-distressed vehicle (DV). Long-term storability 
is desired, and lightweight structure would be especially important for any 
vehicle having a payload-delivery function. 
Those subsystems related to environmental control and life support were 
selected to be of the same type as previously described for Emergency Life 
Support Systems, as they also were predicated on long-term storability. A 
small  storable propellant attitude control system and a simple communica- 
tions system were incorporated to facilitate the later rescue operation. 
As to basic BOW structure,  both expandable and rigid structure versions 
were considered. 
K. 2. 1. 4. 1 
A similar bail-out-and-wait device had been previously delineated in Ref. K - 4  
for a 3-man capacity. The structural  weight data of this reference BOW was 
scaled to 6-man and 12-man configurations. 
resulting XBOW weight characteristics. 
Expandable BOW (XBOW) 
Table K-5 summarizes the 
K. 2. 1 . 4 .  2 Rigid BOW (RBOW) 
To synthesize a rigid structure BOW, and to s t r e s s  hardware commonality, 
the structural  shell of the space tug crew module (TCM) was selected to 
represent the RBOW concept. 
identical to the XBOW in t e rms  of subsystems selection and weight for the 
same number of crewmen and life support duration. 
Except for the structural  shell, the RBOW is 
An advantage resulting from this selection is that the docking port, airlock, 
and side hatch, which a r e  assumed inherent features of the TCM, a r e  
now "built in'' to the RBOW. 
Table K-6 summarizes the resulting RBOW weight characteristics. 
K-7  
K. 2. I .  5 
Two general categories of bail-out-and-return (to safe haven) devices were 
identified: 
K. 2. 1. 5. 1 Return-to-Earth BOR Devices 
Bail- Out - and- Return Devices 
return-to- earth and return-to- space haven. 
A considerable amount of analytical effort has been expended in the past in 
defining the capabilities and resultant characteristics of devices with which 
one or  more astronauts could disembark (escape) from a distressed vehicle 
(DV) and reenter the ear th 's  atmosphere to descend to an earth landing. 
References K-5 and K-6 summarize the most recent activity in this area.  
Reference K-5 was primarily concerned with small (2-3 men) devices (rigid 
and expandable) for reentry from low earth orbit. Reference K-6 delineated 
rigid low earth orbit BOR devices with a greater capacity (3-9 men) and 
further explored the requirements for reentry from geosynchronous orbit for 
a 3-man BOR device. 
The present study activity was therefore limited to summarizing this existing 
data base and extending it to include a broader scope. 
cluded (1) extrapolating Ref. K-6 data to include BOR devices with up to 15- 
man capacity and (2) calculating propulsion system weights to enable geo- 
synchronous deorbit (consistent with similar data in Ref. K-6 for a 3-man 
geosynchronous BOR device). 
Such extensions in- 
Table K- 7 summarizes the pertinent subsystem weight breakdown data for the 
small (2-3 men) low earth orbit reentry devices from Ref. K-5; Table K-8 
summarizes similar data for the Ref.  K-6 data and extrapolations thereof; 
Figure K-3 is an overall summary of the data in Tables K-7 and K-8. 
K. 2. I. 5. 2 Return-to-%ace Haven BOR Devices 
In the return-to-space haven concept the BOR device is not faced with earth 
reentry requirements and is, in i ts  simplest form, a BOW device plus a 
propulsion module (PM) sized to provide the necessary AV to permit return 
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to a space haven from the a rea  of distress.  One special requirement is the 
provision of guidance and navigation equipment (and associated instrumenta- 
tion, etc. ) necessary to perform the AV maneuver and the subsequent 
rendezvous and docking operations. 
Again, both rigid and expandable structures were considered in  this applica- 
tion and both storable and cryogenic propulsion modules were examined. 
K. 2. 1. 5. 2. 1 Rinid Structure 
For  purposes of commonality, the space tug crew module (TCM) structural 
shell (including docking port, side hatch, and airlock) was  selected to  provide 
the basic habitable structure. Life support and environmental control sub- 
systems consistent with long-term storability (as  in the case of Emergency 
Life Support Systems) were utilized. Crew systems (seats, bunks, acces- 
sories,  first aid, personal hygiene) were provided, as well as EVA equipment 
(suit, portable life support system (PLSS), and support equipment). Batteries 
were chosen to provide the electrical power for the communications, guidance 
and navigation, and instrumentation subsystems. 
Table K-9 summarizes the resulting modified tug crew module (MTCM) 
weights used for the return-to-space haven BOR concept for 3 - ,  6-,  and 
12-man crew sizes and mission durations of 2 and 7 days. 
K. 2. 1. 5. 2. 2 
For  the expandable structure case (XM), all subsystems were identical to 
the rigid case described above, except for the structural  shell. Here,  the 
crew module (TCM) shell weight was replaced by expandable structure 
weights previously derived for the expandable BOW (XBOW) devices (Table 
Expandable Structure 
K- 5). 
K. 2. 1. 5. 2. 3 
Both cryogenic (02/H2) and storable propellant propulsion modules were 
considered. 
Propulsion Modules 
To allow flexibility in sizing various return-to- space haven BOR 
K-9 
devices for a multiplicity of Integrated Program requirements, the propulsion 
modules were merely described as a function of the crew module weight 
(MTCM o r  XM) as depicted in Table K-9 and Section K. 2. 1.5. 2. 2. 
An I 
systems and 450 sec was selected for the cryogenic ( 0 2 / H  ) case. 
K-4 and K-5 depict the ratio of propulsion module (PM) to crew module 
(MTCM or  XM) weight a s  a function of required AV, assuming the propellant 
fraction of the propulsion module is 0.85. 
of 310 sec was considered representative of storable propellant 
SP 
Figures 2 
K. 2. 1. 5. 2. 4 
The overall weight of any desired return-to-space haven BOR device is then 
the sum of the crew module weight (MTCM o r  XM from Table K-5 or  Section 
K. 2. 1. 5. 2. 2) and the properly sized propulsion module (PM) from Figures 
K-4 or K-5. 
Return-to-Space Haven Summary 
K. 2. 1.6 
As previously mentioned, both the EOS and Space Tug have rescue vehicle 
capability (Vol. 11, Section 7).  
space rescue vehicle (SRV) which could be transported from the earth by the 
EOS, o r  in space by the Space Tug o r  Space Shuttle. 
Space Rescue Vehicles 
The present intent is to define a special 
Although the crew/cargo module (CCM) i s  a s  yet undefined, i ts  basic 
characteristics of a crew module section plus a second cargo module section 
indicated that it could provide a reasonable basis for modification into a 
rescue vehicle. 
The modifications assumed were that (1) a center section incorporates a 
self-contained RCS for attitude control and limited AV maneuvers (if the final 
standard CCM version is not so configured), (2) the aft cargo section is 
refitted to accommodate crew/passengers from a distressed vehicle (including 
incapacitated members transported by stretchers) and enable medical aid to 
be provided, and (3 )  that the structure is modified to accommodate a variety 
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of special rescue equipment that may be appropriate for the rescue mission. 
Such equipment may include such items a s  portable airlocks, special transfer 
capsules, manipulator a r m s ,  etc. 
The extent of such included equipment could well depend upon whether the 
rescue vehicle is manned o r  unmanned. 
ments indicated for  rescue crew use would not be necessary. 
If unmanned, those special equip- 
In gross,  then, the space rescue vehicle i s  simply a specially refitted CCM. 
The basic weight characterist ics of the previously- synthesized CCM (with 
onboard RCS) were assumed to apply also to the rescue vehicle, except that 
an 800-lb weight penalty due to structural  modifications was assumed. 
Table K- IO summarizes the resulting weight breakdown for the space rescue 
vehicle (manned o r  unmanned) less special equipments and crew weights, 
but including a nominal RCS propellant load. 
K. 2. 2 Cost Estimates 
K. 2. 2. I Introduction 
Estimates of cost for the various space program elements were assembled for 
use in making summary comparisons of overall program costs. 
i 
Cost estimates from previous studies were used whenever possible. 
cases, however, estimates of cost were not available and were prepared 
using available system definitions and estimating data. 
estimates a r e  "typical" values, representing the generic system elements 
involved. 
correspondingly , approximat e. 
In many 
In all cases,  these 
Because hardware definitions a r e  conceptual, the estimates a re ,  
K. 2. 2. 2 
Estimates of cost for the EOS, Space Tug, and Reusable Nuclear Shuttle a r e  
summarized in Table K- 11. 
NASA Study currently underway at  Aerospace, and a r e  documented in Ref. K-7. 
The cost estimating method used for  this purpose is described in  Ref. K-8. 
Basic IP Element Cost Estimates 
These estimates were prepared for  another 
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The RDT&E cost estimates shown include all engineering and development 
activities as well as all facilities and hardware; a minimum of three (3) flight 
art icles a r e  included. In addition, all engine developments a r e  accounted 
therein, including the NERVA engine development for the Nuclear Shuttle. 
The Facilities Investment cost estimates include the acquisition of all facilities 
and equipment needed to operate these vehicles. 
and WTR facilities a r e  included. 
Unit Manufacturing Cost is self explanatory. 
not only manufacturing costs but also sustaining costs such a s  spares, 
engineering, and tooling support and program management costs. Approxi- 
mately 95% learning has been applied in Average Unit Costs. 
flight values shown a re  typical values which include all operation program 
direct and indirect costs. 
For  the EOS, both ETR 
Two values of unit cost a r e  provided. F i r s t  
The Average Unit Cost includes 
The cost per 
K. 2. 2. 3 
Cost estimates for selected Projected IP Elements a r e  shown in Table K-12. 
Data for the Space Tug Crew Module (TCM) and EOS Crew/Cargo Module 
(CCM) were obtained by making detailed program cost estimates using the 
weight data described in Section K. 2. 1 and the cost estimating method in 
Ref. K-8. Space suit, space tug manipulator kit, and maneuvering unit cost 
estimates a r e  rough order of magnitude (ROM) values which were prepared 
after a review and assimilation of the limited amount of available and 
applicable data. 
Projected IP Element Cost Estimates 
K. 2. 2. 4 Special Rescue Equipment Cost Estimates 
A summary of selected special rescue equipment costs is provided in 
Table K- 13. 
LEO BOR device, and emergency EC/LS packages were determined by 
multiplying element dry weight by the following factors: 
RDT&E Cost $55,00O/lb 
First Unit Cost $ 3,00O/lb 
Average Unit Cost $ 3,45O/lb 
Cost estimates for bail-out devices, Modified Crew Modules, 
K- 12 
These factors were obtained from the detailed estimates made for the Space 
Tug Crew Module. 
Transfer equipment cost estimates were made by using a typical manufacturing 
cost for vehicle structure (from Ref. K-8) to estimate first unit cost. 
costs were developed by multiplying f i rs t  unit cost by 20. 
elements were determined by making ROM estimates based on judgment and 
available unit descriptions. 
RDTW 
The costs of other 
K. 2. 2. 5 Cost Reduction via Parallel  DeveloDment 
All of the foregoing specific remedial system costs were predicated on the 
development of each item a s  a separate development. 
(MCCM) was proposed to be a modification of the basic crew/cargo module 
(CCM) and the various rigid structure bail-out-and-wait devices (RBOW's) 
were proposed to utilize the basic structural shell of the space tug crew 
module (TCM), it was estimated that i f  such remedial systems were developed 
a s  a parallel effort to the basic hardware development program (CCM, TCM), 
then the remedial system (MCCM, RBOW) development costs could be s ig -  
nificantly reduced. Therefore, only "modification" and "special equipment" 
development costs should be attributed to the remedial device. 
Since the rescue vehicle 
On this basis, the MCCM and RBOW parallel development costs were 
estimated to be as shown in Table K-14. 
K. 3 SUMMARY 
Numerous remedial system approaches were reduced to conceptual designs 
and their configurational characteristics, weights , and costs were determined 
for a wide range of operating conditions (number of men, mission duration, 
AV requirements, etc. ). The remedial concepts examined included both 
"onboard" and "externally supplied" systems. 
It was considered feasible to use modifications to hardware being developed 
for other uses under the IP as a basis for certain remedial systems. In 
, 
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particular the space tug crew module (TCM) was utilized to configure rigid 
bail-out-and-wait devices (RBOW) and as the habitable portion of a bail-out- 
and-return-to-space-haven device. The EOS crew/cargo module (CCM) was 
used as the basis for a space rescue vehicle (SRV) compatible with earth orbit 
delivery by the EOS or  space delivery by the Space Tug o r  Space Shuttle. 
Other remedial concepts examined included (1) bail-out-and-reenter devices 
(from both low ear th  orbit and geosynchronous earth orbit), (2) expandable 
structure versions of the bail-out-and-wait device (XBOW), (3)  emergency 
life support systems for "onboard" installation, and (4) a portable emergency 
life support system to be carr ied on board a rescue vehicle for later transfer 
to a distressed vehicle. Table K-15 summarizes the range of investigation of 
each remedial system, in t e r m s  of man-days capacity, and the corresponding 
range of remedial system weights. 
Gross cost estimates occurring as a result of the development, procurement, 
and/or implementation of certain basic IP hardware elements and selected 
specific remedial concepts were also estimated to a level consistent with the 
concept definition. 
Cost increments to  provide modifications to  projected IP hardware fall 
between $25 million and $200 million, depending upon the specific concept 
and the extent of changes and special equipment added. 
Bail-out-and-wait devices based on utilization of the TCM outer shell were 
estimated to incur development costs (exclusive of TCM outer shell) of 
$25 million to $200 million, for a life support duration range from 24 man- 
days to 336 man-days, when developed in parallel  with the space tug TCM 
development. Similarly, a rescue vehicle (SRV), developed concurrently 
with and based on modifications to the EOS crew/cargo module (MCCM) was 
estimated to require an additional $1 90 million in non-recurring costs. 
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ist ics of Space Escape Systems, SAMSO TR-67-7 (November 1967). 
:: * 
Not available for distribution outside Aerospace Corporation. 
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Table K-2. Crew/Cargo Module (CCM) Weight Synthesis 
(lb) (12 man Capacity, 2-day Mission 
Duration) 
l s L  Subsystems 
Structure 
Crew Compartment 
Cargo Compartment 
Crew Systems 
Crew 
P r ovi s ions 
EC/LS 
EPS 
Fuel Cells 
Batteries 
Communi cat ions 
Instrumentation 
Cont r ol  s 
Mis c. Equipment 
Expendables (Solid) 
Contingency 
RCS 
RCS Propellants 
EPS 02/H2 Consumables 
Total 
No Onboard Self- 
Propulsion Propelled 
5200 
2600 
26 00 
2900 
2400 
500 
621 
680 
550 
130 
327 
'1 88 
190 
80 
140 
1020 
- 
- 
100 
11325 
5200 
2900 
621 
680 
3 27 
188 
i 90 
80 
140 
1020 
550 
2200 
100 
14075 
K- 17 
Table K-3. S R V  Emergency Life Support System* 
(14 men, 48-hr Capacity) 
Subsystem 1 Weight, lb 
Portable EC/LS Unit 
Potassium Superoxide 
Fan and Motor 
Filters, Valves, Ducting 
Heat Exchanger / Sublimat o r 
Cooling Water and Tankage 
Battery Power Supply 
Miscellaneous 
Emergency Provisions 
Food 
Water 
Total 
525 
21 0 
15 
31 
50 
160 
50 
9 
96 
24 
72 
621 
* 
Portable system carried on board SRV. 
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JI 
Table K-10. Space Rescue Vehicle (SRV) Weight Summary-’ (lb) 
Size 
Sub systems 
Structure 
Fwd. Crew Compartment 
Aft. Aid Compartment 
Crew Systems 
Crew 
Other 
EC/LS 
EPS (Fuel Cells, Batteries) 
Communications 
Instrumentation 
Controls 
Misc. Equipment 
Expendables (Solid) 
Contingency 
RCS 
RCS Propellants 
EPS 02/H2 Consumables 
Totals 
12-man 
14 days 
26 00 
3400 
- 
1650 
6000 
1650 
31 90 
680 
327 
188 
1 90 
80 
140 
1375 
550 
2200 
700 
17270 
12-man 
28 days 
- 
1800 
6000 
1800 
6381 
680 
327 
188 
190 
80 
140 
1580 
550 
2200 
1400 
21516 
.I. -8- 
Less  any crew and special rescue equipment on board rescue 
vehicle. 
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' i  
/ 
Space Tug Manipulator Kit  
Space Tug Crew Module (TCM) 
Basic (3 men, 28 days) 
Space Shuttle CrewjCargo 
Module (CCM) (12 men, 2days) 
Table K-12. Projected IP Element Costs (millions of 1970 dollars) 
RDT&E Unit Cost 
First Average 
Unit Unit 
Mfg . Total" 
(Recurring) (Recurring) 
(N onr e c ) 
- .- 
90 5 6 
457 24. 5 28. 2 
394 
439 
Non - Propelled 
S e I f -  P r ope lled 
18.7 21.5 
20.2 23. 2 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit 
Back Pack 
Platform 
Enclosed 
Remote Control 
I I Space Suit 
25 1.0 1.2 
50 2. 0 2 .4  
175 9. 0 10.3 
120 6.0 7.0 
Soft 
Hard 
40 
50 
1.0 I. 2 
2.0 2 .4  
K - 2 7  
Table K-13. Special Rescue Equipment Costs (millions of 1970 dollars) 
Portable EC/LS System 
Transfer Equipment 
Transfer Capsule 
Portable Air Lock 
Portable Docking Fixture 
Soft Dock 
Space Rescue Vehicle 
Modified CCM (MCCM) 
Bail-Out- and- W a i t  Devices 
Rigid 12-man, 2-day (RBOW I) 
Rigid 12-man, 28-day (RBOW 11) 
Rigid 3-man, 28-day (RBOW 111) 
Modified Crew Module/BOR Device 
Basic Module (MTCM) 
Propulsion Module (PM) 
LEO BOR Device (XM 11) 
Emergency EC/LS Packages 
3-man, 14-day 
3-man, 28-day 
6-man, 14-day 
6-man, 28-day 
12-man, 14-day 
1 2-man, 28-day 
4. -. 
Includes manufacturing costs, spares ,  engineering, tooling support, and 
program management costs. 
K-28  
Table K- 14. Special Rescue Equipment Development 
Costs -- Paral le l  Development 
(millions of 1970 dollars) 
Space Rescue Vehicle 
Modified CCM (MCCM) 
Bail-Out-and- Wait Devices 
RBOW I (12-rnan, 2 days) 
RBOW I1 (12-rnan, 28 days) 
I RBOW I11 (3-man, 28 days) 
190 
25 
20 0 
80 
'! , 
K-29 
Table K- 15. Remedial Systems Weight Summary 
Type of System 
Portable Emergency Life 
Support S y stem 
Emergency Life Support 
System s (Installed 
On Board) 
Bail- Out - and- W a i t  
(Expandable- XBOW) 
Bail- Out - and- W a i t  
(Rigid - RBOW) 
Bail - Out - and - Re - enter , 
LEO Expandable 
Bail- Out - and- Re - enter , 
LEO Rigid 
Bail- Out - and- Re- enter, 
GEO Rigid 
Bail- Out - and- Return 
(to Space Haven) 
Space Rescue Vehicle 
(modified CCM) 
Weight Range, lb 
(Less Crew) Capacity Range 
14-man, 2 days 
3-man, 14 days to 
12-man, 28 days 
620 
1,300 - 7,000 
3-man, 2 days to 
12-man, 28 days 
3-man, 2 days to 
12-man, 28 days 
2 to 3 men 
3 to 15 men 
3 to 15 men 
3-man, 2 days to 
12!-man, 7 days 
12-man, 14 days to 
12-man, 28 days 
1,200 - 7,600 
3,000 - 9,000 
1,300 - 1,700 
2,700 - 9,500 
6,600 - 24,000 
5,000 - 11, ooo* 
17, 000 - 22, OOO"* 
J. e,. 
Does not include propulsion module weight 
Does not include weight of any special rescue equipment 
:: :: 
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Figure K - 3 .  Weight Summary for  Bailout-and-Return Devices 
(24-36 hr EC/LS Duration) 
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3. 
2. 
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1. 
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AV x 1000 f t /sec 
Figure K-4. Propulsion Module Weight Summary 
(AV from 0-10,000 ft /sec) 
K-  3 4  
14 
AVx 1000 ft/sec 
Figure K-5. Propulsion Module Weight Summary 
(AV 2 10,000 ft/sec) 
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AL 
AMU 
BOD 
BOR 
BOW 
CCM 
CM 
CONUS 
cw 
DV 
EC/ LS 
EO1 
EOS 
EOSS 
EPS 
ETR 
EVA 
FLSC 
GEO 
GEOSS 
HT 
HTI 
APPENDIX L 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
airlock 
Astronaut Maneuvering Unit 
Bail-out Device (BOW o r  stranded BOR) 
Bail-out and Return device 
Bail-out and Wai t  device 
Crew/Cargo Module 
Command Module (Apollo) 
continental United States 
continuous wire (heat sensing devices) 
Distressed Vehicle 
Environmental Control and Life Support system 
ear th  orbit injection 
Earth Orbiting Shuttle vehicle 
Earth Orbiting Space Station 
electric power system 
Air Force Eastern Test Range, Patrick AFB, Fla. 
extravehicular activity 
flexible linear shaped charge 
geosynchronous orbit 
Geosynchronous Orbit Space Station 
Hohmann Transfer (minimum energy transfer) 
Hohmann Transfer injection 
7 
L- 1 
IP 
IR 
IVA 
LEO 
LEO1 
LEOSS 
LO 
LO1 
LS 
LSB 
LWIR 
MAP 
MCCM 
MEM 
MMV 
MTCM 
NERVA 
OLS 
OPD 
PAL 
PAP 
P L  
PLSS 
PM 
Integrated Program (NASA Space operations proposed for the 
post- 1980 period) 
infrared 
intr avehicular activity 
low ear th  orbit 
low earth orbit injection 
Low Earth Orbit Space Station 
lunar orbit 
lunar orbit injection 
lunar surface 
Lunar Surface Base 
Long-Wave Infrared Detection and Acquisition System 
Modified Apollo Command Module 
Modified Crew/Cargo Module of the EOS 
Mars Excursion Module 
Manned Mars Vehicle 
Modified Tug Crew Module (Space Tug) 
nuclear engine for rocket vehicle application 
Orbiting Lunar Station 
Orbiting Propellant Depot 
portable air lock 
Prepositioned Aid Package 
payload 
Portable Life Support System 
Propulsion Module 
L- 2 
RBOR 
RBOW 
RCS 
RDF 
RF 
RDT &E 
RM 
RMU 
ROM 
RS 
SB 
sc 
SERD 
SRCC 
SRV 
ss 
TCM 
TEI 
T LI 
TM 
URM 
uv 
AV 
WTR 
Rigid Bail-out and Return Device 
Rigid Bail-out and Wai t  device 
reaction control system 
radio direction finder 
radio frequency 
research, development, tes t ,  and evaluation 
Remedial Means 
Remotely Operated Manipulator Unit 
rough order of magnitude 
Remedial System 
Space Base 
Spacecraft 
Small Earth Reentry Device 
Space Rescue Control Center (on the g r  
Space Rescue Vehicle 
Space Station 
und o r  in rbit) 
Crew Module associated with Space Tug 
trans -earth injection 
trans- lunar injection 
Transfer Module 
Unmanned Re s cue Vehicle 
ult r aviole t 
vehicle velocity increment required for a specific 
mission maneuver 
Air Force Western Test Range, Vandenberg AFB, Calif. 
L- 3 
XBOW 
XM 
YAG 
Expandable Bail-out- and- Wai t  device 
Expandable Reentry Module 
yttrium aluminum garnet (radiation detection 
element mate rial) 
L-4 

